Volume LXXXIX No. 6 November 8, 1968 75 cents

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HOLY SPIRIT

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CORRESPONDENCE

Whose Church Is It?

Bratenahl, Ohio

To the Editors: Häring's article [Sept. 6] upset me. I'm glad he wrote what he did and I'm glad that he is still in the Church. But as one who finds himself slipping away more and more from so much irrelevancy, I consider the pompous curia parading like peacocks while the world founders as antithetical to everything that Christ stood for.

Where is the Church? Internal squabbles about outmoded tradition and "monita" are preposterous while the world is succumbing to the weight of war, human rights, and poverty.

Those who are harassing Häring and other men of conscience have always offered the simple solution. "If you don't like it, get out." What's wrong with this argument is that it assumes that the Church is theirs. They have to be wrong.

I can hardly believe that the kindly, compassionate, and universal Christ could have intended that the leaders in Rome, Washington, or Los Angeles should inherit the Church. In fact, I would wager that He'd throw up at their collective banality, bigotry, and cutright crucifixion of so many.

God isn't dead; neither is the Church. How long must we wait and how many broken and dejected followers must wander off before the Church awakens.

T. JOSEPH SHEEHAN

Thought Gap?

Bridgman, Mich.

To the Editors: . . . . One might have expected that when "a number of leading Catholics" were asked to comment on the "Authority Crisis" within the Church, that some of them might have written about the problems of faith, or hope, or love which both leading and non-leading Catholics are experiencing today. Nor would some careful examination of the role of the Holy Spirit seem to have been wholly out of order. None of the nine

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COMMONWEAL A Weekly Review of Public Affairs, Literature and the Arts. Second-class postage paid in Philadelphia, Pa. Printed in the USA and published weekly, except biweekly Christmas-New Year's and July-September, by Commonweal Publishing Co, 232 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 MUrray Hill 3-2042. *Copyright © 1968 Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc.* *US and Canada, $10 a year. Foreign $12. Single copies 35¢.*

HOLY SPIRIT

The idea behind the *Commonweal Papers* is simplicity itself. Almost of necessity, the editors of and contributors to a weekly journal are concerned with the immediate. Week in and week out, we tend to deal with issues of pressing concern; larger issues are left aside. It was for this reason that the *Commonweal Papers* were first conceived. By giving our writers extra space, the *Papers* permit a more intense scrutiny than is possible in normal week-by-week journalism. And by supplying a book-length treatment of a serious topic, they provide our readers with ample material for thought above and beyond the day's headlines.

As the years go by, we do not doubt that we will occasionally have trouble hitting on suitable subjects for these out-size issues. So far, however, we have not had that problem. The first of the *Papers* was devoted to the subject of God, a large enough topic, surely, and one that was chosen because it is the most central problem in the Church and yet, oddly enough, one that is little explored in a serious yet readable way.

Papers #1, then, represented an attempt to come to grips with the existence and nature of God, and with men's efforts to come to some understanding of what God asks of men. That done, the next choice seemed to be rather obvious: Jesus. Indeed, in few other areas has the gap between the professional theologian and the general public been so great as in Christology. And so the subject of *Commonweal Papers* #2 was Jesus.

Now, with what we think is logic, we present *Commonweal Papers #3: Holy Spirit*. If God and Jesus needed exploration, how much more this subject? If the average Christian were asked to explain exactly what he believed about the third person of the Blessed Trinity, how many of us would give full or persuasive answers? The questions, we believe, almost answer themselves, and it is for this reason that we think *Commonweal Papers #3: Holy Spirit* is so important. We commend it to the attention of our readers.

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

The [early] Christian Community finds itself producing the life of Jesus by the power of the Spirit. It is then, perhaps, in the actual experience of this, that they begin to realize that the Holy Spirit is a distinct person and has come as another Paraclete.

HOLY SPIRIT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

J. MASSINGBERD FORD

The theology of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament presents several problems, three of which are as follows. Firstly, in the synoptic Gospels there are comparatively few references to the Holy Spirit, and Jesus' own teaching is confined to seven sayings, some of which New Testament scholars regard as interpolations by the early Church. Secondly, the Spirit is sometimes used "impersonally" and sometimes "personally." Thirdly, there are two extremely enigmatic sayings concerning the Holy Spirit: St. John says that the Spirit "was not yet" because Jesus was not yet glorified (John 7:39); the disciples at Ephesus declare that they "have never even heard that there is a Holy Spirit" (Acts 19:2).

Why do the synoptic Gospels speak so little about the Holy Spirit? The answer may lie in the problem of Christology itself, especially as regards the Divine Sonship of Jesus.

In recent times our picture of Judaism in the first centuries A.D. and B.C. has been changed considerably. Instead of a certain uniformity of belief and practice scholars have found an increasing diversity. It is within this setting that we must place the formulation of both New Testament Christology and Pneumatology. With few exceptions (such as the Elephantine community of Jews in Egypt, for example), the Jewish people contemporary with Jesus held resolutely to a monotheistic belief, but beyond this there were lively discussions concerning the transcendency and immanence of God. Some schools of thought sought to avoid any suspicion of anthropomorphism or tangible mystical experiences. They were, if you will, the rationalists of the day, who sought to make the biblical text more acceptable to "modern man" by "demythologizing" and allegorization. On the opposite side stood those who admitted certain and varying degrees of anthropomorphism and accepted wholeheartedly the intervention of Providence in human affairs: some of these thinkers believed they experienced the sensible presence of God in various modes. Some accepted many writings, especially of a mystical nature, which later were precluded from the canon; they were inclined to read certain biblical texts almost literally. One pertinent example is the dispute between the schools concerning Exodus 15:3: "The Lord is a man of War, the Lord is his name." All could say that God is not a man but some could aver "that God reveals Himself as man for the sanctification of Israel." In the same strain it was reported that God appeared as an old man in the Temple when Simeon the High Priest was offering sacrifice.

It was those who believed so fervently in the immanence of God in this world, and expected him to take an interest in the smallest detail of human life, who went to such lengths in their beliefs. Essentially it was a belief in the presence and activity of Yahweh under various guises and in different forms.

Therefore, when we turn to the question of Christology and Pneumatology we must first ask about the Jewish beliefs in the presence of Yahweh. The theology of the Spirit is only one section of this. The presence of Yahweh in biblical and extra-biblical works is expressed under some of the following titles:

The Word: There are two main Semitic words for this, *Dibbur* and *Memra*. *Dibbur* usually denotes the spoken word, while *Memra* seems to have been a more concrete hypostasis of the Deity and to have something of a personality. So, for example, the *Memra* of God walks in the

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garden of Eden, closes the door of the Ark; conducts himself as a support for Abraham and Moses, and, in a text known to Roman Catholics from the Christmas Mass, smites the first-born in Egypt:

"For while gentle silence enveloped all things,
and night in its swift course was now half gone,
thy all-powerful word leaped from heaven, from the royal throne,
into the midst of the land that was doomed,
a stern warrior carrying the sharp sword of thy authentic command,
and stood and filled all things with death,
and touched heaven while standing on the earth."
(Wisdom 18: 15-17)*

Although many Jewish readers might accept this type of text as mere metaphor, others concurred with the possibility of such an apparition of the deity. The paraphrases of the Hebrew lessons recited in the synagogue taught the congregation that the *Memra* had delivered them from Egypt, accompanied them on their travel to the promised land and been "God with them" throughout life, but they also looked forward to a second redemption wrought by the Word. Thus, when the people listened to Deuteronomy they would hear "When the Word of the Lord shall reveal himself to redeem his people, he will say to all the nations: Behold, now that I am he who am, and was, and will be, . . . I, in my Word, kill and make alive . . ."

That is, they learnt that the *Memra* would have a central role in salvation history.

Wisdom: Closely associated with the *Memra* with its "personal" aspects was the concept of Wisdom conceived as "created" before the world, the "firstborn" who had a part in creation and delighted to be with the children of men (Proverbs 8:22). It is not sufficient to see Wisdom merely from the primocanonical books; for example, one can see from Wisdom of Solomon that the personification of Wisdom is very close in function and character to the *Memra*. In Wisdom 10:1 - 12:27 the historical illustrations of the power of Wisdom bear close affinity to those of the Word in the *targum* (i.e. the Aramaic free translation of the Hebrew Bible).

The Shekinah and the Glory: Akin to the manifestations of Yahweh expressed by Spirit, *Memra* and Wisdom are the concepts of *Shekinah* and Glory. Whereas these, to all intents and purposes, were the invisible or intangible activity of Yahweh, the *Shekinah* and the Glory were often the visible, well-nigh palpable aspect of Yahweh in the world; both were usually a sign of his favor. *Shekinah* is not a biblical word but is frequent in the *targumim* and very frequently is interchangeable with "Holy Spirit." It derives from a Semitic root meaning to dwell and can mean the royal residence or sovereignty but it is also used of the immanence of God among his people. The *Shekinah* often appears as a light or bright cloud, and her activities are sometimes interchangeable with that of the *Memra*.

"Glory" is difficult to dissociate from *Shekinah*: It is God's splendor, honor and power. In the *targum* one often reads "the glory of the Shekinah of Yahweh"; it is used consistently for the divine and heavenly mode of being and is presented as the object of perception. It is the *Shekinah* and the Glory which lead the Israelites in the desert in the cloud and fiery pillar, are revealed on Mount Sinai to Moses, descend on the Tent of Meeting (Exodus 33:7-11) and fill the Temple (i Kings 8:10-13). Many believed that the *Shekinah* accompanied her people into exile, suffered and wept with them and that they would bask in her Glory in the world to come; that is, they would be before the throne of Glory.

The concepts of the throne of Yahweh and His Glory are brought to a climax in Isaiah 6 and in Ezekiel and Daniel:

Ezekiel 1:26-28
And above the firmament over their heads there was the likeness of a throne, in appearance like sapphire; and seated above the likeness of a throne was a likeness as it were of a human form. And upward from what had the appearance of his loins I saw as it were gleaming bronze, like the appearance of fire enclosed round about; and downward from what had the appearance of his loins I saw as it were the appearance of fire, and there was brightness round about him. Like the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud on the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about.

Ezekiel 8:2-4
Then I beheld, and, lo, a form that had the appearance of a man; below what appeared to be his loins it was fire, and above his loins it was like the appearance of brightness, like gleaming bronze. He put forth the form of a hand, and took me by a lock of my head; and the Spirit lifted me up between earth and heaven, and brought me in visions of God to Jerusalem, to the entrance of the gateway of the inner court that faces north, where was the seat of the image of jealousy, which provokes to jealousy. And behold, the glory of the God of Israel was there, like the vision that I saw in the plain.

Daniel 7:9-10,13-14
As I looked, thrones were placed and one that was ancient of days took his seat; his raiment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like pure wool; his throne was fiery flames, its wheels were burning fire. A stream of fire issued and came forth from before him; a thousand thousands served him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him; the court sat in judgment, and the books were opened.
I saw in the night visions, and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a son of man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before him. And to him was given dominion and glory and kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed.

* All biblical quotations are taken from the Revised Standard Version.

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These texts show once again the idea of God appearing as if in human form. A persuasive, yet somewhat neglected, argument has been presented by Père André Feuillet (in *Revue Biblique*—60, 1953, pp 170-202, and 321-346). He recalls the influence of Ezekiel on the book of Daniel in general and suggests also that Ezekiel has influenced the idea of the Son of Man. Both Ezekiel and Isaiah see the glory of Yahweh, i.e. *"des manifestations de la transcendence divine dans la nature et dans l'histoire."* For Ezekiel the glory of God, is, as it were, materialized. Not only can the seer localize the divine glory, he describes it ". . . *'C' est comme une figure d' homme'."* The upper part of the body is like gleaming bronze, the rest like brightness and the rainbow (cf Ezek. 8:2). The phrase "like a figure of a man" is used to describe angels, but if one relates the background of Ezekiel to the mysterious figure of the Son of Man in Daniel it appears to be *"une sorte de manifestation visible de Dieu invisible."* Feuillet concludes that, taking into consideration this and other data, one may suggest that the Son of Man in Daniel belongs to the category of the divine and is like *"une sorte d' incarnation de la gloire divine, au même titre que la silhouette humaine contemplée par Ezechiél* (1:26)." To him is given glory and dominion.

This, therefore, is the acme of the presence, activity and visibility of the "Spirit" or presence of Yahweh. It is



this type of Jewish Pneumatology which may have prepared the way for the incarnation of Christ. It is in this context, too, in which we may understand Baruch 3:35-37 concerning wisdom:

> "This is our God;
> no other can be compared to him!
> He found the whole way to knowledge,
> and gave her to Jacob his servant
> and to Israel whom he loved.
> *Afterward she [Wisdom] appeared upon earth*
> *and lived among men."*

Most scholars could accept this as Christian, yet the quotation is no more difficult to accept than the statements about "seeing" the *Shekinah,* or Glory of God, or "seeing" God as an old man in the Temple. The least that one may assert is that the Jews as a whole did not overemphasize the transcendence of God but some, indeed, stressed the immanence, and these may well have been more ready to accept the Incarnate God. We must not forget that very many Jews did accept Jesus. Sometimes one is apt to think that all rejected him and only the Gentiles accepted him!

Jesus as the Shekinah of Yahweh Incarnate

Let us turn now to the New Testament to see whether some of the passages may suggest that 1) Jesus was considered the Incarnate Word, *Shekinah,* Glory, Presence, Wisdom or Spirit of God and 2) whether Jesus fulfilled in a new way the signs and wonders manifested by these aspects of the "spirit" of Yahweh for the Chosen People.

The Infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke show this fairly clearly. In Matthew the "Genesis" of Jesus is as follows: Mary conceives from (the) Holy Spirit (literally, in the Semitic language, of the Spirit of the Holiness); how else could a Jewish writer express "Emmanuel" (God with us,) i.e., the immanence of God with His people? In Luke this is even clearer. As René Laurentin and others have shown so aptly, for Mary's conception of Jesus, St. Luke uses the verb for the Spirit overshadowing the desert Tabernacle and, once again, there is a hint back to Genesis. Moreover, the influence of Daniel is felt, especially Daniel 9:17: "Now therefore, O our God, hear the prayer of thy servant, and his supplications, and cause thy face to shine upon thy sanctuary that is desolate, for the Lord's sake."

The purpose of the Old Testament allusions is obvious, The presence of Yahweh to his people, the Daughter of Sion, is fulfilled when Jesus dwells within the womb of Mary, who has become the personification of the people of God in a concrete way. The parallel between Mary and Jesus and the *Shekinah* and Ark is continued in Luke 1:39-44, 56 because just as David moved the Ark, which symbolized the presence of Yahweh, allowed it to remain at Obededom for three months and danced before it at Jerusalem, so Mary stays with Elizabeth for three months, John leaps before her, and finally she goes to Jerusalem.

However, the clearest "*Shekinah* Infancy Narrative" is St. John's Prologue. It is a hymn celebrating the Word (*Memra*) and/or *Shekinah* become flesh. Here the concepts of "Word," "Dwelling" and "Glory" are closely associated, as C. F. Burney saw some years ago. The word "dwell" suggests the Jewish doctrine of the *Shekinah* "or visible *dwelling* of Yahweh among His people, typified by the pillar of cloud standing above the Tent of Meeting, as subsequently in Solomon's Temple." (C. F. Burney, *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel.* Oxford 1922, p. 35) The phrase "we beheld his Glory" is "a clear reference to a second term in the *Targums* to describe God's Self-manifestation to mankind, the Glory of the Lord. The *Targums* employ *Yehara* (Fear), like *Shekinta,* in paraphrasing passages which, as they stand in the

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Hebrew might be taken to describe the appearance of God in bodily form" (p. 36) Burney refers to the hypostatization of the Word in Ps. 107:20, Ps. 33:6. He concludes, "This is evidence that, so far from his owing his logos-doctrine to an Alexandrine source, he is soaked through and through with Palestinian Jewish thought which is represented by the *Targums*. Nor would the teaching of the Prologue need time for its development. Any disciple of our Lord who had heard the Targumic rendering of the O.T. in the synagogue, and who was capable of recognizing a superhuman power shining through the Master's Personality in His mighty acts, of detecting the Divine voice in His teaching, and at length of apprehending that in His Presence on earth God had come to dwell among men, could hardly fail to draw the inference that here was the grand fulfillment of O.T. conceptions so familiar to him through the Aramaic paraphrase" (p. 39).

Thus in all the evangelists' Infancy Narratives, Jesus is shown to be the Incarnation of the Spirit or presence of Yahweh but not the Father himself. The mystical or anthropomorphic ideas became historic.

Yahweh and Jesus

Now we should take a glance at a few examples of the correlation between the characteristics and functions of these manifestations of Yahweh and the symbolic actions and historical events which occurred in Jesus' life. We shall confine ourselves to parallels with the phenomenon known as the *Gilluy Shekinah*. This means a special revelation of *Shekinah* usually in a concrete mode and often on a definite occasion. The word *"Shekinah"* need not necessarily occur in the text but the revelation is of God himself.

The Baptism of Jesus: A *Gilluy Shekinah* was supposed to have occurred at the crossing of the Red Sea. One citation reads: [He revealed Himself in . . . two opposite ways] "so as not to give the excuse to the Nations of the World to say that there are two Powers . . . He was in Egypt, He was at the (Red) Sea; He was in the past, He will be in the future . . .; He is in this world, He will be in the World to Come." (Max Kadushin, *The Rabbinic Mind,* Blaisdell, 1965, p. 230.)

However, Professor W. D. Davies, in *The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge, 1964), has demonstrated a more illustrative background. He cites several ancient Jewish texts which show the tradition that Yahweh Himself was revealed crossing the Red Sea:

". . . when the Holy One . . . revealed Himself at the sea, no one had to ask: 'Which one is the king?' But as soon as they saw Him they recognized Him, and they all opened their mouths and said: 'This is my God and I will glorify Him." In short, God himself was seen at work *at* the crossing of the sea.' Professor Davies also calls attention to the fact that in the *Mekilta* (Commentary) on Exodus 14:13:

"The Holy Spirit . . . then rested upon them [the Israelites] presumably to give them confidence in the presence and power of God. At the same moment, Israel is compared to a dove . . . also, although the express phrase 'the heavens were opened' is not used, this is what is implied to have happened, because squadrons of the heavenly hosts appear to the Israelites' sight, that is, they are granted a vision in which God reveals his power to save."

Against this background we may suggest that the people saw in the baptism of Jesus a parallel to the revelation of Yahweh at the Red Sea. This also appears to have been the background to Jesus' walking on the sea, (Matthew 14:28 ff. and parallels). Compare

"Thus says the Lord,
who makes a way in the sea,
a path in the mighty waters . . ." (Isaiah 63:16-20).

We might say, therefore, that a *gilluy Shekinah* occurred at the river Jordan.

The Manna and the Multiplications of loaves: The relationship between the "Spirit of Yahweh" and heavenly food and the light it sheds upon Jesus' actions is seen most clearly in John 6. The first part of this discourse reflects the banquet proffered by wisdom in Proverbs 8 and 9 and is, therefore, a wisdom motif possibly illustrating that "Man does not live by bread alone" (cf. Jesus' temptation); but the second part turns to the manna which was provided in the wilderness. In some circles there was a Jewish tradition that the manna was the *ziv* (radiance) of the *Shekinah* which was endowed with physical properties; this was the nourishment of Israelites in the desert, of Moses on Sinai, of the angels and of the first in the world to come. In John 6, therefore, the person of Jesus probably is associated with the concepts of Wisdom and *Shekinah* and he says that he will be the sustenance of those who eat his body and blood. In baptism Jesus repeats the event of the Red Sea, in John 6 the event of the manna in the desert.

The Transfiguration: This is a climax in the earthly life of Jesus as regards the *Shekinah* motif and in one way it is a corollary to the Lucan birth narratives. Jesus is transfigured in terms not unlike the visions of Ezekiel, Daniel and the Apocalypse and a *bath qol* (a voice from heaven which often occurs when a decision has been reached) identifies him as the Son of God. However, the account which harmonizes most completely with the Jewish concept of the *gilluy Shekinah* is found in 2 Peter 1: 16-19:

"For we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. [Note that "majesty" is predicated of Christ.] For when he received honor and glory from God the Father and the voice was borne to him by the Majestic Glory, 'This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased,' we heard this voice borne from heaven, for we were with him on the holy mountain. And we have the prophetic

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word made more sure. You will do well to pay attention to this as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts."

Here we have the very term "Majestic Glory" which denotes the presence of the *Shekinah,* but Jesus is clearly seen as "Son." Further, we are taken back, not so much to the Feast of Tabernacles but to Mount Sinai (the Jewish Feast of Pentecost) where the giving of the Law and the bestowal of prophecy are given.

Thus far, we have attempted to see the New Testament writers' feeling toward an expression of their concept of Jesus of Nazareth. For them, through the human nature of Jesus, shone the glory of the *Shekinah* which had returned in the fullness of its power to the earth. The point reached eventually is perhaps a binitarian view of the



deity. The later sections of the New Testament and the early patristic works were to develop more precisely and definitively the trinitarian concept which is hinted in the New Testament. But perhaps the absence of many references to the Holy Spirit in the synoptic Gospels and the oscillation between the character and functions of the Spirit and those of Christ in the Pauline epistles may be explained by the fact that at first Jesus was almost identified with the "Spirit" of Yahweh. This may also account for the impersonal references to the Spirit.

The declaration of Jesus as the Son of God by a *bath qol,* by his living relationship with the Father and by his own designation as "Son of Man"* (which I believe to be an euphemism for the Son of God), persuaded Jesus' disciples toward a binitarian view of the deity. After Jesus' resurrection and Ascension he sent his Spirit upon his disciples. It would appear that first of all they thought of this Spirit as the Spirit of Jesus analogous to the Spirit of Yahweh, that is, a manifestation of him, a facet of his risen person but as not a distinct person.

What eventually could have persuaded them that there were three persons in the deity? To answer this we must try first to obtain an understanding of Pentecost. Pentecost appears to have occurred on the Jewish Feast of Weeks, which commemorated the Covenant on Mount Sinai and the Giving of the *Torah;* it was also the birthday of the Jewish nation. Apparently there were current Jewish beliefs that the *Shekinah* had her original home among men but that She had gradually withdrawn into the upper heavens owing to the increasing sin of mankind. Yet, through the merits of seven righteous men, She gradually returned until by the time of Moses She was prepared to rest upon every individual on Mount Sinai and every individual would have the power to prophesy. This tradition is illustrated by the following text from *Numbers Rabbah* XIII, 2:

" . . .When Adam sinned, the Shechinah withdrew to the first . . . heaven, when Cain sinned to the second . . . the generations of Enoch to the third (*et cetera*) . . . Then six righteous men arose, and they brought the Shechinah back to the earth. For Abraham brought it back to the sixth heaven, Isaac to the fifth . . . Moses finally brought it back from the upper world to the lower world [i.e. the earth]. For indeed the wicked cause the Shechinah to ascend from the earth, while the righteous cause it to dwell on the earth. When exactly did the Shechinah come down upon the earth? On the day when the Sanctuary was set up, as it is said, 'Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord filled the Sanctuary'." (Compare this passage to John 3:13.)*

However, the Israelites committed the sin of the Golden Calf and the Shekinah was obliged to withdraw. Therefore She was destined to rest only upon chosen individuals. Yet many Jews looked to the restoration of the Holy Spirit in the Messianic Age, and they quoted Joel 2: 28-32 to that effect:

"And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions:

"And also upon the servants and upon the handmaids in those days will I pour out my spirit.

"And I will shew wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke.

"The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and the terrible day of the Lord come.

"And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be delivered: for in mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance, as the Lord hath said, and in the remnant whom the Lord shall call."

* The Greek for the title "Son of Man," literally translated is "The Son of the Man," where it is used without reference to Jesus, the Greek translation would read "the son of man."

* This is one tradition. Another tradition is remarked by H. Parzen, in "The Ruah Hakodesh in Tannaitic Literature," *Jewish Quarterly Review,* n.s. 20 (1929-30) pp. 51-76. The following quotation is from p. 54: "Generally speaking, there were two momentous ages which may be regarded as landmarks in the prevalence of the Ruah Hakodesh (Holy Spirit) in Israel's midst. Up to the time of the 'Ascension' of Elijah, the Rabbis believed, the Ruah Hakodesh was experienced by Israel most frequently. With his 'secretion' a diminution set in which reached its climax with the death of the last three prophets, Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi. With their demise the Ruah Hakodesh also passed away, (note 8 Tosefta, Sotah 12, 5 and 13, 2)." This tradition is interesting in view of the Elijah typology of St. Luke.

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Then they believed the Holy Spirit would rest upon all, Jew and Gentile, slave and free, man and woman. The early Christians believed that this happened at Pentecost after the Ascension of Jesus: this was the promise of the Father (Luke 24:49) for when Jesus had atoned for sin all obstacles to the restoration of the Holy Spirit to the whole community had been removed. St. Luke portrays Pentecost as analogous to the conception of Jesus. The power from on high descended not only upon Mary but upon the whole assembly which she had prefigured. They conceived in a spiritual sense the Spirit of the resurrected Jesus; perhaps they thought they received the second person of the deity rather than the third.

Yet Pentecost also shows affinity to the baptism of Jesus. The gifts received by the Church and the signs and wonders which the Spirit of Jesus performed through them enabled them to go out on a public ministry like Jesus after his Baptism. The whole Church as a body reproduced the ministry of Jesus. This is shown in theory in St. Paul's teaching in 1 Corinthians 12: 4-11:

> Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.
> And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord.
> And there are differences of administrations, but the same God which worketh all in all.
> But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.
> For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit;
> To another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit;
> To another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues: But all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will.

It is shown in practice in the Acts of Apostles. One notes that, except for the gift of "tongues" and "interpretation," all the ministries described in 1 Corinthians 12 were formerly performed by Jesus. He spoke with wisdom (Matt. 13: 54) and brought knowledge; he healed; he performed miracles; he possessed the gifts of prophecy (Mark 14 *passim*) and he was able to discern the spirit of man (John 2:25) and to cast out evil spirits. In the same way, the Spirit of Wisdom, Understanding, Knowledge and Counsel are remarked in the disciples (Acts 4: 13; 16: 10; 20: 22-27 16: 6-10) because Isaiah 11: 2-5 (the Servant's endowment with the Spirit) has been fulfilled in them, too. They performed miracles similar to those of Jesus and preached and were rejected in the same way: they were sustained by the Spirit of Might. Above all they produced in the community a unanimous spirit of joy, peace and love, the fruits of the Spirit (compare Galatians 5: 22-26).

In traditional Judaism, it was the Holy Spirit who enabled men and women to possess these gifts and they were endowed with these not merely for their own sanctification but for the building up of the community. In his informative article Dr. Parzen speaks about the character and functions of the Holy Spirit in Judaism. He summarizes the subjective effects of the Holy Spirit as follows: "To sum up briefly what the Ruah Hakodesh (the Holy Spirit) from the standpoint of effect means . . . It connotes prophecy and wisdom, poetic inspiration, spiritual purity and spiritual exaltation" (p. 75). These were fully realized by Jesus and yet we never hear of his being called as a prophet or inspired by the Holy Spirit: in reality the Holy Spirit does not need to rest upon him because he is the Son of God by nature. But the Church as a whole is endowed by grace with the gifts of the Spirit, which were given only to chosen individuals in the Old Testament. This means that the Holy Spirit is no longer given by measure (John 3: 34) or to a Chosen Race but to all who believe on the Lord Jesus. Further, the Church at her Eucharistic worship represented the same gifts or ministries as illustrated by Parzen. St. Paul describes them in 1 Corinthians 14: 26-33:

> "How is it then, brethren? when ye come together, every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation, hath an interpretation. Let all things be done unto edifying.
> "If any man speak in an unknown tongue, let it be at the most by three, and that by course and let one interpret.
> "But if there be no interpreter, let him keep silence in the church; and let him speak to himself, and to God.
> "Let the prophets speak two or three, and let the other judge.
> "If any thing be revealed to another that sitteth by, let the first hold his peace.
> "For ye may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be comforted.
> "And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.
> "For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace, as in all churches of the saints."

At this worship they share in the resurrected body and blood of Jesus.

So the Christian Community finds itself producing the life of Jesus by the power of the Spirit. It is then, perhaps, in the actual experience of this, that they begin to realize that the Holy Spirit is a distinct person from Jesus and has come as another Paraclete (both Jesus and the Holy Spirit appear to have been called "Paraclete") when Jesus ascended (John 16:7). Hence it may be that the word "given" was added to the Johannine text "the Spirit was not yet" and this also may explain why the disciples at Ephesus apparently had heard of "Jesus" but not of the Holy Spirit. They must have heard of Jesus from John the Baptist.

This essay has suggested that the Pauline epistles (perhaps on the whole our earliest witness to Christian

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thought) vacillated between Christ himself and the Spirit; St. Paul also alternates between an impersonal and a personal use of the Spirit. The synoptic Gospels in some passages see Christ as the incarnation of the *Shekinah*; in other passages there seems to be a distinction. His designation "The Son of The Man" fulfilled the prophecies of Ezekiel and Daniel concerning the "incarnation" of the Glory of Yahweh. St. John gives more information about the Holy Spirit as distinct from Jesus, but, in what are, perhaps, earlier strata of the Gospel material Jesus is seen as the Incarnate *Shekinah*. The Acts of Apostles see the Spirit of the resurrected Jesus descend upon the infant Church but then give some hints that the Spirit is distinct from the Spirit of the risen Jesus. In early patristic works there is the same ambiguity between Jesus as Logos and Wisdom and the Spirit as such; it is only later that separate treatises are devoted to the Holy Spirit.

We need not be disturbed by the slow evolution of Pneumatology, but perhaps the contemporary Western Church should express some regret in having been slower than the Eastern Church to recognize the dynamic activity of the Holy Spirit. The Encyclical of Leo XIII and Pope John XXIII's "New Pentecost" threw the activity of the Holy Spirit into high relief, and the present neo-Pentecostalism and other Spirit-filled movements may (or may not) show us more of his Power. The extraordinary charismata and the almost miraculous unity of understanding, love, peace and joy in the Eucumenical movement today suggest that these signs, like those in the Acts of Apostles, are efficacious, prophetic symbols that in the Holy Spirit Christians may see soon the realization of Jesus' prayer ". . . that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us, so that the world may believe that thou hast sent me" (John 17: 21).



There is reason why the Holy Spirit has suffered from neglect. Of all the divine persons, he is the most difficult to conceive . . . The Spirit resides in an obscure unimaginability which doves and tongues of fire do little to relieve.

HOLY SPIRIT IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT

EDWARD D. O'CONNOR

In the New Testament, the Holy Spirit appears as the dynamic principle of the Christian life. He led Jesus about in his life on earth and, after the Resurrection, was imparted to all the disciples in order to cleanse, renew, vivify, strengthen, illumine, teach and guide them. In modern times, however, for many Christians he has become simply the third person of the Blessed Trinity—a colorless, odorless, tasteless entity with no evident practical *raison d'être*.

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This has not come about simply through a gradual accumulation of oblivion down through the centuries. The truth is that the Holy Spirit went into a sort of eclipse very soon after the apostolic era, and has been emerging from it gradually, and with occasional setbacks, ever since. Our own day is at once the depository of the sediments of neglect that date particularly from the eighteenth century, and the witness to a rediscovery of the Spirit that fulfills a movement that began in the third century.

To trace this history, we must distinguish between two spheres: the manifestation of the Spirit in the Church, and the knowledge of the Spirit by the Church. The ini-

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tial eclipse occurred in both these spheres; but from then on their histories are quite different. The manifestation referred to here consists of the extraordinary charisms such as prophecy, healing, speaking in tongues, discernment of spirits, etc. In the primitive Christian community, as it can be glimpsed through the *Acts of the Apostles* and the Epistles of St. Paul, they occurred with a frequency that astounds modern readers. In the course of the second century, however, they diminished: the gift of tongues seems to have disappeared altogether; prophecy and the power of healing and miracles became the prerogative of rare and exceptional individuals. Charismatic activity never completely disappeared from the Church; every age has had its miracle workers, prophets and inspired preachers. Nevertheless, a definite change seems to have taken place from a regime in which the operation of charisms was normal in each local church, to one in which their appearance is a rare phenomenon that provokes astonishment and even a kind of scandal.



This change does not seem to have evoked any comment from the earliest Christian writers, who were its contemporaries; hence we can be sure that it came about gradually, and that there never had been a time in which all Christians were charismatic in this sense. For the same reason, it is impossible to trace the history of the transition. However, it must have been substantially complete before the end of the second century, when the Montanists laid claim to a new spirit of prophecy, reviving that which had died out in the Church at large.

This relative disappearance of the charisms must be one of the most momentous changes that ever took place in the history of the Church. Traditionally, it has been explained on the grounds that charisms were necessary for the expansion of the Church in primitive times, but are no longer. However, there are critics who charge that the development of hierarchical offices in the sub-apostolic Church choked out the original charismatic leadership, or more simply that the primitive fervor was gradually lost, causing the Spirit to withdraw. In truth, however, each of these explanations is glib and inadequate; all of them need to be reconsidered in the light of a deeper understanding of the role of the charismatic in the Church.

One principle, enunciated by I Cor. 13, and confirmed and clarified by the collective spiritual experience of the Church, is that the chief and essential action of the Spirit in the Church does not lie in the manifest charisms, but in the invisible work of sanctification. The charisms are given in the freedom of the Spirit when and in what measure they are useful. Their presence is not a sure sign of sanctity, and their relative disappearance does not imply a withdrawal of the Paraclete from the Church. In fact, the continual emergence of saints in all eras is a surer sign of his unfailing fecundity than those manifestations of which St. Paul could say, "If I should speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I have become a tinkling brass and a sounding cymbal."

When we turn from the sphere of manifestation to that of knowledge, our history grows more complex. Here, too, there occurred a partial eclipse in the second century.

The early generations of Christians were not able to appreciate the full riches of the apostolic teaching. On the subject of the Holy Spirit, as on many other topics, there is an evident impoverishment when we pass from the New Testament to the apostolic Fathers or the apologists. It is as though the human mind had been quite unable to assimilate all at once the rich nourishment left it by Christ. The Church could take in, as it were, only a few basic ideas at the start; it had to live off them, be formed by them and grounded in them, before it would be able, as there was occasion, to turn to some other point that had meanwhile lain more or less dormant, and begin to draw out its potential.

There is a special reason why the Holy Spirit in particular suffered from neglect. Of all the divine persons, he is the most difficult to conceive. The Son, of course, is the easiest, because of his human flesh. The Father occupies, as it were, the place always attributed to the one God before the revelation of the Trinity; in addition, he has appropriated the name of Father, so rich in meaning associations. But the Spirit resides in an obscure unimaginability which doves and tongues of fire do little to relieve.

It is true that the Spirit has the great advantage of being the one sent by Christ to stay permanently with us, and act in us. Accordingly, the earliest idea of the Spirit, that which Scripture itself gives us, conceives him in function not of his nature, but of his activity. However, this is all the more reason why, when his works ceased to be so manifest, his person became harder to keep in view.

In any case, it seems that the second-century apologists, Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Theophilus and even Clement of Alexandria, all had an inadequate notion of the Holy Spirit. Some scholars go so far as to claim that these writers regarded the Spirit as nothing more than the spiritual presence and action of Christ, although others defend their orthodoxy. But the very fact that such a controversy is possible indicates how vague and indefinite their notion was.

The great question which preoccupied the Church Fathers was how to conceive of the Son of God in a monotheistic religion. The Trinitarian and Christological de-

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bates of the third, fourth and fifth centuries were all aspects of this one problem. The question of the Spirit was dealt with mainly as a corollary. This mentality is evident in the "Apostles" Creed (ca.200) which, after a long clause about the Son, adds only "I believe in the Holy Spirit . . ." for the third person. In fact, the Church was to require many centuries, not only to settle the place of the Son in its doctrine, but also to assimilate him fully into its piety. This task was not completed (if it ever can be completed) until the establishment of devotion to the Sacred Heart beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The question of the Holy Spirit was, however, forced upon the attention of theologians during the fourth century, by the appearance of the *"pneumatomachoi"* who expressly denied his divinity. This was easy enough to do, since the nature of the Spirit is not dealt with directly in Scripture. Hence, paradoxically, it was the nature and person of the Spirit that first became the object of theological discussion and dogmatic definition, if we prescind from the minor, although not insignificant discussions raised by Marcion (d.c. 160). The activity of the Spirit, about which Scripture has much more to say, received relatively less attention from the theologians.

The great point which had to be made was that the Holy Spirit is not just the power of God active in the world, but is a distinct person, equal to and coeternal with, the Father and the Son, even though he proceeds from the Father and is not a Son. Arguing from the activity attributed to the Spirit in Scripture, the great doctors of the fourth century, Athanasius, Basil and Gregory Naziansen, established this doctrine for all future ages. The fruit of their labors is expressed in the "Nicene Creed," which still reflects the dependence of the pneumatological question on the christological: ". . . and in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, who spoke through the prophets."

Whereas the nature of the Spirit and his place in the Trinity thus came to be settled relatively early,* his activity in the sanctification of souls took much longer. In fact, it has not yet received the comprehensive formulation it requires. But down through the ages, different cultures and different epochs have each added their contribution to a pneumatology which is only today beginning to discover its full stature.

The same Greek Fathers who established the divine personality of the Spirit also gathered together the biblical doctrine on his work of restoring and sanctifying fallen human nature. With growing firmness and boldness, they taught that human nature is in a true sense divinized by the presence of the divine spirit. This doctrine attained its greatest richness in Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444), and bore fruit in the mysticism of an unknown writer who published ca. 550 under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. In stressing the personal presence of the uncreated sanctifier, and the analogy between his eternal procession from the Father and Son, and his temporal mission into the souls of men, Greek theology paid greater attention to the activity of the Spirit than did the Latin. The latter, at least until very recent times, has been somewhat neglectful of the personal indwelling and operations of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it has been in Latin theology that these topics have been investigated with the greater precision and detail.

*In the ninth century, a fierce debate arose when the Greek Church objected to the Latin addition *Filioque* to the Nicene Creed. This addition expresses the doctrine received throughout the Latin Church that the Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son. Discussion of this point, which still goes wearily on, has provoked an endess literature all out of proportion to the importance of the matter.

Latin Investigations

This has come about in two overlapping phases. The first, which lasted until about the Reformation, was decidedly Christocentric; the second, which began to get under way in the high Middle Ages, has been progressively more and more "Pneumatocentric."

Augustine (354-430) dominates the first phase, and is in considerable part responsible for the lesser attention paid to the Spirit by Western thought. Even though Augustine himself made important and original contributions to the theology of the Spirit, his speculations on the Trinity and his controversies over grace had the effect of deadening somewhat, at least in the long run, the popular consciousness of the Paraclete.

The earliest theologians of the Trinity had started with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and had labored (against vehement opposition) to demonstrate that the second and third are equal to and coeternal with the first. This approach kept the distinct characteristics of the three persons vividly in sight. Augustine's *De Trinitate* sets the one divine nature in the foreground and then within it distinguishes the three persons. This has great theoretical advantages, but tends to obscure the individuality and distinctness of the persons. When this occurs, the Holy Spirit inevitably loses out most of all because, as we have seen, he is in any case the most difficult of the three for human thought to capture. On the other hand, however, Augustine significantly enriched our concept of the Spirit by his suggestion that, just as the eternal generation of the Son is conceived as analogous with the formation of a word or concept in the human mind, so the eternal emanation of the Spirit can be conceived by analogy with the emanation of love in the human heart.

The distinctiveness of the Holy Spirit was also obscured by the theory of appropriations, which has its roots in the doctrine of Augustine. Tradition had attributed the work of creation to the Father, redemption to the

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Son, and sanctification to the Spirit. But critical reflection led the Latin Church to recognize that in fact all three persons collaborated equally in all their works (with due reserves being made for the special instance of the human activity of Christ). Hence, when a certain work is regarded as proper to one of the persons, this is only because it bears a certain privileged resemblance to him. As this principle became established in the consciousness of the Church, it had unfortunately, and unnecessarily, the effect of causing people to pay less heed to the appropriations, which are biblically founded and render important service in enabling us to identify the divine persons. Once again, it is the Holy Spirit who has suffered most, because he, unlike the Father and Son, is known almost exclusively through the works attributed to him.

As regards these works of the Spirit, Western thought has focused on the effects occurring in man, rather than on the action of the divine person. This is not necessarily a fatal defect; the same thing can be said of the Synoptic Gospels, which are much more concerned with what man must do to enter into the Kingdom than with the gift of the Spirit, about which we get our information mainly from St. John and St. Paul.

This bias of Western thought is no doubt due in large part to the practical, non-mystical bent of the Latin mind, but it seems to have been confirmed by the Pelagian controversy over the need of grace. This is paradoxical, because the doctrine that man can do nothing for his salvation except by the grace of the Holy Spirit was embraced throughout the Western Church, and defined as a dogma by the Council of Orange (529), due mainly to the energetic campaign carried on by Augustine. Nevertheless, the very nature of the controversy tended to direct attention to the human rather than the divine coefficient of the mystery of grace. At a later epoch, the Reformation, Jansenist and Molinist controversies reinforced this concern with created rather than uncreated grace.

On the other hand, this concern led Augustine to enrich the understanding of grace immensely by a distinction of its various kinds and functions. And it is of great importance for the subsequent development of the theology of the Spirit that Augustine explored, as no previous Father had done, the implications of Is.11:2 (on the Spirit of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, etc., which was to rest upon the offspring of David).

Medieval religious thought proceeded in the direction taken by Augustine. Not only the pastoral preaching of bishops, but even the monastic treatises on spirituality, such as Bernard's *Ladder of Humility* (ca. 1124), or Bonaventure's *Mind's Road To God* (1259), dealt chiefly with the practice of virtue by which man prepares for the supreme gift of (infused) contemplation, or the stages of growth by which the soul ascends to it. That the grace of contemplation, and even the virtues themselves, were gifts of the Holy Spirit was clearly recognized; but the anthropological rather than the theological aspect was directly in view. However, the two great hymns, *Veni Creator Spiritus,* and *Veni Sancte Spiritus,* which were composed approximately in the ninth and thirteenth centuries respectively, warn us not to exaggerate the forgetfulness of the Spirit attributed to this period. The first ample treatise on the seven gifts of the Spirit was the work of a twelfth-century theologian, Rupert of Deutz. And while St. Bernard did not make much reference to the Spirit when explaining the stages of spiritual growth, elsewhere, e.g. in his moving description of the Spirit as a divine kiss (Sermon VIII on *The Canticle*), he makes it evident that he knew by personal experience whereof he spoke. There are many similar signs in the saints of this period that the relatively little attention given to the Spirit in their writings was not an index to the neglect of the Spirit in their life. It was merely that their system of ideas was not yet adequately adapted to the mysterious realities of which they spoke.

The Humanity of Jesus

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there arose that devotion to the humanity of Jesus which has made the Christmas crib and the Way of the Cross staples of Catholic religious life ever since. This development merely carried onto the plane of piety the Christocentric character which had taken hold of theology since the third century. Naturally, it strengthened still further the tendency to leave the Holy Spirit in the background, so far as conscious ideas are concerned. But the warm piety which led this epoch to "discover" and hold dear the sacred Humanity could hardly have come from any other source but the Spirit of Jesus. Francis of Assisi (1181-1226), the first person known to history on whose hands, feet and side the stigmata of Christ's passion were imprinted, is the exemplar of this piety. But the body of the saint would hardly have received this miraculous emblem of the passion of Christ, if his soul had not been filled with the Spirit of Christ.

Furthermore, the case of Francis reminds us that it was out of the Christocentric piety of the age that there welled up in the twelfth century the great wave of mysticism which spread across Europe in the thirteenth century, and reached its climax in England and the Rhineland in the fourteenth and fifteenth. Finally, as the flame cooled in the North, it burst out anew in Spain, with the Carmelites Teresa (1515-1582) and John (1542-1591), the greatest expositors of the mystical life.

If ever there have been Christians who "walked by the Spirit," and "lived in the Spirit," it was these privileged men and women, who were brought into an intimate and quasi-substantial contact with the divinity, which transformed and radically spiritualized them, and utterly transcended their efforts, sometimes lyrical, sometimes stammering, to describe it. And yet, for the most part, even the mystics make little express mention of the Holy

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Spirit. This is particularly striking in the case of John of the Cross, despite the fact that on occasion he represents the Holy Spirit as the *Living flame of love* that enflames the soul in perfect union with God. As a theologian, John is perfectly well informed about the workings of the Spirit, and as a mystic he has a rich personal experience of them; nevertheless, in conceptualizing the spiritual life, and even in representing the passivity required of man, he writes in terms of what man undergoes rather than of what the Spirit does. *The Imitation of Christ* (1418) may or may not be classified as mystical, but it is by far the most popular and influential expression of late medieval piety, and it has only two brief and uninspired chapters on the Holy Spirit.

The scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages also perpetuated in their own mode the Augustinian approach to grace. They amplified and systematized the various divisions of grace inherited from Augustine. They created a new and original theory of virtue which fused the biblical doctrine on faith, hope and charity, and the Augustinian doctrine that whatever is good is of grace, with the philosophical traditions on virtue inherited from Greece and Rome. They were far from being Pelagians; in fact, the tendency prevailed among them to hold that every genuine virtue is infused by God (Lombard's *Sentences* I, 27). For a moment they were even tempted to identify charity with the person of the Holy Spirit (*ibid.* I, 17), until

saner reflection led them to distinguish between the divine person who is cause and the created qualities and actions which are his effects in the human soul.

The structural needs of the great theological systems of the thirteenth century required that the uncreated person be treated separately from his created works. For a reader alert to the connection of cause and effect, this did not imply regarding them as separate in reality; but many of the later popularizers were not so alert. As a result, the theology of grace in the late medieval and modern periods tended to grow more oblivious to the Spirit's personal presence and sanctifying action than earlier medieval thought had been; in a way that was more harmful because it was more systematic.

The scholastics had even stressed the bond between the Spirit of God and the sanctification of man in their treatises on the invisible mission of the divine persons and the "Gifts of the Holy Spirit." The latter concept is a creation of medieval reflection on the spiritual life (evoked by Augustine's comments on Is. 11:2) and was brought to perfection by Thomas Aquinas (1224-1272). He was the first to hold that the characteristic of the gifts is to make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, in contrast with virtues which are exercised according to the judgment of man's own reason. Furthermore, he maintained that the inspirations are not an extraordinary supplement to the normal Christian life, but are indispensable for salvation. In taking this position, Thomas goes well beyond his predecessors and brings out into the light of clear, firm declaration a truth that had been latent in the early medieval preoccupation with the seven gifts. In so doing, he took what was perhaps the decisive step toward the rediscovery of the Spirit by the modern Church.

His initiative, however, was not carried forward by the scholastics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who lost touch both with the Word of God and with the life of the Spirit. It was rather the mystical and spiritual life of the faithful that led the theologians of later ages to come back to the one ultimate root of Christian spirituality. But this development was to be retarded several times by the vagaries of false mysticism and the reactions it provoked.

Already in the twelfth century, Joachim of Fiore (c. 1132-1202) had prejudiced this development by proclaiming that the Age of the Son, which had succeeded that of the Father, was in turn soon to be supplanted by an Age of the Spirit.

While the Hospitalers of the Holy Spirit (1198) were devoted to genuine works of Christian charity toward the sick, the amorphous groups known as the "Brethren of the Free Spirit" regarded themselves as freed from the authority of the visible hierarchy by the invisible Spirit who led them.

Martin Luther (1483-1596), in his ambition to supplant scholastic theology with a purely biblical style of thought, did perhaps as much as anyone to bring the Holy Spirit before the religious consciousness of the modern mind. His beautiful lines on how the Spirit opens men's hearts to receive the Word of the Gospel, and inspires those good works that are a sign of the "new creation," would have been welcome in any Catholic spirituality. But Luther exalted the Spirit by radically depreciating the role of the sacraments, the hierarchy and man himself in the work of salvation. As a result, all appeals to the interior work of the Spirit tended to become suspect in Catholic eyes, and the tendency which had set in during the late Middle Ages, to regard the Church as a juridical structure rather than a community of believers, was confirmed. The Spirit's role in guiding the hierarchy was stressed at the expense of his vivifying and illumining activity in all the faithful. Protestantism itself, recoiling from the radical spiritualism of the Anabaptists, soon lost its own atten-

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tion to the Spirit, which would later be recovered sporadically by the Quakers, the Pietists, the Camisards, the Moravian brethren and the Wesleys. Some of these movements may in turn have influenced the Catholic revival in the Romantic period.

Meanwhile, the Thomistic doctrine on the Gifts of the Spirit was being kept alive by a thin stream of scholastic theologians, mainly the great commentators, Cajetan (1469-1534), the Carmelites of Salamanca (1631-1701) and John of St. Thomas (1589-1664). The latter's treatise is a masterpiece. Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471) made this doctrine accessible to a wider public.

But it was the French spiritual writers of the seventeenth century who effectively began to bring about an authentic sensitivity to the Spirit in the Church. The simple, fresh, all-embracing spirituality of Francis de Sales (1567-1622) prepared the way, although still very implicitly. The Jesuit novice master, Louis Lallemant (1588-1635), aimed his spiritual direction very expressly at the goal of docility to the Holy Spirit as the interior master of souls.

De Berulle (1575-1629) and his disciples are chiefly known for their intense and methodical cult of the mysteries of Christ, thus prolonging the piety of the high Middle Ages. They advanced beyond the latter, however, in focusing attention on the interior states of Jesus' soul, rather than stopping at his exterior actions. The attitudes and dispositions of Jesus, in short his spirit, were to be relived by his disciples. It is a short and inevitable step from the "spirit of Jesus" in this sense to the person of the Holy Spirit, who inspired the human life of Jesus and alone can create the "mind of Christ" in His followers. The Berullians made this step consciously, above all Olier (1608-1957), who insists upon the need of following the Holy Spirit in all things in order that Christ might live in us.

Although it made a permanent contribution to the heritage of Christian spirituality, the French school itself was short-lived. An anti-mystical reaction built up alongside of it, led by men such as Pierre Nicole (1625-1695) and Louis Tronson (1622-1700), who adhered to the safer, more human ways of discursive prayer, intense self-examination (Tronson's *Examens particuliers*) and resolute practice of virtue. (It should not be forgotten that even Francis de Sales had for a long while mistrusted the passive prayer into which Jeanne de Chantal was being led.) Then, at the end of the seventeenth century appeared the pseudo-mystic quietism of Molinos in Spain, and of Fénelon and Madame Guyon in France. Their condemnations in 1687 and 1699 respectively achieved the disrepute of mysticism in general, and of the ideal of docility to the leading of the Holy Spirit in particular. Confirming the suspicions already provoked by Lutheranism, it produced that attitude of mistrust of religious experience which has so shackled Catholic spiritual writing of the past two centuries. This attitude tends to regard mystical experience as so exceptional that it hardly need be taken into account in ordinary spiritual direction, reacts instinctively to "consolations" by warning against the danger of illusion and excess, and leads one to expect that he must walk in the darkness of pure faith all his life long, with never a ray of light or taste of divine love until the beatific vision bursts upon him in full splendor.

Such a mentality leaves nothing for the Spirit to do except to bestow an invisible grace that can only be taken on faith. But at the very epoch when this mentality was settling upon the Church, the means to dissipate it were also being disseminated, in the devotions to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and to His holy Mother. Critics often charge that these devotions came to take the place of the cult of the Holy Spirit that was wanting to Catholic piety. There is some truth in this view, for these devotions were a concrete embodiment of and exercise in that warm and simple spirituality which the Spirit of Jesus effects. Thus, in a hidden and indirect way, they prepared minds for a full and explicit appreciation of the doctrine of the Spirit when this would be possible.

The revelations of the Sacred Heart to Sister Margaret Mary (1763-1675) imparted to the Berullian cult of the interior states of Jesus the concreteness and fire necessary



to touch the hearts of the masses. At the same time it disposed one immediately for, and as it were called down from heaven, the manifest and plenary action of the Holy Spirit, who alone can inflame hearts with that knowledge of the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge (Eph. 3:17, 19).

Similarly, the Marian piety which flowered with the French school and came back to life in the nineteenth century, after the Enlightenment had turned to dusk, was in its deepest sense a piety of simple docility to the Spirit, of which the Virgin of Nazareth is the supreme type. St. Louis de Montfort (1673-1716) made this connection expressly. He sees as the goal of Marian devotion being filled with the Spirit of Jesus. The first rule of true devotion is to do all things "through Mary," i.e. to obey her in all things and conduct oneself by her spirit; for "the spirit of Mary is none other than the Spirit of Jesus."

Similarly, the "little way" of Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897) with its appeal to simplicity, humility and brotherly love, which is such a natural prolongation of the

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spirit of Francis de Sales, and anticipation of the spirit of Vatican II, is in effect an appeal to infuse the Spirit of Jesus into the most ordinary activities of life. Without being explicit, it is a kind of training for the Paraclete's plenary intervention.

The explicit appreciation of the Holy Spirit in modern theology has come about largely through three trail-blazing thinkers of the nineteenth century. The first is Adam Moehler (1796-1838), whose research and reflection led him to change from a very juridical and structure-conscious notion of the Church to one which regards it more as the community of those animated by the Spirit of Jesus. In this he anticipated and gave a powerful impetus toward the movement which has led twentieth-century theology to see the Church as the Body of Christ, with the Spirit as its soul, and as the People of God, in whom he dwells as in a temple.

Cardinal Newman (1801-1890), in studying the development of doctrine, became aware of the active role that had been played by the faith of the laity, which he expressed in his famous discourse on the consultation of the faithful in matters of doctrine. The foundation of his stand is the fact that the Holy Spirit illumines not only the hierarchy in their teaching office but all the faithful in their belief.

Finally Matthias Scheeben (1835-1888) was led by the study of Petau (1583-1652) and the Greek Fathers to formulate the theory that the divine indwelling is not merely appropriated to the Holy Spirit, but pertains to him in a proper way, distinct from that of Father and Son. Later scholarship (Gardeil) has challenged the correctness of Scheeben's reading of the Fathers, but his position focused the attention of theologians on the doctrine of the divine indwelling and the work of the Holy Spirit.

Due to the impetus given by these men, as well as to other causes, many currents of contemporary theology and spirituality are conspiring today to highlight the action of the Holy Spirit. Thus, there is a powerful inclination to emphasize that grace entails not only a created quality but the presence of an uncreated Person. The sacraments are being viewed as personal encounters with God (and especially with the Holy Spirit), and not merely as sacred rites which produce that which they signify. Revelation is coming to be regarded as a personal divine communication more than an objective formulation of truth. New theories of inspiration and tradition also raise the question of the Spirit.

The liturgical movement has reminded us that Christ is present through the Spirit in a special way wherever two or three gather in his name; and this same consciousness has inspired the rapid growth of non-liturgical, informal prayer groups led by laymen. The modern biblical movement, at least when linked with piety, has drawn attention to the Spirit's role both in the prophet and in the hearer of the Word of God. The ecumenical movement gets its dynamism from the conviction that the Spirit is present and active in all those communities which believe in Jesus as Lord. Moreover, an almost militant determination to acknowledge the Spirit's action in every form of religion sincerely professed extrapolates this movement even beyond the confines of Christianity. In both theology and spirituality today, there is a powerful yearning to return to "the sources," among which must be numbered the Spirit as he was active among the early Christians. There is a clamor for the hierarchy to lay aside its material trappings in order to be more transparent to the Spirit. The appeal for the laity to recognize and exercise their special charisms is so powerful that this age in the Church is already being called the age of the laity. Never in the past has theology been so acutely conscious of the charismatic dimension of Christianity.

Even modern culture, with its exaltation of freedom, democracy and personal values, is furnishing a climate favorable to the recognition of the presence and work of the Spirit in each individual. Simultaneously, of course, secular humanism tends to turn away from any power in man other than man himself. The false spiritualisms that have proliferated amazingly in the present century are themselves a sign of the times, as counterfeit is of true coin.

The hierarchical magisterium has fostered, and to a large extent led the way in, this rediscovery of the Paraclete. Pope Leo XIII enunciated the traditional Catholic teaching on the Holy Spirit in the encyclical, *Divinum illud munus* (1897). Pius XII encouraged most of the above developments by his encyclicals on the Mystical Body, the liturgy and the study of Scripture. Led by Pope John, the whole Church prayed that the Holy Spirit would renew his wonders in our time, as in a new Pentecost. The second Vatican Council was an extraordinary manifestation of the Spirit's action in the College of Bishops. In its documents, especially those on the Church, the missions, the laity and ecumenism, the Council spoke of the place of the Holy Spirit in the Christian economy with a fullness and vision unprecedented in Church teaching.

Thus, the tone of modern culture, the currents of modern theology, the aspirations of modern spirituality, and even the ravages of fraudulent spiritualism have conspired to focus attention on that "other Paraclete" through whom Christ guides his Church more divinely than the Israelites were led by the pillar of smoke and fire. As Cardinal Suenens declared to the Vatican Council, "The time of the Church is the time of the Spirit." Finally, the reappearance in the past few years of charismatic activity on a scale comparable to that of the primitive Church compels us to ask whether Pope John's prayer for a new Pentecost is not being answered beyond all expectations by the arrival of an age of the Holy Spirit that will not supplant the age of the Son (as Joachim of Fiore imagined), but will consummate it, just as the latter had brought to fulfillment the age of the Father.

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

The Spirit completes the mission of Christ and makes him present in the world in the unity of the one body, as well as in the multiplicity of the 'brothers' who are anointed with him as 'christs' to be also the sons of the heavenly father.

HOLY SPIRIT IN ORTHODOX THEOLOGY AND LIFE

THOMAS HOPKO

The few themes touched upon in this paper are taken from the writings of modern thinkers of the Russian Orthodox tradition. Although being very different types of men, and some not theologians at all in the strict sense of the word, they have shown a remarkable unity in their interpretation of the thought and experience of the Eastern Church concerning the person and action of the Holy Spirit in the life of men.

In his letter, *On the Holy Spirit,* Father Pavel Florensky, the Russian priest, scientist, philosopher and theologian who is believed to have died in a Soviet prison in the '50s, sketches a history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit which is essentially confirmed by his like-minded and much more famous friend, Father Sergius Bulgakov (d. 1944), as well as by the man who was perhaps the greatest contemporary Orthodox theologian of the strictly patristic tradition, Vladimir Lossky (d. 1958). In his letter, Florensky reveals the impossibility of elaborating any precise doctrine of the Holy Spirit comparable to the dogmas of the Holy Trinity and the Person of Christ which have been elucidated in the history of the Church and which carry official commendation in conciliar decrees. What has been said of the Spirit dogmatically has almost exclusively been an extension of the doctrinal assertions about the Logos, with the formally required exchange of "procession" in place of "generation" in relation to the Father as the only significant adaptation. "Since such and such is said about the Son," writes Florensky, "so by the same token we are compelled to say such and such about the Spirit." This is the type of "false window" pneumatology which is found in doctrinal history, the contrived and somewhat artificial method of gaining a "symmetry" in trinitarian theology beyond which there is only silence about the Spirit himself.

The silence concerning the Holy Spirit, however, is considered to be not merely the result of an accidental lack of interest in this particular area because of the more urgent problems concerning the person of the Logos in his eternal and incarnate existence. Nor is it understood to be the result of the absence in the Church of dogmatic theologians capable of rising to the heights of doctrinal articulation concerning the third person of the Godhead such as that of the great church fathers of the trinitarian and christological controversies. On the contrary, the silence concerning the Spirit is understood to be demanded by the Paraclete himself who has remained, and by nature will always remain, hidden as a person in his divinity before the freedom of the human persons in whom he reveals himself in his indwelling; the Spirit who remains himself, as the Church sings on Pentecost, the feast of his coming, always and forever "sovereignly free."

Taxis in Theology

The famous passage of St. Gregory the Theologian in his oration on the Holy Spirit, a passage of great popularity in contemporary Orthodox thinking, is quoted in full by Florensky. This is the place where the church father develops the doctrine of an order (taxis) in theology in which the Trinity is gradually revealed to men "as they can bear it"—the Father in the Old Testament, the Son in the Incarnation, and the Holy Spirit in the Church. Lossky recalls this same text in his *Mystical Theology,* and adds the commentary that as the Father finds the

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"express image of his person in the Son," and as the Son is manifested in the Spirit, the Spirit himself has no divine person in whom his image is expressed, and his manifestation to the world, the confirmation of his divine person and power is accomplished in human persons and always carried, therefore, the "character of a secret."

"The Spirit remains unrevealed, hidden, so to speak," writes Lossky, "by the gift (of his presence) so that the gift which he imparts may be fully ours, adapted to our persons . . . he mysteriously identifies himself with human persons while remaining incommunicable. He substitutes himself, so to speak, for ourselves; for it is he who cries in our hearts, Abba! Father! as St. Paul puts it. We should rather say that the Holy Spirit effaces himself as person before the created persons to whom he appropriates grace. . . . It is then that his divine person, now unknown, not having his image in another (divine) hypostasis, will manifest himself in deified persons: for the multitude of saints will be his image."

These words of Prof. Lossky form the foundation of the Orthodox theology of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church: the multitude of holy men will be his icon.

The Spirit in the Church

In Orthodox theology the Church has one two-fold foundation, Jesus Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit. The accent on the Spirit in the Church depends on and flows from the person of the Incarnate Word who sends his Spirit to his people from God his Father so that they may become corporately his body, and individually members of it. The Spirit completes the mission of Christ and makes him present in the world in the unity of the one body, as well as in the multiplicity of the "brothers" who are anointed with him as "christs" to be also the sons of the heavenly Father: gods by the gracious unction of the Spirit.

Just as the work of Christ would be devoid of power without the "power from on high" in a Pascha without a Pentecost, so would the Way remain unwalkable, the Truth unknowable and the Life unlivable. The Spirit comes to make possible in men all that Christ is by nature by the gracious gift of his presence. This is what St. Maximus means when he says that men are called to be by grace all that Christ is by nature. And what St. Basil means when he announces so boldly that men are "creatures who have received a command to be god."

The two-fold polarity of the Church's dimensions—Word and Spirit, incarnation and inspiration, passover and pentecost, nature and person, body and members, unity and multiplicity, ontological assumption of full humanity by God and personal participation in full divinity by men—all this is made alive in the sacramental mysteries of the Church in the Eastern tradition, especially in the two-fold character of its rite of sacramental initiation into the churchly life.

The originating events of the Church, the New Passover of Christ and the New Pentecost of the Holy Spirit, are ever renewed in the messianic age as the Church is continually fulfilling itself in baptism and chrismation (confirmation), and continually celebrating this new covenant of the new creation in the eucharistic mystery. In baptism the human person is born into the new humanity of Christ by dying and rising with him in the "tomb and womb" of the baptismal waters. In chrismation the human person is personally empowered to live the life of the new humanity with which he is clothed in baptism by the "seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit" who comes as a person to persons to enable each one in his own unique and individual way to "attain to the fulness of Christ." In the eucharist, the multitude of human persons become one body in Christ as the Holy Spirit comes "upon us and upon the gifts here offered" to manifest all things as communion with God through Christ in the Spirit. The sacramental foundation of the Church reveals the essential and existential unity and collaboration of Christ and the Spirit in God's redemption and glorification of the world of his original creation. God creates and redeems through Christ in the Spirit. And the created and redeemed return to God through the same Christ in the same Spirit. For here, rooted in the paschal, pentecostal, all-fulfilling events of the sacramental baptism, chrismation and eucharist, man gains "access to the Father" through Christ in the Spirit, and becomes his dwelling-place, filled with the "fulness of him who fills all in all . . . filled with the fulness of God".

With this fundamentally sacramental vision and experience of human life, the modern Orthodox theologians have continued to defend what was often criticized as an ecclesiological deficiency from the one side, and an anthropological utopianism from the other, in their own particular developments of the well-known sentence of St. Irenaeus of Lyons: "Where the Holy Spirit is, there is the Church; where the Church is, there is the Holy Spirit." This doctrine is understood to be the only logical and theological conclusion of the central Christian affirmation, to quote Irenaeus once more, that "God became what we are to make us what he is"—the introduction of Godmanhood into the world, the fulfillment of God's destiny for the one created in his image.

Father Bulgakov exemplifies this tendency very clearly when he defines the Church as "the blessed life in the Holy Spirit, or the life of the Holy Spirit in humanity" which "exists in us not as an institution or society, but first of all as a spiritual certainty, a special experience, a new life." For this reason, both Bulgakov and Lossky, albeit with quite different emphases and conclusions, are agreed to see in Mary, the Theotokos and Mother of God, the personal icon of the Church, the image of the perfection of life in the Holy Spirit, the bride of God glorified already now through the fulness of the Spirit's

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gracious indwelling; the personal, hypostatic pledge of what is given to all men in the Church who are "blessed" because "they hear the word of God and keep it."

In recent times the accent on the Holy Spirit in the Russian Church tradition, undoubtedly not unconnected from the rigid institutionalism of the church and society in the last century, and the Marxist experience in our own, was exceedingly widespread. The great father of the spiritual renaissance, directly or indirectly, and indeed the one whose life is the perfect living testimony to the life of the Holy Spirit in men, was St. Seraphim of Sarov (d. 1833). Called by G. Fedotov, the unique scholar of the Russian religious spirit in recent times, as the "latest and perhaps the greatest of Russian saints," St. Seraphim is most famous for resurrecting and popularizing the patristic formula of the goal of Christian life as the "acquisition of the Holy Spirit."

"The fire-infused grace of the Holy Spirit" is given to all people, even the simplest of men, in the sacramental mysteries of faith; and though sin darkens the Spirit's light and corrupts his power in the time of the "ordeal" ordained by divine providence, through sincere repentance, and good works done in the name of Christ, and especially through prayer invoking the name of Jesus, man can acquire the Holy Spirit in his life "who operates within us and establishes the kingdom of heaven in our hearts." Although the recorded words of even this greatest "icon of the Spirit" in modern times did not escape the "benevolent censorship" of the church hierarchy, the witness of this man stands as the first and most perfect sign of Spirit-centered Orthodoxy, in both theology and life, which began to blossom a century ago.

Within the framework of the traditional monastic spirituality, Seraphim was not alone, either in his penetration to the depths of the tradition, or in his emergence with prophetically inspired forms of its expression. There were also the "elders" such as those of the famous Optina monastery, with their often quite worldly, practically-oriented spiritual counsels. And there were also the writers and teachers of the life of the Spirit who exercised important influence on the lives of countless souls, especially with relation to prayer and the practice of the Jesus Prayer, such as the bishops Ignatius Brianchaninoff (d. 1867) and Theophanes the Recluse (d. 1894). At this time mention also should be made of the Spirit-centered literature of the novelists, poets and philosophers such as Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, A. Khomiakov (d. 1860) and V. Solovyev (d. 1900).

The turn of the century also marked the turn "from Marxism to idealism," and the creation of a number of religious-philosophical circles in Russia by a considerable number of the intelligentsia whose own personal lives and ideas and forms of expression are vastly different, but whose original inspiration by the same "great ideas" of Christ and the Spirit, freedom and creativity, human community and cosmic beauty, is undeniably one. Here we find not only Berdyaev and Bulgakov, but Florensky, Frank, Fedotov, Struve and a truly significant number of others among whom we may even include the free and inspired souls of a number of contemporary poets, led by Boris Pasternak whose work is really a spiritual event.

The beginning of this century also witnessed the life of the acknowledged saint and "all-Russian pastor," Father John Sergieff of Cronstadt (d. 1908). This parish priest was in every way the antithesis of the free-thinking liberals, and yet even he demanded the friendship of czars to preserve him from the pressures of ecclesiastical officials so that his renewing inspiration and example could manifest itself as the clearest beginning of what Fedotov has called "A new 'spiritual' type of priest" in the Russian tradition. Among these "types" whose manifold gifts were so fruitfully expressed in rarely brilliant pastoral lives—a charisma so sadly missed in the church—are the fathers A. Elchaninoff, S. Chetverikoff and V. Zenkovsky. And in this respect Metropolitan Eulgious,



the post-revolutionary bishop of Western Europe, must be named as a hierarch of incomparable inclusiveness and openness for everyone and everything, a pastor whose last will and testimony for his flock were the words: "Preserve the freedom in the Church."

"The Lord wants us to love one another . . . in this lies freedom. As God is love; so the Holy Spirit is love. By the Holy Spirit I came to know the Lord. . . . Ask, and the grace of the Holy Spirit will enter your souls and you will cry: This is true freedom. True freedom is in God and of God. He who is in the Holy Spirit can realize that paradise is the kingdom of the Holy Spirit within us."

These words, scribbled down on scraps of paper in the kitchen where he worked on Mount Athos, are just a token sampling of the thoughts of the unlettered peasant monk Silouan who died in 1938 after forty-three years in seclusion. Invoking the memory of St. Seraphim and John of Cronstadt in his "markings," almost every one of his sentences makes reference to the Spirit of God who abides in us granting knowledge and love, and a foretaste of the joy of paradise. No one in contemporary Orthodoxy has spoken of the Spirit with such simplicity and conviction as this divinely-anointed brother in his kitchen retreat. When considering the place of the

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Holy Spirit in contemporary Orthodox life, the living testimony of this man without a doubt holds the most extraordinary place.

And at almost exactly the same time that Silouan was alive on Athos, a Russian nun was walking the streets of Paris, through its slums, saloons and asylums. Aristocratic and sophisticated from her childhood, she plainly scandalized many with her un-nun-like association with philosophers and poets as well as drunkards and lunatics whom she took into her house. And when she finally went to her death in a Nazi gas-chamber on Good Friday, 1945, together with the Jews whom she protected, Mother Maria also had said her word to the world. "If Christianity is not fire," she said, the Fire which is the Spirit whom Christ has come to cast upon the earth, "then it does not exist."

Authority, Freedom and Truth

The theologians and religious thinkers of the recent Russian experience had many things to say about the person and action of the Holy Spirit. And much of what they said was in fierce opposition to the Christian West and to what Father Georges Florovsky has called the "Western captivity" of the thought and spirit of their own church and nation. A large part of their criticisms are considered today to be grossly one-sided, uninformed and exaggerated. And many of the specific problems which they discussed have simply disappeared in history or have fallen into obscurity before the new theologies and new religious understanding of the contemporary world. But yet, despite all the changes in history and men, and the enormous multiplicity of new approaches to things, the newness itself is very often just a newness in forms and expressions of fundamentally unchanged positions, and the insights of these particular men continue to be meaningful for us, especially as they touch the person of the Holy Spirit of God.

When asked a few years ago before an audience of Catholic educators what was in his opinion the one great obstacle to Christian renewal, especially as it effects the relations between East and West, the Russian theologian Father John Meyendorff made immediate reference to Dostoevsky's *Legend of the Grand Inquisitor*. Although Dostoevsky may have had a distorted image of the Church of Rome, and although his stabbing points about the institutional church may have been directed against his own Russian Church without impunity, the inference of Father Meyendorff remains, that behind all of the formal, specific thelogical issues which divide the Christian world—the Vatican dogma, the procession of the Spirit, the conception of Mary, the nature of grace, the understanding of the sacraments, the place of the Bible—there lies a more original, more synthetic spiritual vision of reality, of God and man, the Church and the world, which keeps Christians apart, particularly the Orthodox East and the whole of the West, both Roman and Reformed.

The key to the problem which underlies all problems, and here we must leave Meyendorff specifically for a whole school of like-minded men, is the meaning of freedom and authority and their relation to truth. And this is basically a problem of the Holy Spirit in the life of man and the Church.

The forgetfulness of the Holy Spirit has caused men to search for what Khomiakov has called "an external criterion of truth," an "authority" which yields a doctrinal certainty and a spiritual security which is alien to the Christian idea of man as created in the freedom of God's image for life in the Spirit. The only authority for truth, if we might use the term "authority" in this way, is the Holy Spirit. He is the Spirit of Truth who proceeds from God, who brings to remembrance all that Christ has said, who teaches all things and guides into all the truth. The Spirit alone is the sole existing criterion for truth, its only guarantee. He is the unique Advocate who bears witness of the Truth. In the Spirit, Christ remains with us "even unto the end of the ages" and thus he needs no other guarantee for his presence; and indeed no one to represent him in his absence. Christ has given his own Spirit to make himself present in his body and its members which every man is called to be if only he has a hearing of the faith, and is ready and open to receive the Spirit, not being fearful or suspicious of his genuine coming.

Neither hierarch nor magisterium, council or decree, the Book or the multitude of books which may have the gift of serving to manifest Christ in the Spirit can ever pretend to jurisdiction over this divine Spirit who is "sovereignly free" and who, in the freedom of his holiness, imparts freedom to human persons to know the truth, and to "know that they know" by no other criterion than that of the certain conviction of the Spirit within them.

The only authority for truth which exists is the Truth itself, seen and embraced in the Spirit of Truth. And this is freedom: "For you will know the truth and the truth will make you free. I am the Truth. And I will send you the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth. And where the Spirit is, there is freedom."

And where the Holy Spirit, there also is the Church. As "the blessed life in the Spirit" the Church must never yield to the temptation to offer something different or something less, not even to those "poor souls" whom, in a compassion ostensibly greater than that of Christ Himself, it judges as unworthy or unable to bear the glory of such gracious exaltation. The Church must not allow itself to become an "institutional authority," nor must it allow any of its external expressions within it, either living or printed, to take the place of the Holy Spirit, the only advocate and guarantee of freedom and truth.

But it is precisely here, on this point, that we discover

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the pathetic and tragic crisis in the Church—and even in society—today. It is not a "crisis of authority" as so many think it is, be it of the papacy or hierarchy or canons or scriptures or denominational disciplines in the churches, or social, political or family structures in society—which has resulted in the hard-line defenses of the authorities and the wild cries for revolutionary emancipation of the freedom-seekers. On the contrary, it is a crisis of a spirit which has been pushed to the point where it can only understand truth as necessarily bound to external authorities, and can only understand freedom in its negative relation to authority and not in its positive relation to authority and not in its positive relation to truth.

The very putting of the questions: How much freedom? How much authority? How much institution? How much individual conscience? The very existence of such questions put in this tightly-sealed framework betrays the futility of the situation as it stands, which can only burst open with a destructive power that can destroy the Church as well as any secular structure built on the same premises, and even man himself. For no matter which side ultimately emerges victorious, the human person himself is lost by the very categories themselves which deny him his destiny as the image of God, created to know the truth in perfect freedom by the indwelling inspiration of the divine Spirit who is indeed in every man who "comes to a knowledge of the truth" whatever his individual awareness may be.

The Church must remain as the herald and protector of such a human experience, the active witness of such an understanding of man. It must constantly insist, even to itself, that every law and authority, formulated within its own body or outside it, has ultimately the very restricted function of serving as a pedagogue, a tutor or custodian, to the life of perfect humanity in which men arrive to truth in freedom, and to freedom in truth.

After the Russian experience of our own day in which not only millions of bodies were destroyed, but hundreds of millions of souls, an experience prophesied with such penetrating analyses of the human spirit by a Dostoevsky and confirmed after the fact with such equally inspired insight by a Pasternak—after all this, one can only wonder how men, especially Christian men, can fail to see the seeds of destruction in the closed ways which they continue to pursue.

The Sacred, the Secular and the Kingdom of God

In much the same way, and because of the same forgetfulness of the Spirit, we are also given to believe today that we are confronted with a radically dualistic choice between our sacred and secular hopes. We can either choose "religion" in the sacral sense, with its totally other-worldly substance which finds in the natural world, in human history, society and culture, nothing but dust and ashes; *profanity* which must be escaped as it will ultimately be eternally destroyed. Or we can choose "secularism" which either sees this world as God's area of activity with nature, history, society and culture as the place of his presence; or these same realities as autonomous from God in his "economic," or plainly ontological absence. This second choice, which is clearly more fashionable at the moment, contains the strange spectrum of a cryptic predestinationism on the one extreme, which can see God as the final determiner in the most capricious acts of nature and history; and cryptic and



even openly revealed humanistic atheism on the other, which gives sovereign autonomy to man alone. But whatever the choice here—sacred or profane, religious or secular, churchly or worldly, divinely-determined or humanistically-autonomous—at least according to the witness of Orthodox thinking today, the choice is seen once more as a destructively false one. And here again the Holy Spirit moves in the center.

The work of Father Alexander Schmemann may be taken as an example of an Orthodox approach to this question. Summarizing his position, it may be said that there must first be an immediate disavowal of any sort of "sacral religion" which radically denies the world of God's creation and redemption in the name of some "other world." There must be an equally resolute "no" said to "secularity" in any of its forms; both to those which divinize this world and its natural and historical processes and to those which emancipate them in a radically independent autonomy from God. And there must still be the third absolutely categorical rejection that the relation between God and the world can even be put into such closed and mutually opposed positions.

There must be instead the sacramental vision of reality, the affirmation of the fact that this world in which Christ has been killed has forever lost its chance to become the kingdom of God through any natural process or development, even of "God acting in history"; or through any autonomously human "reshaping of the planet," to use the expression of Pasternak's Lara. But yet the foolish and scandalous paradox must remain that this very world which has condemned itself through the Cross of Christ has also, through the same Cross, been forgiven and saved, since by the humiliation of Christ, God has poured forth his Spirit upon men so that all of creation,

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already now in the mystery of the indwelling of the Spirit of God in human persons, may be experienced as now given back to men filled with the fulness of God.

Such theologians as Lossky and S. Verkhovskoy speak in very different terms from Father Schmemann, and yet they too are explicit witnesses of the theology which finds the overcoming of the closed option between the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, the other world and this world, indeed between God and man, in the concept and experience of the kingdom of God in the midst of the earth, present in those men who have received the Holy Spirit.

The Church in the Orthodox tradition is popularly called "the kingdom of God on earth." The kingdom is not of this world and cannot be identified or essentially tied to any of its "elements." And yet the kingdom is in the world, and it may even be dared to say that the kingdom is the world as it is, dead and resurrected, rejected and restored, condemned and then glorified in men who have passed through the death and resurrection of Christ and have received his Holy Spirit. The Church offers the experience of God's kingdom in sacramental mystery made possible by the presence and action of the Paraclete, the seal and pledge and guarantee of the age to come when "this world" will pass away and the new creation will be revealed filled with the presence of God. The Holy Spirit is the hidden presence among us of the kingdom of God. This doctrine has been developed in detail by Florensky where he refers to a gloss of the Lord's Prayer in the writing of St. Gregory of Nyssa where "thy kingdom come" is read as "the Spirit come upon us and cleanse us"; and goes on to quote the same St. Gregory when he says simply: "The Holy Spirit is the Kingdom."

Holy Spirit and Persons

The Holy Spirit, the kingdom of God, comes to persons. It does not come to the world in general, to nature, to history, to society or culture. It does not even come to the Church understood as a human society or an institutional authority which is identifiable with any "element" of this world. The Kingdom comes to persons who form the body of Christ. It may reveal itself outside of the walls of the institutional society for, as we are told so frequently these days, "the Spirit blows where he wills." However, the Spirit over whom no man or institution holds jurisdiction is the same Spirit whom Christ has sent to those who consciously believe in him and who is given to men in the sacramental experience of life in the Church. If it were not for the experience of the Spirit in the Church, the Spirit "whom the world does not know," then there could be no possibility at all even to know that there is a Holy Spirit, like the men of Ephesus in the *Book of Acts,* not to speak of discerning the action of the Spirit in men in the world.

The kingdom of God, the Holy Spirit, comes not with observation, but with power. The power must be received, built up, acquired. It must be invoked and prayed for. It must be nurtured and not "quenched." It may never be taken for granted as it is exclusively personal and sovereignly free. It always, and even in the Church, has the "character of a secret."

The events of history and the achievements of society and culture have an eternal meaning, not in themselves, but as the events and achievements of human persons. There is no "holy history" after Easter and Pentecost, nor any secular restructering or revolution which can bring about the kingdom of God. History has come to an end with the crucifixion of God in history and with the mystical breaking in of the "kingdom to come" by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The age to come has entered with the "eighth day" of Pentecost, and since that "final day," the building of God's kingdom is accomplished in human persons whose greatest achievements are lost in history and culture, but whose smallest achievements are not lost for eternity in the mystery of their persons, the persons of other men and the persons of God. Not only do the events in the time and space of this world find their eternal worth and salvation as they remain alive within the unending personal life of humanity, but even the groaning and travail of natural creation finds its transfiguration into rejoicing in the "revealing of the sons of God," the personal acquiring of the Holy Spirit by human persons. In this age, the Church must remain as the witness to these things until all things are fulfilled in the appearance of its head, the Lord of Glory.

The Church must remain—this is the message of Orthodox theology and life—to bear witness to the mystery of Godmanhood, the mystery of the Spirit in us, the mystery of the fulfillment of human destiny and the destiny of the world in the gracious deification of human persons in freedom and in truth. The "new religious understandings" which appear in every age and generation from Pentecost to our own and which, according to Florensky, have always tried to bring about the manifestation of the Spirit "prematurely or willfully," above and beyond the Church of Christ, have always condemned themselves to failure. This is not because the Church has dominion over the Spirit, nor because it is suspicious of or denies his free and genuine presence and action in men. It is because the Church must fulfill its function to preserve the mystery of the Holy Spirit whose presence remains always hidden, and whose very revelation is in his own self-effacement in freedom before the freedom of human persons, so that the grace of the fulness of the divine kingdom which he brings may be fully and completely our own. It belongs to the Church, in the face of so many more easy ways, to quote Florensky for the last time, to insist that "all the perplexities, difficulties and torments of our life are gathered around the Holy Spirit; and yet all of our hopes are also found in his revelation."

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

The separation of the forgiveness of sin from the Holy Spirit allowed the Protestants to claim that God accepts the world as it now exists rather than requiring and causing it to be made anew.

HOLY SPIRIT AND PROTESTANTISM

HERBERT RICHARDSON

How would you write the closing section of the Apostles' Creed?

Possibility #1. "I believe in the Holy Spirit, the holy catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting."

Possibility #2. "I believe in the Holy Spirit;
"[And I believe in] the holy catholic Church;
"[And in] the communion of saints;
"[And in] the forgiveness of sins;
"[And in] the resurrection of the body;
"and the life everlasting."

Which of these ways seems right to you?

"I sort of like the second possibility," said my wife. "It looks more like a poem to me."

Now that's just the trouble with marrying a poetess instead of a theologian. You get gut reactions, not deep thinking. O.K., suppose you would write the last section of the Creed as a series of statements rather than just one, long complex statement. How, then, would you write the middle section of the Creed?

Possibility #1. "And [I believe] in Jesus Christ, His only Son, Our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate . . . etc."

Possibility #2 "And [I believe] in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord, Who
"[I believe] was conceived by the Holy Spirit;
"[And I believe] born of the Virgin Mary;
"[And I believe] suffered under Pontius Pilate;
". . . *et cetera.*"

To be consistent would you once again choose the second possibility?

To see what is at stake in these questions, ask yourself whether you believe in "the virgin birth" or in "Jesus Christ Who was born of the Virgin." If you believe in "the virgin birth" and such other things as "being conceived by the Spirit" and "descending into hell," it may be that you are separating—in your mind, at least—the possibility of such events from the person of Jesus Christ. It would then follow that you understand the Christian faith to involve a belief in (1) Jesus Christ, the Son of God and (2) the possibility and occurrence of several rather unusual events such as virgin births, spiritual conceptions, and resurrections from the dead. And you might find yourself reading reports on cases of supposed partheogenesis or communications with the dead, thinking that such reports suggest the possibility of a certain kind of occurrence which is also said to have happened to Jesus. And you might find yourself admitting that unless such things could be conceived to happen to other human beings (thereby becoming available for scientific investigation) that they couldn't be said to have happened to Jesus.

But is this really the way Christians understand these ideas? Isn't it rather the case that we hold our belief in the person of Jesus Christ and the account of the events in his life together as a single complex belief? If so, then when we say "And [I believe] in Jesus Christ, His only Son, Our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit . . . etc. etc. . . . thence He will come to judge the living and the dead," we are not affirming either the natural

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possibility or the scientific inspectability of virgin births, descents into hell, resurrections, and spiritual conceptions. Rather, we are affirming these things as actions possible only for a divine person, the Son of God. And if this is the case, then we would say that any person who talks about virgin births or spiritual conceptions apart from the Son of God—supposing that such things could happen to other men—would not be understanding what the Christian means when he says the Apostles' Creed.

Only Two

In the same way, the first part of the Creed is not an affirmation that the world—considered as a thing in itself—began to exist in time (and hence possessed some potentiality to exist even before it existed). Rather, the first part of the Creed is one complex statement affirming "God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth." So both the first and the middle parts of the Apostles' Creed contain but two propositions.

The problem with supposing that the last part of the Creed contains *six* more propositions (in accord with the second way of writing it, above) is that to believe in the general possibility and occasional or eventual occurrence of such things as "the resurrection of the body" or "the communion of saints" seems very much like believing in the general possibility of virgin births and descents into hell. For the second rendering separates these events from their divine Agent, the Holy Spirit, and thereby forces us to think of them as if they were marvelous, exceeding rare, but still quite natural events—a bit like giving birth to octuplets.

In order to clarify still further the problem involved, consider the following illustration: in Lewis Carroll's well-known story, Alice is said to have stepped through the looking glass into a strange new world. Now suppose you were to give a multiple choice question to a student, which would be the correct answer? "In Lewis Carroll's story, the girl Alice

a.—— stepped through the window.
b.—— stepped through the looking glass.
c.—— neither.
d.—— both."

Could you now ask a student who gave answer "b" whether he believes (1) that stepping through looking glasses is possible, (2) that the girl in Carroll's story is called "Alice," and (c) that the girl Alice did this thing that is possible in general, that is, also possible for you and me? You could ask him this—though, of course, he will think you are being silly. For both you and he know full well that stepping through looking glasses is here meant as a possibility for a special story-book girl—and not for human beings like you and me.

Now the spiritual conception of Jesus is affirmed by the Christian as a possibility for the Son of God—not for human beings like you and me. Since this is the case, we have absolutely no right to assume that this conception in any way resembles such fanciful occurrences as parthenogenesis. In the same way, the resurrection of the body, the life everlasting, and the communion of saints are possibilities that can be worked by the Holy Spirit; they are His acts. Hence, we should not try to explain them as general possibilities that might occur through some other agent. And we would say to any person who tried to prove or interpret any of these from psychological, historical, or physical evidence or in terms of analogies with any natural events that he was not understanding them correctly because he had separated them from the more-than-natural being who alone possessed the power to cause such things to happen. Apart from the Holy Spirit, neither the resurrection of the body nor the forgiveness of sins could occur—since the sole possibility of their occurring is in His power to do them.

Suppose, now, that we turn to the Church. Do we believe that the author of the Church is the Spirit, that He is the immediate agent of its existence? Or do we believe in (1) The Holy Spirit and (2) the Church—which has its charter and character not from the Spirit, but from another. Actually it was traditional in medieval theology to separate the Spirit and the Church, sometimes even regarding the Church as the agent of the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. On this view, the characteristic marks of the Church in her unity, catholicity and holiness often seem to resemble other natural forms of unity, holiness and catholicity. It is against such a distorted understanding that arises when the Church is separated from the Spirit that the Eastern Catholic Archbishop Elias Zoghby warns when he argues that to conceive the unity of the Church as

> an agreement between the heads of churches and make them the chief and only agents of this unity is to reduce the Church of Christ to the level of ordinary human societies.

Rather, he argues, it is "the Holy Spirit who is the source of all sanctity and all union." And the unity and sanctity authored by the Spirit is an expression of the unique unity and holiness proper to the Spirit alone and hence not to be found in any other natural thing. But is it really true that we think of the unity of the Church in this way? Don't we usually think of the unity of the Church in a purely natural way—as a kind of organizational unity that is also found in many other institutions—and then claim that this natural unity is supernatural? No wonder we confuse people when this occurs. But focusing on Christ's "legal commission" to Peter as the founding of the Church, rather than the Pentecostal descent of the Spirit from heaven to create among men a new understanding that transcended linguistic differences, leads to such difficulties. For it suggests that Christ rather than the Spirit authors the Church.

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The purpose of this essay is not, however, to debate with theologians who separate the Church from the Spirit, but to focus on the misunderstanding of the forgiveness of sins that occurred when the Protestant Reformation theologians separated this action from the Holy Spirit. For the Protestants thought of the forgiveness of sins as the work of someone other than the Spirit. They displaced the forgiveness of sins from the last to the middle section of the Creed. Here is a typical example —from the Thirty Nine Articles. "The Son," it says, "is one Christ,

> very God and very Man; who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile the Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for the actual sins of men. //As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also is it to be believed that he went down into hell. . . ."

Naturalizing Process

This displacement of the forgiveness of sins to the Christological section of the Creed was the fulcrum exploited by the Protestant theologians to "naturalize" the meaning of forgiveness itself. For if the Holy Spirit authors the forgiveness of sins in a man, He does so by overcoming sin in a man and making him truly holy (sanctified) by virtue of His indwelling presence. By making the agent of forgiveness Jesus Christ (one who is "outside" man), the Protestant theologians were also able to claim that a man's righteousness and forgiveness are also "outside" him. For Christ's death can be construed as changing God's attitude toward sinful man rather than changing sinful man himself. The forgiven man, on this view, thereby remains a natural man in a fully worldly condition; he is said to be *justified* (God accepts him), but not *sanctified* (he is really still a sinner).

The Protestant notion of forgiveness is very peculiar—to say the least. For it assumes that what keeps God from accepting man is God's wrath rather than man's sinful condition. It asserts that it is God who needs the therapy, not sinful man. This misunderstanding of forgiveness provides a rationale for worldliness and undercuts the claim of the Catholic Church that a religious vow and withdrawal from the world is the way to holiness. Such a rationale was needed by the emerging middle class—and it was needed because the Church had failed to affirm the full value of creation. But if the Protestants regained a positive appreciation of the creation in this way, it must also be said that they did so by distorting the idea of Christian sanctity. For the separation of the forgiveness of sins from the Holy Spirit allowed the Protestants to claim that God accepts the world as it now exists rather than requiring and causing it to be made anew.

The political consequence of the separation of justification and sanctification is to allow men to believe that they can accept an essentially unjust world because God himself does. That is, it provides an excuse for the *status quo,* a legitimation of political conservatism. We should not think that such thoughts were not in the minds of those who developed and applied these doctrines. They knew the troubles stirred up by those *spiritualists* who held that since the Spirit authored the Church and forgave man his sins, the Church should be truly holy, a man should live a saintly life and society should be totally reformed. This would be a very embarrassing thing for the new Church of England which—as a national church—had to include both saints and sinners; and it would be very hard on the new Protestant bourgeoisie, who certainly did not intend to conform to the spiritualist demands to create spiritual cities with community of goods (communism!) or to restructure society to alleviate the tragic conditions of the poor, just then beginning a Peasants' Revolt. The Church and the sanctity of the Christian had to be defined as "invisible," "forensic," or "alien" if the political and economic interests of the emerging bourgeoisie were to remain undisturbed. The Protestants were so aware of this problem that, in a document like the Westminster Confession, it is specifically said that neither the sanctity of individual Christians nor the spiritual communion the Bible says they have with one another could be understood to

> take away or infringe the title or propriety which each man has in his goods and possessions.

So we see that the Reformation displacement of the forgiveness of sins into the second article of the Creed allows a Christian to have Christ's righteousness and not have any of his own that might "take away or limit the propriety" he has in any private property. Nor does it require from him concern for the poor, any change of social structures or titles. Then how, we might ask, do the two Reformation confessions quoted above treat the Spirit? And the answer reveals their distaste for this subject. The Westminister Confession does not even include an article on the Holy Spirit—an embarrassment that American Presbyterians finally corrected about 1900 when they put an appendum on the Spirit in the Westminster Confession by a special vote of their General Assembly. And the Thirty Nine Articles, while including a statement on the Spirit, carefully gives Him no functions. It says simply that "The Holy Spirit,

> proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God."

The magisterial Reformers and their immediate successors did not exclude or depreciate the Spirit as a vital part of the communal life of the Church unwittingly. By their very omission of this emphasis—an emphasis that was central to the Anabaptist, Quaker, Leveler, and Antinomian groups that were also emerging at this time —they arranged to keep the Church, the forgiveness of sins, and everlasting life out of the hands of the Spirit

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(represented by the revolutionaries) and in the hands of Christ who, being absent, had to be represented by His vicar on earth—whether pope, preacher, prince or presbytery (the representatives of established privilege and property). "The time of the Spirit is not yet," they said. "And the place for the Spirit is not here. The Spirit belongs to eschatology; the Spirit belongs to another age." And when the Spirit started speaking to the enthusiasts, mystics, and Schwärmer, then the Protestant Reformers thanked God for the *filioque!*

The *filioque*—marvelous invention! What it says is that the Spirit doesn't come from the Father alone (in contrast to the Son). No, the Spirit comes from both the Father "and the Son" (*filioque*). This is what tames the Spirit and makes it ecclesiastically safe. For since "No one has seen the Father, but the Son. . . ." we have to believe the Son's word about the Father. But since the Spirit comes from *both* the Father and the Son, we do not have to believe what the Spirit says unless it can be shown by us to be in accord with our understanding of Christ. "Shown *by us?*" I mean by those who are properly accredited members of the magisterium of the Church. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the Spirit never speaks a truth that disturbs or embarrasses the Church—for any disturbance or embarrassment would itself be an evidence that it was not the Holy Spirit speaking, but some other spirit. The effect of the *filioque,* then, is to insure that God shall never be able to fulfill his promise, "Behold, I make all things new."



The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century was a reformation that never really took place. Fortunately, before things got out of hand, Luther saw the light and exhorted the princes to put down the murdering, thieving hordes of peasants. Anabaptists were drowned by the tens of thousands. Revolutionary Utopians were destroyed by the sword. And the Protestant-Catholic axis finally worked out a solution that evidences the real interests at stake. *Cuius regio, eius religio:* "Let the religion of each land be the religion of its king." This insures that God supports the existing politico-economic order, an order that has been expanded now just enough to allow the rising bourgeoisie a share of the wealth and a share of the say.

The question whether the Spirit is the immediate author of the Church and the forgiveness of sins is in large part a decision bearing on God's attitude to the *status quo* and the amount of sin that the Christian can regard as acceptable. For surely if God accepts a sinful world, the enthusiasts who refuse to do so and who promote utopian visions can be disregarded as dangerous eccentrics. The question whether the Spirit is the author of Christian holiness, so that the Christian must be really and visibly different in his behavior, presses us to ask whether the Christian gospel is not to proclaim a future kingdom of God, but to establish a present kingdom of righteousness —where there will be no war, no poverty, no sickness or death, no ignorance, no fear. Because the Reformation Protestants shied away from the reformation of the world, the Protestant reformation never took place.

ACT TWO

The Protestant Reformation Finally Does Take Place

"But, Mr. Wesley, it is in such bad taste to be running around the countryside in the company of all these poor, ignorant, and stinking people. How can they understand the subtleties of Christian metaphor, much less appreciate the fine things of culture? And yet you are said to go out into the open fields and preach to gathered masses of these vulgar persons, telling them that God not only seeks to make men perfect simply by sending the Spirit into their hearts, but that God is going to make them perfect right here and right now. Why if God makes them holy simply by the Spirit, then what will happen to their obedience to the Church? And if they are to become perfect by faith, then how can an Oxford education increase a man's perfection? You are preaching a dangerous doctrine, Mr. Wesley, when you go out into the fields and into the city homes. Let the vulgar, if they wish perfection, be obedient and attend to the sacraments of the Church; and let them listen to instruction from their betters.

"What more dangerous than to separate the Spirit from the sacraments—as if a man could become holy simply by some fancy that the Spirit enters his heart and causes him to be 'born again.' 'Born again,' Mr. Wesley? What a strange and arrogant presumption. Bloated with pride, they rant and rave that they are new men and that even the king, the theologians, the professors, and even I must be born again. I do not choose to be born again; I am perfectly satisfied with the station I was born into the first time. And I wonder why they cannot be likewise satisfied. Humility, Mr. Wesley. Tell them about the virtues of humility, obedience, suffering, and patience. But do not rant on about the holiness, peace, and joy of the Spirit. Peace shall come, Mr. Wesley, to every man when he is raised beyond the grave. For the time being, we must be satisfied with an imperfect world, with a vale of sorrows.

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So preach to them the humility, obedience, and suffering of Christ, Mr. Wesley. Tell them of God's compassion, not this utopian perfection. Speak no further about the Spirit's making men to be born again. God loves the poor just as they are, Mr. Wesley. He loves us in spite of our imperfections. And we cannot overcome these, Mr. Wesley."

"Madam, we shall overcome."

"Overcome sin, Mr. Wesley?"

"Madam, we shall overcome."

Overcome all fear, all rage, all injustice, Mr. Wesley?"

"Madam, we shall overcome."

"Overcome poverty, Mr. Wesley?"

"Yes, we shall overcome poverty and slavery and war—and men shall be free at last, free at last. Thank God Almighty; we're free at last."

"Don't be so unrealistic and impatient, Mr. Wesley. You want things to change too fast. Call home your outside agitators who travel throughout our land preaching a revolutionary doctrine that undermines its law and order. I fear for the life of men like you who think it is their business to reform the world."

"They shall murder me in Memphis, madam. But we shall overcome."

The true Protestant reformation—a reformation of the Church which also requires the reformation and sanctification of the world—took place in the eighteenth century. Wesley and Edwards—rather than Luther and Calvin—were its prophets. The sixteenth century "reformation" never found a new positive principle of holiness. It exposed that depreciation of the world and all the goods of creation implied by the medieval notion of a state of grace that was "higher" than the state of nature. It guarded its new insight by mastering the methods of historical exegesis earlier than its adversaries and by the artificial device of setting Scripture in opposition to tradition. It legitimated the admission of a new commercial bourgeoisie to a share in political-economic power. But it never discovered a new *religious* principle, a new understanding of holiness, a "machinery" for transforming and sanctifying man and the world. And it brutally exterminated the anabaptists and spiritualists who had won a prophetic insight into the true meaning of the Holy Spirit and who struggled for a holy world.

Traditional histories of the Christian Church dependent, as they are, upon European scholarship and the 19th century perspective overemphasize the significance of the evangelical-catholic controversy and depreciate, or completely overlook, the eighteenth century "Later Reformation." In this "Later Reformation," a new religious principle is given definite expression: the idea of a holy worldliness, a sanctified creation. This new movement presupposed what the 16th century magisterial reformers had won, namely, that the creation and the goods of creation provide the context within which man's religious destiny must be worked out. It presupposed there is no "higher order of grace" that stands against nature. It assumes these theological gains and then goes on to introduce its new positive principle: that the creation must be transformed by the Holy Spirit into a holy and perfect community. A comprehensive inventory and ordering of the new themes and tendencies of this spiritualistic reformation is presented in my *Toward an American Theology*. Within the confines of this essay, I can only indicate a sampling from this rich new lode.

Double Reformation

First, I have indicated that the true fathers of the Protestant reformation—i.e., that reformation of the Church which also implied the reformation of the world—were John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, men who crystallized the insights of the radical and spiritualist sectarians into a powerful new missionary and ecclesiastical Awakening. Wesley's personal experience and Scriptural studies led him to the conviction that the period of God's administrating the world through law had been brought to an end by Christ, and that God now was working to recreate a new humanity by the power of the Spirit. The key to this transformation in the life of an individual man is his being "born again," a total psychological reconstruction that roots out the effects of original sin—namely, death and the fear of death—and makes possible, in principle, the living of a perfect life.

To view all men as possessing this potentiality for moral perfection (since we now live in the age of the Spirit) opens the way for a new attitude toward law and a new task for the Church. Whereas classical Christian anthropology presupposed the inevitability of sin and, hence, the religious necessity of law and police power as dikes against sin, the new vision of the Spirit's working shifted the task of the Church to the actualization of those potentialities in man that would allow him to be perfect and live without the law. The classical view, by its intrinsic logic, forced the Church to legitimate the existing political order—since this order wielded the law needed to restrain sin. The new spiritual anthropology now put the Church on the side of the potentialities of man's living perfectly without law—thereby opening the way for revolution against unjust rulers for the sake of a reconstructed, truly just state.

The spiritualist move toward Church-State separation, be it noted, is not simply a political accommodation to a pluralistic religious situation (as certain historians, even today, seem to conceive the matter). It is rather a logical consequence of the spiritualistic anthropology, the new vision of Christian perfection. In Europe, where the true Protestant reformation never took root, the Churches found themselves inextricably bound to the vested interests of the governing and propertied classes and the later proletarian revolutions were carried out in the name of

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atheistic and secular ideologies. In England and in North America, however, the true Protestant reformation itself was the revolutionary vanguard. It was Wesley who mobilized the poor in England—though it was Marx who mobilized the poor on the continent. It was Wilberforce and Parker and the revivalists of the second Great Awakening who mobilized the conscience of men against slavery. It was the *Baptist,* Walter Rauschenbusch, who formulated the definitive theology of the social gospel and the *Baptist* Martin Luther King who led the struggle against the use of war and violence as methods for settling human conflicts. Such movements presuppose the spiritualist vision of man.

The new vision of man and society is rooted in an exegesis of Scripture that is guided by the experience of the Holy Spirit. The magisterium for this new movement is the experience of the sanctified man who, because he has experienced the new birth and intimations of a holy community, reads Scripture as a testimony to its possibility. *Lived spiritual experience* rather than obedient belief in things taught by an authority (for the sake of attaining eternal life in a world to come) is the new characteristic form of religious life. Not obedience, humility, suffering, and belief; but joy, peace, creativity, and holiness are the marks of the spiritual man. These are, of course, the eschatological virtues. And, in fact, the new



theological centrality given to the Holy Spirit is an expression of the spiritualists' faith that the eschatological age has now begun.

Jonathan Edwards, the American counterpart to Wesley, is credited with creating the form of the "revival," the central institution of the Great Awakening. Historians who interpret this movement too often do so from the classical perspective that regards spiritual feelings or testimonies to being "born again" as signs of human presumption and madness. They fail to see them as Edwards saw them—as psychological evidences that we are in the midst of a great historical transition to an age when a perfect human community can be established on earth. The Great Awakenings were not interpreted by their proponents primarily as methods for increasing church membership. They were interpreted rather as signs that the eschatological Spirit was at work in the world, as evidences that the foundations for a just society were being laid, as proofs that a new possibility was evolving within creation itself.

In the nineteenth century at the time of the second Great Awakening, another eschatological institution was created: the benevolence society. Benevolence societies were voluntary associations of men converted in the revivals, now working together to improve this or that social problem situation. Benevolence societies struggled against slavery, child labor, and rum; they fought for female emancipation, public education, and later for labor and its right to organize. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Protestant gospel had become a social gospel and the Protestant Church itself had become a complex conglomerate benevolence society—a *communis sanctorum* filled with the desire for holiness and struggling for the creation of a holy world. The Holy Spirit was conceived to be the Spirit unifying and moving this community, the vanguard of the new humanity living for the sanctification of man. In this way, the techniques of the revival were harnessed to the social gospel.

In our day we have seen a still more effective fusion of these two institutions—the revival and the social gospel Church—in the dramatic confrontations and demonstrations against injustice and traditional privilege by Martin Luther King. King's gospel is that of the true Protestant reformation: that spiritual reformation of the Church requires also the sanctification of the world. The religious character of his political struggles, his commitment to the cause of a holy and righteous world, are evident in the rhetoric and ritual of the cause. Participation in this struggle is itself the new sacrament of holy life. Just ask your friends who have tried it! Just test the magisterial experience of someone who has tasted this new kind of holiness. This spiritualistic tendency has also become a central emphasis in such modern movements as Pentecostalism, movements that bear a marked affinity with eschatological Protestantism.

The recovery of the Holy Spirit in modern theology related to the discovery that the time and place of eschatological life is *here* and *now*. The true reformation—the reformation of the world—begins with this insight. A full theology of the Spirit still awaits being written; but the form of such a theology now seems to be emerging in the course of that consistent historical tradition discussed above. Moreover, the import of the question with which this essay began should now be clear. Do we believe that the Church, human forgiveness, and the life everlasting are the works of the Spirit—so that the Church must be a spiritual Church, forgiveness be true moral perfection, and eternal life be a sharing in the life and work of Him who is and who seeks holiness? And do we believe that the Spirit, whose works these are, is now working in our midst? If we do, then we share the vision of holy worldliness. And to share this vision is to share in the Spirit's work for a holy world.

Is such a holy world possible? It is for the Spirit!

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For a Roman Catholic to believe himself healed by the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes is a mark of childlike piety; to believe in a healing by the Holy Spirit through a charism is a mark of rank hysteria.

HOLY SPIRIT AND PENTECOSTALISM

KILIAN McDONNELL

Pentecostalism as a movement dates from the turn of the twentieth century. It arose out of the social disorganization and spiritual rootlessness that accompanied the great waves of immigration to America. Indeed, immigration reached a record high, 8,800,000, precisely in the decade, 1901-1910, when Pentecostalism began to form as a movement. One would expect major social dislocations from the greatest movement of nations in history. But even earlier, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, social disorganization was fostered by the industrial revolution, which brought to an end America's primarily agrarian society despite the westward movement that temporarily prolonged the dominance of rural life. During this time of industrialization, the growth of the cities and rapid social change, people sought refuge from the grim realities of life in revivalism, which offered assurance of salvation when there were no other certitudes. The revival was eminently democratic: there was little esteem for clericalism, it was non-liturgical and it exalted personal experience and personal action. The touchstone of orthodoxy was in individual religious experience, continually renewed in worship.

The immediate forerunner of the Pentecostal movement was the Holiness movement, a primitive reaction against theological rationalism, secularism and institutionalism, stressing continual growth in holiness. The Holiness groups tolerated expressions such as speaking in tongues, falling, jerking, moaning. They conceived perfection in two stages: first, justification by faith alone (or a conversion experience), then a full sanctification experience. Pentecostalism took over this pattern but made speaking in tongues (glossolalia) a proof that the second stage, sanctification, had been reached. This is about as close to a definition of Pentecostalism as is possible.

There is no doctrinal unity to the Pentecostal movement, and its manifestations are so varied that generalizations are more than usually hazardous. Walter Hollenweger, who has published a nine-volume *Handbuch* on the movement, contends that the ultimate common denominator is "an overpowering sense of the presence of God and personal involvement, whether in baptism by the Spirit or in worship around the Lord's table." The Pentecostal is concerned above all about fullness of life in the Holy Spirit. One moment in this fullness is the baptism in the Holy Spirit (which is distinct from water baptism). It is an experience in which the Christian knows that the Holy Spirit not only dwells in him, but that he dwells in the Spirit. Most Pentecostals believe that speaking in tongues is proof that this mutual indwelling has actually taken place. They do not believe that the Christian had been without the Holy Spirit before the baptism but that the baptism represents a new fullness, a new modality of being in the Holy Spirit. Although tongues play a large role as proof, they are less important in the life of the Pentecostals than an outsider might think. For the Pentecostal what is important is fullness of life in the Spirit, being in the Spirit, and tongues is only one manifestation of the present and active Spirit. The baptism in the Holy Spirit can be a highly emotional event, but often it is simply an experience, calm and disciplined, of the presence of God.

Pentecostal prayer services are ideally unstructured; there is a kind of practiced spontaneity about them with hymn-singing, preaching, testimonies, reading of the

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word, extemporary prayer. The number of times either speaking in tongues or prophecy occurs in a public service is very small. The more the local congregation has taken over the features of the historic churches (often the worst features), the fewer are these charismatic manifestations. Worship services in a Pentecostal church on a Sunday morning usually last as long as those in the mainline Protestant churches (and tend to be more subdued than other Pentecostal services), but a week-day prayer service, or a revival meeting led by a traveling evangelist, can easily last three or four hours. But the change of tempo, the hand-clapping, the congregation's involvement (each member is a contributor, each has a message, each a testimony), the joy in the presence of the Lord makes three or four hours go very quickly. Pentecostals seem to enjoy their worship services, perhaps because they are more than a means of fulfilling a "Sunday obligation." They are oriented to re-actualizing the sanctification experience which is the baptism in the Holy Spirit, and thereby attaining the goal of continual revival.

The worship services are also means of evangelization and recruitment, necessary in any ecclesial group based on voluntary association. David du Plessis, who might be called "Mr. Pentecost," has noted the falsity of the common supposition that a Pentecostal group will always remain so. "Every generation must have its own Pentecostal experience, if the revival is to continue." Apart from the voluntary association which each generation creates, there is no supporting apparatus to carry on the spiritual momentum. Thus, Pentecostal statistics do not include the children of members, because the Pentecostal experience cannot be inherited or handed down. As du Plessis puts it: "God has no grandsons."

The Pentecostals are people of the bible and they are fundamentalist in their interpretation of it. Although usually innocent of a unifying biblical theology, they do have a profound knowledge of the sacred text. The Pentecostals' spiritual vitality, devotional ardor and their amazing growth is related to the clarity and immediacy of the sacred Word in their lives. They divide the world, with a very unbiblical incisiveness, into nature and supernature. God may break through into the world of nature but essentially it is at war with the things of God. Their rich, even exaggerated view of the supernatural contrasts markedly with an impoverished, in fact rationalistic, view of nature. Expecting God to intervene in their lives, they can name place and date where they are convinced that God did break through and alter the course of their personal histories. The word "miracle" is often on their lips in public and private testimonies.

Many find the Pentecostal eagerness for miracles naive, often a matter of wish fulfillment. On the other hand, one cannot accept the New Testament witness and then postulate a deistic God, who observes from afar but never manifests himself in history. In the book of Acts, the point of departure for Pentecostal thought, it is the Holy Spirit who inspires the decisions necessary to maintain the unity of the church (15:28) and who guides the apostles and preachers of the Gospel in their missionary journeys (4:8; 6:10; 8:29; 10:19; 13:2-4; 20:23). It would be difficult to confine the manifestations of the Spirit to the apostolic age; there is no reason why persons in any age who open themselves to the Spirit should not experience the actuality of God's presence in their lives. Unless one is willing to admit the act of God not only in Christ but in the lives of Christians then one has to abdicate all pretensions to a biblical spirituality. It is appropriate to be somewhat skeptical about the miracles, prophecies and numerous divine interventions claimed in Pentecostal circles, but it would impoverish the Gospel to rule out, *a priori,* the numinous and the wondrous from the lives of ordinary Christians.

The Phenomenon of Tongues

Pentecostalism is popularly identified with speaking in tongues. It would be a mistake, however, to isolate this phenomenon, to study it exegetically, historically and psychologically and think that one has thereby studied Pentecostalism in depth. If Pentecostalism is to be identified with any one thing it must be with the fullness of life in the Spirit, including all the gifts and charisms of the Spirit, of which tongues is one. Even though most American Pentecostals speak of tongues as evidence that the baptism in the Holy Spirit has taken place, even the more intransigent leaders insist that the central issue is not tongues. On the other hand, it was the linking of tongues to the baptism in the Holy Spirit which gave viability to the Pentecostal movement. Tongues is clearly not innate to the Pentecostal ethos.

Outsiders are much mystified by the phenomenon of tongues and their fascination with it makes them attribute an importance to it that it does not have in the life of the Pentecostal community. Pentecostals do not gather for the precise purpose of speaking in tongues. It may or may not occur at any given meeting, just as there may or may not be prophesying. The practice varies.

In the biblical sense, tongues are distinguished from similar cultural manifestations by its functions within the kingdom of Christ: to glorify Christ and to build up the community. These functions are not fulfilled by some kind of spiritual extravaganza, a grand display of strange utterances, but only by glossolalia as a prayer gift. It is precisely this point that outsiders fail to understand. The gift of tongues is a gift of prayer, and more particularly, a gift of praise (Acts 10:46). Researchers who have done field work and talked at length with those who "have come into the experience" know that the depth of their prayer life, their great love of prayer, their joy in praying and desire to praise and glorify God plus the transformation in their lives because of this new prayer dimension, are not lightly to be dismissed.

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From a theological point of view, the question of whether or not tongues are a real language is irrelevant, although the Pentecostals insist that they are. Pentecostal literature is full of instances, admittedly rare in proportion to the frequency of tongues, in which the language was recognized. (In the original Pentecostal experience, as related in Acts, Chapter 2, the language was understood by the bystanders, while in the Epistles of St. Paul the phenomenon apparently was not understood by the listeners.) The difficulties of a scientific investigation in a controlled situation are almost insurmountable when one is speaking not about linguistic analysis (which has its own problems) but about recognition of a given tongue. (There are about 3,000 languages in the world, according to an admittedly low estimate by Carl F. Voegelin, director of the Archives of the Languages of the World.)

Scornful critics of the Pentecostal movement have dismissed the baptism in the Holy Spirit and tongues as "instant holiness." Some Pentecostal converts who thought themselves so transformed by the experience, have declared that they were no longer capable of sinning; most were proved wrong. For those entertaining such an illusion, the sense of God's presence is so immediate, and the realization that God's love is not a parable is so forceful that the possibility of deliberately offending God seems impossible. To be sure, the concept of sin prevalent in some Pentecostal circles is superficial, but there is no ambiguity about the Pentecostal insistence that tongues are neither to be identified with holiness, nor are they to be considered a sign of spiritual maturity. Pentecostals would rather say that glossolalia is the lowest of the gifts—merely the first step in the full life of the Spirit—and, being the lowest of the gifts, it is is a good place to start. Spiritual maturity is a process of growth, they would say; the profound and sometimes overpowering sense of God's presence which often accompanies the baptism in the Holy Spirit is not to be confused with spiritual maturity. Pentecostal history, like that of every religious movement, has ample evidence of leaders endowed with spiritual gifts who failed to live up to some of the more prosaic norms of Christian morality. Pentecostals would even be willing to grant the possibility that the incestuous man spoken of by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 5 was a spirit-filled Christian.

Some experts have called tongues "ecstatic speech," but that can be misleading. Those who speak in tongues are generally not in a trance; they start when they want and they stop when they want. They can pray in tongues without any emotional elevation. One can, of course, mention cases of persons who, in speaking in tongues, moaned, cried, rolled on the ground, etc., but these excessive manifestations are extraneous to the experience of the baptism and to glossolalia, and would be vehemently rejected by many Pentecostal leaders.

Dealing with tongues in this way, in terms of the criticisms posed by non-Pentecostals, has necessitated isolating the issue in a manner that only does violence to its essential meaning. The task of theologians and, I might add, church officials, is to take the admonition of St. Paul seriously: "Do not forbid speaking in tongues," (1 Cor. 14: 39), and, having adopted at least a policy of toleration, to situate all the charismatic gifts (not just tongues) in a broad ecclesiological framework. All the gifts have a proper role which should be worked out theologically as a part of an extensive ecclesiological reflection. If the early Pentecostals had been competent to undertake this theological work they might have avoided many a sad chapter in their history, as knowledgeable Pentecostals will themselves admit, and contemporary classical and neo-Pentecostals would not be repeating the earlier mistakes. Walter J. Hollenweger, the greatest living authority on Pentecostalism, has for years urged competent Pentecostals to pursue this task.

The Healing Phenomenon

To millions of television-viewers Pentecostalism *is* Oral Roberts, and Oral Roberts is healing. Although he has recently renewed his affiliation with the Methodist church, he remains a Pentecostal in outlook. In 1962 both *Harper's* and *Life* published articles about Roberts. Both were essentially negative and pointed up the difficulties in evaluating a man who belongs to a subculture without a real awareness of its structures, modalities and patterns. Without a truly socio-cultural approach, entailing a study of the man within his own subculture, no valid judgment can be made. There is a Pentecostal logic and a Pentecostal vocabulary stemming from this experiential knowledge of God's presence and from the manifestation of the Spirit through his gifts. Although the root experience may be valid and even biblical, the logic and vocabulary need not be a pure expression of it, undiluted by cultural determinants. Oral Roberts uses a logic and speaks a vocabulary which is rooted in a biblical experience. However, they are also reflections of a given socio-economic level and historical setting. To understand him one must know how to distinguish between the biblical and the socio-cultural; further, one must understand the dynamics of the cultural components within their proper secular context. Here only a few random remarks can be made.

When Roman Catholics approach the subject of miraculous healing they use the filter of their own subculture; that is, they filter out certain events as undesirable and admit others as desirable. Thus, for a Roman Catholic to believe himself healed by the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes is a mark of childlike piety; to believe in a healing by the Holy Spirit through a charism is a mark of rank hysteria. Using the Catholic filter, the faithful son of Rome has no alternative but to label Oral Roberts a fanatic and a huckster; whatever he is, however, Roberts is neither of these. If one accepts the biblical wit-

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ness that there are "gifts of healings" (1 Cor. 12:28) one need not accept the style of healing ministry which Oral Roberts represents. Proceeding exegetically from the biblical component of his subculture, one would have to have very serious reservations about his claims. On the other hand, it is difficult to dismiss all of the healings as psychic, although even the Pentecostals will admit that many of them can be attributed to psychological "adjustments." Oral Roberts himself says of his failures: "No one has prayed for more people who have *not* been healed than I." Like most faith healers, he publishes a magazine, *Abundant Life,* the most restrained and dignified of the healing magazines, in which, he prints only the testimonies of those who have been under a doctor's surveillance for an extended period of time.

Apart from Oral Roberts, there is a difference of opinion within Pentecostalism on the role of healing ministry, and in particular about the big healing campaigns. Donald Gee, undoubtedly the most articulate leader Pentecostalism has so far produced, has written extensively on this subject. Although he truly believes in the manifestation of the Spirit in healings, he is severely critical of healing demonstrations. "Solid missionary work is not fulfilled by attracting huge crowds to witness a ministry of healing in a revival campaign. That is easy. It needs solid preaching and teaching to produce fruit that remains." Gee counsels the honest admission of failures. There is a "place for wise and courageous facing of 'failures' to receive miraculous answers to prayer, including honest exposition of passages in the Bible where miracles did *not* happen. The weakness of faith-building propaganda that does not face all the facts is that in the end it can leave people more hopeless and distressed than ever."

The campaigns are often accompanied, says Gee, by commercialization and exaggerated reports. While granting that true healings have occurred, he suggests that "there has been a misguided attempt to make a habit of that which should be unusual and therefore impressive and sanctifying. It is cheapening the holy to attempt to play upon people's love for the wonderful by systematizing it." Finally, he claims that the healings claimed are often ephemeral and that after a spectacular healing campaign one is left "with the stark fact . . . that most often very little remains of permanent value." Carl Brumback, also a Pentecostal, accuses some local healing preachers with immorality, vanity, arrogance, too high an esteem of bodily healing and the false doctrine that health is the decisive sign of piety. This accusation prompted the *Pentecostal Evangel* to stop printing reports of the successes of the healing preachers. Many Pentecostals recognize that healing is not the most important aspect of the Gospel and, as far as I have been able to determine, Oral Roberts has never suggested that it is.

In all of this the Pentecostals have a reputation of being very gullible. It would surprise many therefore that some Pentecostal pastors with little or no education, but with years of experience in the movement, manifest a remarkable sophistication and are not easily taken in. More officially, the General Presbytery of the Assemblies of God, one of the largest of the Pentecostal denominations, issued a report in 1952 calling attention to the abuses in the healing ministry. This report, issued by a highly responsible group of men, is as sober and circumspect as any of the staidest of the historic churches. It laments the attempt on the part of healers to diagnose diseases, condemns the financial gimmicks sometimes employed ("Is selling prayers any more religious than selling indulgences?"), the unfounded claims of success and the emotional excesses.

It should not be thought that Oral Roberts is the object of all these allegations. Whatever negative judgment one feels bound to make on certain elements in his style of ministry, he is a dedicated, talented and sincere servant of the Gospel. Finally, any man who has been able to realize his ambitions to found a multi-million dollar university is a man to be reckoned with. Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, Okla., has not yet earned its academic spurs, but it is a step in the right direction.

Rampant Neuroses?

Questions about the psychological stability of Pentecostals are based on two factors: the emotional content of their prayer services, and their practice of what in Western society is socially unacceptable behavior, speaking in tongues. Depending on the socio-cultural situation, the emotional level can either be excessively high (by Roman Catholic standards) or restrained and contemplative.

It was recognized very early in Pentecostal history that the movement did attract some neurotic types. Frank Bartleman, who has described Pentecostalism's early history—one which he helped to form—wrote: "We had plenty of wrongheaded and wayward people with us. . . . Persons who would not listen to reason and violent characters have tried to cast their lot with us." Experienced Pentecostals will readily admit that in given cases tongues can be a merely hysterical manifestation. Where it is evident that a person needs help Pentecostals are not above urging their members to seek psychiatric counseling.

Some scholars take a dim view of the psychological make-up of glossolalics. The standard treatise on tongue-speaking is by George Cutten who contended (in 1927) that glossolalia is related to schizophrenia and hysteria. Lapsley and Simpson (in 1964), while denying that glossolalics can be considered mentally ill in any clinical sense, still consider them "uncommonly disturbed." In their judgment, tongues fill the psychic function of reducing conflict brought on by a "developmental 'fixation' at an early age in their relationship with parental figures" and is a "dissociative expression of truncated

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personality development." William W. Wood (in 1965) came to the conclusion that "Pentecostalism attracts uncertain, threatened, inadequately organized persons with strong motivation to reach a state of satisfactory inter-personal relatedness and personal integrity." In an unpublished paper, Andrew D. Lester noted that glossolalic groups he studied manifested childish megalomania, had weak egos, confused identities, high levels of anxiety, and were generally unstable personalities. In a survey of the pertinent literature (in 1968) George J. Jennings came to the conclusion that "most scholars and observers maintain that glossolalists are usually characterized with some personality deficiency."

Many researchers would not only reject these negative judgments, but also would reject the assertion that any such consensus as Jennings postulates exists. Taking up the conclusions of Cutten that glossolalia tends to be related to schizophrenia and hysteria, Alexander Alland (in 1961) countered that the socio-cultural data no longer supports such a view. The members of the Negro Pentecostal church that Alland studied were well adjusted to their social environment and, by the norms of socially acceptable behavior, normal in every respect except for speaking in tongues. In 1939 Anton Boisen wrote that: "the rapid growth of eccentric religious cults in recent years may be regarded as a direct result of the shared strain due to the economic depression," but he found no mental illness among the people he studied. Indeed he found several disturbed individuals who found the Pentecostal experience psychologically beneficial. E. Mandell Pattison (in 1964) rejected the position that economic deprivation is a necessary factor in explaining growth. Pattison also found that glossolalics are neither contentious nor emotionally maladjusted. In an early study Lincoln Vivier (in 1960) showed that Pentecostals scale lower on suggestibility than non-Pentecostals; in a later study (1968) he asserted that "glossolalia, as practiced in its religious context, is manifested in normal, non-neurotic persons." Vivier found that glossolalia brings a change in the ego complex which "tends toward the more mature and tends, furthermore, to add quality and enrichment of feeling and depth of meaningfulness." Speaking of Pentecostals within the historic churches, A. W. Sadler (in 1964) contended that the psychic force of glossolalics may not be neurotic but rather the unconscious expressing itself positively in a creative way.

Anxiety and tension, Vivier says, are obliquely associated with glossolalia, that is, not with the practice but with the frequency of tongues. One of the most interesting studies is that of the Jewish sociologist, Nathan Gerrard (1966, 1968), who observed a snake-handling Pentecostal church, using a conventional denomination as a control group. He concluded that there is very little difference between the two groups with regard to mental health, "but whatever differences there are seem to indicate the serpent-handlers are a little more 'normal' than members of the conventional denomination." The list of studies finding good the psychological health among Pentecostals could be extended. These studies and yet unpublished material show that to argue the dubious character of the Pentecostal experience or persons on the basis of psychological data is to argue from very shaky premises.

Before considering the rise of neo-Pentecostalism, a word should be said in criticism of classical Pentecostalism. Classical Pentecostals tend not to distinguish sufficently between what comes from the human psyche and what comes from the Holy Spirit. As Fatter Lepargnier has pointed out, the criterion for identifying charisma is not phenomenological, as the Pentecostals generally contend, but functional. Most Pentecostals are given to a fundamentalistic interpretation of the bible that pushes *sola scriptura* principle to its ultimate. Walter Hollenweger insists that even within the Protestant tradition the *sola scriptura* principle holds only within the framework of the church, and the Pentecostals are extremely weak on ecclesiology. Pentecostals tend to absolutize Lukan theology—as Catholics tend to absolutize the Pastoral epistles and the Lutherans a Pauline anthropology and conception of the Spirit. The radical nature-supernature dichotomy of the Pentecostals is hardly biblical, but is familiar to the decadent scholasticism in the Roman tradition and to the tradition in Protestant orthodoxy going back to the 16th and the 18th centuries. The Pentecostals' total approach is too subjective and too individualistic, which has been one of the causes of the fragmentation so characteristic of Pentecostal history. In their devotional literature, not in the life of the church, they give the impression that tongues is the dominant New Testament reality. In defense of the Pentecostals, it should be said that there is hardly a criticism mentioned in this article which Pentecostals have not already made of themselves.

Neo-Pentecostalism

About 1955, Pentecostalism moved into the historic churches, advancing from the lower socio-economic groups to the higher and thus, with one fell blow, shattering all the neat categories researchers had carefully worked out, especially their economic-deprivation theory. From this point on there were to be found large numbers of persons of wealth, education and social position among Pentecostals: doctors, lawyers, university professors, business executives. This movement, which is called neo-Pentecostalism, has had the most profound effect on churches which historically, doctrinally and liturgically, were the farthest removed from Pentecostalism: Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Lutherans. The groups that had the most in common with Pentecostals, that is the Holiness churches like the Church of the Nazarene and the Christian Missionary Alliance, were the least af-

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fected. In the spring of 1967, Pentecostalism appeared as a movement within Roman Catholicism. As far as I have been able to ascertain the Catholic bishops are mystified, cautious and basically unhappy (mostly because they lack information), but they have made no overt measures to stem the movement. It is still too soon to assess the reasons for this relative calm within Catholicism in contrast to the vigorous opposition often experienced by Protestant neo-Pentecostals, even to the point of excommunication.

In order to understand the negative reactions within the historic churches, Protestant and Catholic, some attention should be given to the difficulty of an objective evaluation of Pentecostalism. Obviously the first obstacle is the dearth of critical studies by those who have studied in some depth the movement within the classical Pentecostalism and in the historic churches. Church commissions set up to study the problem frequently are inadequate to the task simply because they cannot do the primary research themselves and do not have sufficient scholarly research on which to draw. The result is that judgments are made with only superficial knowledge.

The most formidable obstacle, however, is the public image of Pentecostalism. It is so bad that Pentecostals, classical or neo, never really receive a fair hearing. To the public, Pentecostalism conjures up images of emotional fanaticism, religious mania, illiteracy, messianism, credulity, and panting after miracles. It cannot be denied that there is both historical, and to some extent, contemporary justification for this image. But for large segments of the Pentecostal community the image does not reflect the Pentecostal reality. It no more reflects the true nature of Pentecostalism than the Inquisition, the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day or Alexander VI reflect the essential quality of Catholicism, although all belong to Catholic history.

Fear of religious experience also constitutes an obstacle to an objective evaluation of Pentecostalism. If I approach a lay person, priest, bishop, or religious superior with an abstract theological statement he will consider its orthodoxy dispassionately. But if I face him with a religious experience he panics. We have taken the position that religious experience does not belong to the normal Christian life. This is not formulated theologically, but is rather a psycho-theological stance. Catholics inherited this suspicion from the era of John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila who wrote at a time of some grave scandals; contemporaries claiming to have had religious experiences were later proved to have been either dupes or impostors. A heritage of suspicion was created that is with us still. Within Protestantism the fear of religious experience stems from a too-radical rejection of pietism.

The norms of socially acceptable behavior constitute another obstacle to evaluating Pentecostalism objectively: If one proceeds on the assumption that what is not socially acceptable, whatever its objective merits or demerits, is not worthy of a mature person, then social acceptability becomes the ultimate norm. Obviously, for the vast majority of Americans, and others too, speaking in tongues, prophesying and interpreting the Bible are not socially acceptable ways of behaving, however authentic the manifestations may be.

A further difficulty is the very nature of the charismatic gifts. One can subject them to a rational inquiry, examine them psychologically and sociologically and study their economic implications (which do exist). In this way one can learn much about the gifts, but the ultimate spiritual reality eludes such methods. Spiritual gifts can only be discerned spiritually, in the function of the kingdom of Christ. St. Paul said quite clearly that the gifts of the Spirit would not be understood, and therefore they would not be received. "An unspiritual person [that is, man left to his own natural resources] is one who does not accept anything of the Spirit of God: he sees it all as nonsense; it is beyond his understanding because it can only be understood by means of the Spirit" (1 Cor. 2:14).

There are some who will admit the existence of the gifts but object to what they consider their abuse. There are abuses and objections to them are well taken. But for large numbers of people what they object to in reality is not the abuse, but to the fact of the gifts. For many, any use of the gifts is an abuse, but as Larry Christienson notes "the cure for abuse is not disuse, but proper use."

Another obstacle to an objective evaluation is the history of divisiveness and fragmentation associated with Pentecostalism. Their causes are various. Some have interpreted baptism in the Holy Spirit and the gift of tongues as a direct authority to impose a personal theological view of the spiritual life, the nature of the church and the mechanics of parochial life. This supposed authority has been accompanied by a new legalism, messianic postures and disdain for the uninitiated. Others, on receiving the baptism in the Holy Spirit have, in the first joy of their discovery, been importunate in persuading friends and acquaintances to seek the baptism. This has resulted in alarm, resistance and open opposition. But even when all is in order, when there are no expressions of superiority, messianism or hard-sell, even with the greatest circumspection, opposition has developed; not infrequently it has been an irrational opposition whose vehemence is difficult to account for logically.

A final obstacle to an objective evaluation is the fear on the part of ecclesiastical authorities when they are forced to deal with a dimension which knows no jurisdictional boundaries, which cannot be regulated by decree, which cannot be pre-programmed, pre-planned or pre-structured. In such a situation ecclesiastical authoritarian figures often over-react. This could force a show-down in which persons are faced with the temptation to choose between the structural and the charismatic church, a

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fatal choice. Structure without the pneumatic, prophetic element is a corpse. But the pneumatic prophetic element without the structure is only charismatic chaos. One might ask whether a purely charismatic ecclesiology is viable. The church order without definitive offices (sacramental orders) as seen in the Corinthian epistles seems to have been rejected even in Paul's lifetime.

Despite all these fears and obstacles, Pentecostalism is growing, in some countries from 9 to 15 times as fast as the historic churches. How is this growth to be explained? Why are Roman Catholics joining the Pentecostal movement?

In the first place, Pentecostals offer not a doctrine, but an experience of God. For persons brought up within the tradition of an arid intellect-and-will, catechism-Catholicism and within the ambience of a raging objectivism (in liturgy, piety, prayer, law), an experience of God in the Pentecostal sense can be the discovery of a new dimension in life. Beyond that, Pentecostals promise that the experience of God will be power-generating, so that one's whole life will be transformed. This power is not hidden in the recesses of the soul, access to which is only through some abstract faith-act; rather it is power experienced within the room in which man experiences his concrete, historical self. Protestant and Catholic neo-Pentecostals share the whole spectrum of problems, personal and social, common to their contemporaries, but one of the problems so acute for others is greatly diminished for them: relevancy. The immediacy of the presence of God, the reality of his love, the power of his mercy, the clarity of his voice in his Word are all so real that they see God active in their personal history. A social psychologist might see in Catholic Pentecostalism the attempt to interiorize the authority which the now-suspect structural church exercised in the past, an attempt to find a new anchor for an institutionally nervous Christianity. Pentecostalism in any of its forms is an attempt to reach behind the formalities and structures which sacramentalize the original Christian experience, and to recapture the original experience itself without the visible sacrament. To this extent Pentecostalism is reductionist.

Even in their impatience with the structures of the Church, Catholic Pentecostals are usually profoundly loyal and have a great compassion for the episcopacy, in marked contrast to their attitude before their Pentecostal experience (which prompted one bishop to remark, "May their tribe increase"). A number of priests and nuns who were uncertain in their vocations have been reconfirmed in them. Neo-Pentecostals are also strongly drawn to prayer, so much so that one might be led to think of Pentecostalism simply as a prayer movement. The prayer meetings of Protestant neo-Pentecostals tend to be much more restrained than those of classical Pentecostals; Catholic Pentecostal meetings are even more so, being indeed the height of propriety.

The neo-Pentecostals are only one manifestation of the contemporary quest for transcendence and a new synthesis, a quest which has religious and secular branches. In the secular branch self-transcendence is sought through the use of LSD, pot, through T-groups, sensitivity sessions and yoga exercises. Two representatives of the religious branch would be neo-Pentecostalism and the underground church. The sociological similarity of Catholic neo-Pentecostalism and the Catholic underground church, to limit the scope, is striking. Father Caporale's characterization of the underground as "covenanting ecclesial units, neither territorially nor hierarchically located, which maintain functional identity boundaries, and generate more or less enduring autonomous systems of symbols, control and rewards," is a fairly accurate sociological description of Catholic Pentecostal groups. The whole quest for transcendence tends in both its religious and its secular branches to be a white middle-class activity.

Those in the historic churches who have found a measure of success in their quest for transcendence through the Pentecostal experience are faced with temptations to prophetic enthusiasm. Donald Gee, a classical Pentecostal, gives this advice to the neos: "Do not allow the first rush of novelty where prophetic gifts are concerned to sweep you off your feet. It is all so wonderful, and is such a liberation of spirit, that it is easy to become unbalanced, with speedy disaster. . . . Beware of making too much of 'messages' whether through tongues and interpretation, or any other way. The Spirit of God is not so prodigal with these things as we, in our folly, would have Him to be." Gee has also noted the frequency with which men of academic background seemed to forget all their scholarship and learning; this seems to be especially true of people with theological training. The essential reality which classical Pentecostalism has brought to the attention of the historic churches, the fulness of life in the Spirit and the exercise of the gifts, is of unassailable validity. But Pentecostalism is very weak in exegesis and in doctrine. Classical Pentecostalism cannot make a contribution here, and it is sad to see men of theological attainments taking over the whole Pentecostal vocabulary, exegesis and doctrine, simply because the experience has validity. All too often the result is simple, that neo-Pentecostals repeat the same mistakes that classical Pentecostals made and now regret. Also tragic is the unthinking way in which neo-Pentecostals adopt all the cultural baggage of classical Pentecostalism. Frequently no distinction is made between the experience and socio-cultural components which are not transferrable. Baggage here is not necessarily a pejorative term. It simply means the accoutrements with which one passes through time, which are historically and culturally determined, belonging to a style of life that is not universally valid. The pattern of classical Pentecostalism may have validity for a classical Pentecostal but not necessarily for others. A Lutheran or Presbyterian or Catholic who tries to squeeze himself into this pattern can only be the loser.

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

What the Spirit-ideologies fundamentally represent is the cultural emergence in the American Catholic world of a basically healthy and widespread Romantic Revival.

HOLY SPIRIT AS PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

DAVID TRACY

Perhaps it would be most helpful to state immediately one's basic reservations concerning the recent phenomenon of 'Spirit-talk' in contemporary American Catholic practice and theology. At the price of sounding world-weary at best and irreligious at worst, the phenomenon seems to this observer significant but certainly not unprecedented in the history of theology (c.f. Yves Congar's *History of Theology*. Doubleday, 1968. Esp. pp. 144-154; 166-168). Positively, the present phenomenon allows a genuinely religious spirit some breathing room within what have often become stifling institutional forms. It also provides for some intellectual flexibility within the often too rigid categories of the Catholic theological tradition. Negatively, however, the phenomenon bears very little long-range theoretical importance for theology. Of course, many in the 'underground' church or in the pentecostal movement find such lack of theoretical significance itself insignificant to their religious concerns. But any of them who have attempted or will attempt to construct a theology from their religious experience of the Spirit must be willing to face up to the strictly theoretical difficulties of their position. Nor does one have to adopt the purely rationalist stance of Brand Blanshard (vis-à-vis Kierkegaard) or the purely naturalist stance of Sidney Hook (vis-à-vis Paul Tillich) or the "linguistic stance" of Anthony Flew (vis-à-vis any 'religious' thinker) to share what would undoubtedly be their lack of enthusiasm for the new Spirit-Theology. In the short space available here, we will try to elaborate and exemplify how such a probably unpopular judgment is possible without forcing one into an anti-religious or anti-Spirit stance.

At first sight, a specific treatment of the nature of judgment may seem rather extrinsic to present purposes. Indeed, to consider it here may risk taxing the prospective reader's patience more than is judicious. But a number of considerations seem to demand precisely that risk. For do we not really have to ask ourselves anew, just what anyone means when he states that he is attempting a philosophical-theological judgment-discernment upon any phenomenon—especially upon a religious phenomenon that explicitly claims to be able to *discern* the Spirit? Is not such a question particularly exigent at a time when the Kantian critique of judgment and its influence on Protestant theology have come under serious questioning from a number of perspectives? Is it not equally urgent when the Thomist notion of judgment has become widely recognized as too explicitly objectivist to allow any immediate aid for the discussion of the presumably psychological-ontological factors involved in all "Spirit-Talk"? Or can we really content ourselves with the consoling but probably illusory thought that we somehow possess Pascal's *esprit de finesse* or Newman's illative sense on the question of "Spirit-talk" and may, therefore, sidestep a defense of what we mean by judgment at all and move immediately into often exhilarating but rather short-runned joys of judging in the style of "it seems to me that," etc. . . .

Indeed, within a context in which the very word "judgment-discernment" is open to so many meanings it becomes imperative for any prospective "discerner" of the discerners of the Spirit to state as clearly as possible just what he thinks he is doing when he attempts some

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judgment on their expressions and meanings. For in this as in any other critical attempt one must be willing to ask a few relatively uninteresting questions before the more interesting ones can even be formulated. In the present context, before one may attempt to formulate a language for the Spirit-phenomenon (section two) or, *a fortiori,* articulate the necessary conditions of possibility for a positive theology of the Spirit and attempt to judge the present American Catholic Spirit phenomenon (section three), one may do worse than say what he thinks judgment itself is. In this article, then, the last two sections are attempts at judgment; while this first is more simply an attempt to say what such an attempt presumes. But it is time to turn from an apologia for the discussion to the discussion itself.

1. The Nature of Inquiry and Judgment

"Judgment," of course, is a very elusive word: the histories of philosophy and of theology are strewn with theories of judgment (Aristotelian, Kantian, Whiteheadian, etc.) each one of which must ultimately defend its position psychologically, epistemologically, and ontologically. This is obviously not the proper place to enter into a discussion of these philosophical dialectics. For present purposes, I prefer to content myself with a brief exposition of the best theory in the nature of theoretic inquiry in general and of the act of judging in particular with which I am familiar, Bernard Lonergan's in *Insight.* While assuming the possibility of different analyses from other philosophical viewpoints, therefore, we will later be employing Lonergan's theory in order to locate some of the more important conditions that impel a relatively negative judgment on the recent theologies of the Spirit.

However, three precautionary notes should first be added. Caution one: the theory is not arbitrarily chosen. For as any careful reader of *Insight* realizes, the core of that work is Lonergan's careful and gradual movement up to, explicitation of, and development from, his peculiar explanation of judgment as a "virtually unconditioned." Caution Two: Lonergan's theory does not occur in a vacuum innocent of the more general philosophical dialectic. Indeed, it bears important and intrinsic connections with a long and respected intellectual heritage (principally, its obvious connections with contemporary theories of the nature of scientific judgments and its historical connections with Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Newman). Caution Three: Lonergan's theory is employed here not to impose a rigid set of *a priori* categories upon the Spirit phenomenon. Rather, it is chosen precisely because it avoids such rigidity by elaborating an explanatory but flexible theory on the nature of inquiry and judgment which may help to elaborate the necessary "conditions of the possibility" for judging the Spirit phenomenon. In fact, in the present writer's judgment, the Lonerganian language merely (but importantly) provides the most helpful heuristic approach for expediting the discussion.

To recall a central and often overlooked factor in Lonergan's argument, his analysis of the dynamism of human questioning reveals four differentiated, functionally interdependent and indeed self-structuring levels of inquiry (experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.). The original data (the 'religious' experience) provokes a whole series of questions: psychological, sociological, anthropological, philosophical, and theological. But before moving into any of those specifications, one should recall that the question impels one to a second level of the cognitional process: All the questions for intelligence (what? why? how often?) provoke insights and concepts on the level of understanding. But the questions for reflections (is it so? is it verified? is it true?) provoke the further and quite distinct kind of critical insights and judgments. For it is on this third level alone that there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and probability, of yes or no. On this level, there arises the personal commitment that makes one responsible for one's judgments: for on this level there come the utterances that express one's affirmations or denials, one's assents or dissents, one's agreements or disagreements. In a word, one expresses oneself. With La Rochefoucauld (if less cynically), one really understands why "Everyone complains about his memory, but no one of his judgment." It is time, however, to allow La Rochefoucauld's insight to take a more technical turn.

Accordingly, in the short section, 'The General Form of Reflective Insight,' lies much of the strength of the entire argument of *Insight.* In Lonergan's terms, the grasp of the sufficiency of evidence for a prospective judgment is a grasp of that judgment as a virtually unconditioned. The meaning of each part of the phrase is critical. 'Virtually,' first of all, refers to the fact that there are conditions for the judgment but that such conditions are fulfilled. In short, the inquirer is not dealing with a 'formally' unconditioned, (i.e., a judgment which has no conditions at all) but with a 'virtually unconditioned,' involving three principal elements:

(1) a conditioned,

(2) a link between the conditions and the conditioned. and,

(3) the fulfillment of the conditions.

Hence, any prospective judgment (e.g., Am I understanding this argument, Do I grant the possibility of 'spiritual' religious experience?) will be a virtually unconditioned (and thereby a grasp of the evidence as sufficient) if:

(1) it is conditioned: but the very fact of the actuality of *question for reflection* (Am I understanding?) shows that it is. For the posing of the question itself indicates a conscious recognition of the need for evidence that will insure a *reasonable* pronouncement.

(2) the conditions are known and (3) they are ful-

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filled (e.g. Am I alert at present? Have I understood the context and meaning of the question? Am I detached and disinterested in my inquiry? Am I asking the question in an already differentiated intellectual pattern of experience? And not in any spiritually undifferentiated state? Do I realize the meaning of the word 'virtually?' Am I seeking a matter-of-fact judgment or an absolutely necessary one? etc., etc.) In short do I realize that the very meaning of reflective insight is the power of my own rationality to make precisely that move? Indeed, Lonergan's explicitation of this universal reflective process as the movement of a prospective judgment from a conditioned to a virtually unconditioned by means of a grasp of the (usually) myriad conditions (see sections 2 and 3 for some of these conditions on Spirit-talk) of the conditions and their fulfillment is meant to be not some 'deus ex machina' (illumination, 'intuition,' 'vision') to save the epistemological day, but rather a relatively simple explanation (i.e. explicitation) of the matter-of-fact (*not absolutely* necessary) behavior of all rational activity. In other words, if the critical inquirer in any theoretical question (e.g. what is the relevant question to provide the needed conditions of possibility for Spirit-talk?) grasps that the correct question for reflection, in each case, actually constitutes the conditions, then he may further grasp that behind, within and grounding the 'link', the fulfillment of the known myriad conditions of every case for reflection, is *the condition* of all rational behavior: that rational and structured exigence immanent and operative in all cognitional process —an exigence which always demands a sufficiency of evidence and is satisfied to cease its inquiry only when its own high ideals are fulfilled. It is, then, the immanent cognitional structure itself, set into operation by the reflective question (e.g. Is religious experience verifiable and is this experience verifiable as religious?) and finding fulfillment only in a reflective act of understanding, which allows, indeed impels the critical inquirer to make the judgment *it is* (or *it probably is*) or it is not (or probably is not).

II. The Horizons of Religious Inquiry

If the nature of inquiry and judgment can be described in that general way, then the next heuristic necessity becomes to articulate the complexity of the 'religious' phenomenon (i.e. the data or experience in question here) and the consequent complexity emerging on all levels of inquiry into that phenomenon. For in the present case, the data alone (as 'human meaning' or 'behavior') are manifold and extremely difficult to determine. For example, even the relatively minor phenomenon of 'speaking in tongues' associated with the pentecostal experience has yet to develop measurable criteria. Secondly, the questions of the intelligent inquirer (in, for example, psychology, sociology or anthropology) upon this manifold and not easily measurable set of behavioral data are also as varied as the various theories in the various human or behavioral sciences. Thirdly, the questions for judgment (e.g. what are the conditions of the possibility of religious speech? Are they fulfilled here?) are likewise as varied as the criteria and categories employed by a particular philosophy of religion or a particular theological method and language. Once again it is impossible to enter fully into these many dialectics. Instead, we will again introduce a category—'horizon'—which may expedite the possibilities of the present discussion while forestalling a peremptory approach to the question.

Before defining 'horizon' technically, however, it would be well to attempt to set the descriptive mood whence such concerns and categories may emerge. 'Mood' here, moreover, refers not to some fleeting and unimportant phenomenon but to the Heideggerian reality described by Macquarrie as a moment of heightened awareness by means of which the right questions may begin. During the past few years, for example, every American has be-



come all too familiar with phrases such as 'generation gap,' 'credibility-gap,' etc. By now, moreover, every serious contemporary theological student presumes that he is also familiar (precisely as 'post-existentialist') with the much discussed 'existential gap.' But are we really? As Americans and Catholics, I suspect that just the reverse is true: that we are just beginning to *experience* that gap, however well we may be able to define the category. In fact, as we continue to lose our formerly treasured American and Catholic innocence, is it not far more likely that we will continue to be rapidly and sometimes desperately tossed into the crisis-situation exposed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the philosophical and Protestant 'existentialists'? For behind the use of the category 'existential gap' lies the reality of a fundamental alienation of the horizon-threatened subject from his former world of meaning and, at the limit, from himself and reality. And the self at stake here is not merely the 'self' revealed by the sciences of biochemistry or depth psychology or sociology but the yet more basic self as the opening to and/or creator of one's meaning, one's intelligence, one's freedom, one's ability to love, one's very ability to get some positive hold on the complexity of human and cosmic reality. In short, it is the self who has known dread. Even if one cannot express that experience, he knows that somehow and irretrievably

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his entire former interest, orientation, concern, horizon have become threatened on some basic level. At least two features of such dread are clear and commonplace: a non-specifiable anxiety in the face of such a threat combined with a spontaneous, ingenious and often subconscious resistance to the demands for radical change now put upon one. From such an experience the only possible liberation is, psychologically, a new self-identity and, ontologically, what can only be called a conversion, i.e. an entire shift from my present orientation, direction, and concern; a radical transformation of myself, my operations, my worlds of meaning.

Within such an 'existential context,' the category 'horizon' may first be defined metaphorically: as such it is the limit or boundary beyond which one simply cannot see. What lies beyond my present horizon, then, lies not principally in unresolved answers but in unrecognized questions which the phenomenon of dread has finally forced upon me. More technically, a horizon may be defined as a maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint. It possesses both an objective and a subjective pole, each one of which is conditioned by and conditions the other. The subjective pole refers to the intentionality-meaning possibilities of the present stage of development of the subject. The objective pole refers to the 'worlds' of meaning achieved by or open to the subject at his present stage of development. His world, in other words, may be defined as that totality of objects by means of which the subject in his present intentional development can operate.

For example, the subjective pole of an expert in a particular field would be comprised of that set of scientific operations with which he is familiar, while the objective pole is the field or fields (worlds) that such operations may reach. More philosophically, the objective pole of a philosopher in the Christian Wolff tradition is all possible being. His subjective pole would be the logical operations of necessity and possibility establishing the relationships between possible and necessary 'beings.' Or, more to the point, the subjective pole of a philosopher employing transcendental method (Coreth, Rahner, Lonergan) is that method itself; the objective pole is the being intended by and critically grounded in such method. Finally, in such a framework, one may recognize that any man at any stage of his life is open to at least refinement of his horizon, usually development and sometimes even what we have called above conversion (i.e., radical transformation).

In his most recent work, Lonergan has not remained content with his earlier analysis of man's horizon constituted by six differentiated worlds (common sense and theory; sacred and profane; interior and exterior) along with various possibilities of integration (e.g., elimination, transposition, oscillation, mediation, etc.). Rather he has attempted to formulate a basic theological method whose full complexity (e.g. the key concept of functional specialization) cannot be investigated here, but one of whose features merits attention for all theologians, i.e. the attempt to allow a genuinely collaborative effort by differentiating the notion of horizon into what he calls with increasing frequency relative and basic horizon. The distinction, I believe, is fundamentally the fruit of Lonergan's (and most Catholic theologians') deeper reading in the problematic of the human sciences (especially psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology) and in the contemporary philosophical movements of phenomenology and existentialism. But whatever its origin, the distinction itself is clear enough: relative horizon is one's present horizon relative to one's psychological (education), sociological (society) and cultural (epoch) development. It depends for its articulation on the present stage of development of those varied human sciences. Basic horizon, on the other hand, is the horizon of any man in relation to the presence or absence of what Lonergan begins to call the four basic, i.e., trancendental, conversions (intellectual, moral, religious, Christian). The key, once again, is conversion. As an operative definition of this central category, one may say that conversion is the actual transformation of the subject, his orientation and operations and therefore his worlds. While it is normally a prolonged process, it is often remembered as concentrated in a few key judgments and decisions. And when we refer here to the four *basic* or transcendental conversions, we are referring to the horizon-factors that must be operative in any genuinely theological inquiry: intellectual (or, more properly, philosophic) conversion; moral conversion, i.e. the transformation involved in moving from the level of judgment to that of decision and action: in short, the questions of value, of ethics, of self-constitution; religious conversion, i.e. the transformation of the subject when he is aware of himself as possessing an openness not merely as fact and achievement (self-appropriation) but as gift: it is the level, for example, of Jaspers' *Eksistenz*, of self as gift of the self by God to the self; Christian conversion, i.e. that transformation-in-faith of the subject into the 'contagious', if you will, life of the Spirit, into the death-resurrection of Christ Jesus. This later transformation, moreover, must be made in the face at once of one's highest possibilities (c.f. Bonhoeffer) and of one's own recognized inability either to indefinitely sustain one's development or to avoid the reality of the surd, the irrational, the genuinely evil factor in one's own life and that of one's society and culture, one's own or other epochs. (cf. the 'existentialist').

III. The Horizons of the Theologies of the Spirit

A few summary observations, then, are in order here. Judgment (precisely as a grasp of a virtually unconditioned) becomes increasingly difficult as the myriad conditions for critical inquiry expand. For example, on our

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present question, what we have called 'relative-horizon' factors have formerly been either ignored (e.g. Luther on the Anabaptists) or treated in purely literary terms (e.g. Ronald Knox's treatment of the Anabaptists in *Enthusiasm*). Today, on the contrary, such factors are imperative for the philosophical theologian to absorb especially as the human sciences in question grow ever more complex and technical. In psychology, for example, the conquistador attitude of Freud towards religion is now in fairly widespread disrepute among psychologists as the post-Freudian attempts to deal with the religious phenomenon continue to emerge (most recently, for example, the far more positive approaches of Abraham Maslow or Paul Pruyser or especially the far more rigorous approach of Paul Ricoeur). In sociology and anthropology, Marx's and Durkheim's critiques have yielded to the far more complex languages and more sophisticated data of such very different figures as a Claude Lévi-Strauss or a Peter Berger.

And in a directly parallel fashion, a philosophical theologian's judgment on the basic-horizon factors intrinsic to any religious phenomenon becomes ever more difficult as the philosophical and theological dialectics grow ever more complex. In contemporary theology, for example, it is by no means the 'Death-of-God' theologians alone who are fully involved in the philosophical-theological discussion of the God-Talk (or *a fortiori* of 'Spirit-Talk'). In fact, the present dialectic has become so complex that merely to list some of the more obvious options demanding serious and prolonged study by anyone in the field is itself a reasonably lengthy task: the contrasted availabilities of the 'early' or the 'later' Heidegger; the use of Whitehead and Hartshorne; the possibilities of the 'later' Merleau-Ponty; the subtle employment of American naturalism and pragmatism; the transcendental method of Rahner, Coreth, and Lotz and its historic-political critique by John Baptist Metz; the approach to the question of God by the Lonergan of *Insight* as compared to his more recent work and the work of some of his former students (Novak, Burrell, Dunne, *et al.*); the use of empirical 'models' or linguistic analysis (especially, the possibilities of the 'later' Wittgenstein), etc., etc.

If the reader acknowledges the accelerating complexity of all serious theoretical study of the religious phenomenon; if he further acknowledges the legitimacy of some kind of distinction between relative and basic horizon factors and finally, if he acknowledges the need on the level of basic horizon first to consider intellectual and moral conversion-factors before differentiating the possibilities of specifically religious 'conversions,' then he will be in a critical position to recognize the principal conditions that must be considered before making any definitive philosophical-theological judgment of the 'underground' and pentecostal phenomena and their resultant Spirit-theologies.

Moreover, if the critic is attempting to judge what claims to be an explicitly *Christian* conversion (the 'Holy Spirit') then, besides the conditions listed above, the following must also be studied: the widely acknowledged underdevelopment of a theology of the Spirit in the Western theological tradition; the gradual emergence (in the wake of the scriptural revival) of the needed biblical understandings of the Spirit; the scholarly recovery of the great theologies of the Spirit of the Eastern tradition (especially Origen and Gregory of Nyssa); the studies, in the Western tradition, of such central factors as the distinction between Thomist prudential 'discretio' and Ignatian personal 'discernment'; the recovery of the Western mystical tradition and the development of new and largely phenomenological categories to explicitate and communicate that tradition (e.g. Morel on John of the Cross, Fessard on Ignatius of Loyola); the contemporary emergence of a whole series of problematics each of which serves to highlight the inability of traditional categories for the Holy Spirit to handle certain theological tasks (e.g., the 'Kingdom-Church' relationship; the intrinsic role of the resurrection in redemption; the nature and function of the 'magisterium'; the nature of the sacraments and their relationship to faith).

Perhaps it may seem that I have set so many conditions for the prospective judgment that any such judgment is really an impossibility. To state the matter as bluntly as possible, I hope I have. For actually, the more one tries to judge any religious phenomenon, the more the hopes for some classical synthesis or neo-Romantic *tour-de-force* dissolve. Indeed, unless philosophical theologians become willing to recognize, on a purely practical level, the crying need for a collaborative enterprise and, on a more theoretical level, the centrality of the methodological question, the present impasse will continue. And, if one may be permitted to indulge in apocalyptic imagination for a moment, a few more years of this impasse and a few more desperate mythic attempts to save the theological day may well allow the few remaining practitioners of theology to become the alchemists of the behavioral sciences.

But this discussion still leaves me with the need to defend my relatively negative judgment of recent theologies of the Spirit. The basic defense of that position can now be defined: as fas as I can see, all of the 'Spirit' practitioners and theologians are quite innocent of the nature of theoretical inquiry, of the need to differentiate the myriad conditions before judging, and of the contemporary inadequacy of a return to undifferentiated expressions of religion. But that judgment may best be defended by a specific example: aside from the 'underground' and 'pentecostal' movements themselves, probably the most influential 'Spirit-theology' among American Catholics at the present time is Dr. Rosemary Ruether's in *The Church Against Itself*. Readers of that often brilliant work and the discussions it provoked (espe-

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cially the Callahan-Ruether exchange) will recall that besides its more obvious limitations (e.g., its too heavy dependence on one school of biblical exegesis or its often dogmatic statements on involved historical questions) there remains a central flaw in the whole enterprise: How in the world is Dr. Ruether able to speak so knowledgeably (i.e., so theologically) of the Holy Spirit? Does she realize the sociological, psychological, anthropological, philosophical, and theological presuppositional difficulties of her work? Her reply to Mr. Callahan (who wrote a largely sociological critique inspired by Peter Berger along with his own philosophical critique disguised as an incarnational theology) leads me to suspect that she does not.

A second reason for a negative judgment is fundamentally a relative horizon factor, but an extremely important one. It involves what many commentators consider the most important cultural determinant in contemporary Catholicism, viz, the much-discussed shift from classical to historical consciousness. That shift is by now familiar fare to most readers of contemporary theology and we will not belabor it here. Briefly then, in the theoretical realm the shift is one from classical Aristotelian science's concern for the universal, the necessary, the essential, to contemporary science's search for the complete explanation of all the data in terms of their intelligible relationships and its attendant concern for the changing, the probable, and the pluralism of perspectives involved in 'the best scientific opinion' on a particular question in a particular period. On a more 'existential' level, the collapse of classical theological systems and the slow transformation of classical institutional structures have forced most contemporary Catholics (*pace* Brent Bozell *et al.*) into a development of a genuine historical consciousness. Indeed, somewhat hesitantly at first on the level of *aggiornamento* and now in a full-fledged way on a widespread post-Vatican II and even post-ecumenical front, most Catholic thinkers no longer feel embarrassed to declare both their Catholicism and their contemporaneity.

Besides the generally acknowledged fact of this cultural shift, two factors involved in it seem especially pertinent to a discussion of the 'Spirit-phenomenon' and the varied reactions it provokes. In the first place, historical consciousness occurred not first in the Catholic context but outside and often against it (the seventeenth century scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the nineteenth century German Protestant domination of philosophical and theological thought). It is hardly surprising, then, if those trained within the structural and ideological security of the classical Catholic world should immediately distrust and/or reject any such 'Spirit-talk.' Their present dilemma is most graphically expressed by the desperate rapidity with which they find themselves quoting Luther's cries against the Anabaptists before returning to their anti-Luther polemics.

In the second place, the previous entries of historical consciousness (notably into the empirical and human sciences, into philosophy and into Protestant theology) have all been attended by a Romantic period. Indeed, such a period almost seems to be a necessity: to allow the newly-liberated culture to experience its varieties of spare, strange, original uniqueness again; and to allow time for the theoretic exigence to emerge anew and to formulate the methods and categories needed for its new tasks (for example, the experience of the young Hegel or the Protestant development of a hermeneutic from the Romantic hermeneutic of Schleiermacher and Dilthey through the more complex technical developments of Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer). Once again it is hardly surprising if the Catholic (especially the American Catholic) community should feel compelled to indulge in its own Romantic revival. Now, this is not to argue with supremely Toynbeean serenity that history must repeat itself. Indeed all the previous historical situations are only analogous to ours and certainly not definitive. For example, the American Catholic theological situation has for so long been strained by the pure rigidity of the manualist approach and the inflexibility of many of its institutions that the short space of time available to it either to recover its own theological sources (the biblical, patristic, medieval, liturgical, philosophical revivals) or to enter and understand the modern and contemporary periods may well prolong and intensify the classicists' antagonism towards the romantics and the romantic distrust of theory. In fact, the original difficulties attendant upon the classical Greek and medieval movements into the differentiated consciousness of *theoria* and the still further difficulties of the collapse of that movement into the sterile rigidity of the manuals along with the later and still-evolving transformation of that movement into the yet more complex and demanding exigencies of historically conscious *theoria* have tempted many Catholics to abandon the demands of theory and content themselves with the enriching but ultimately disappointing delights of an undifferentiated, i.e. romantic consciousness.

It is true, of course, that these shifts in Roman Catholic theology and practice have not yet occurred upon a universal front. But that they have occurred is indisputable —and not merely on the 1950's level of Toynbee's 'creative minority,' but also on the widespread and far more influential front represented most clearly by the majority of the documents of Vatican II and most graphically by the creative and inevitably controversial 'Dutch' catechism. Indeed the earlier struggles of the biblical, partistic, liturgical and ecumenical 'return to the sources' have already found eloquent and irreversible expression in the decrees and reforms initiated by that council. In that return, a clear, indeed, a radical openness to judgment by the 'Word of God' is especially prominent— and, I suggest, the key reason for the two-edged success

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of the 'aggiorniamento.' For the classical consciousness of the Catholic Scholastic tradition (including most of 'neo-Thomism') *has* yielded to a gradually evolving historical consciousness represented first by positive empirical studies of the bible, fathers, councils, liturgical decrees, etc., and secondly by the exigencies of continental personalism and phenomenological existentialism. One need only recall the careful historical work of a Congar, a De Lubac and a Küng, the aesthetic and kerygmatic impact of a von Balthasar, or the interpersonal categories of Schillebeeckx's sacramental theology to taste anew the freshness of recovery in the best thought of that period. Still it may be well to recall that the European Catholic theological context has, by and large, not abandoned a theoretic critique of its religious tradition but has attempted to restore and restructure that critique in the light of the richer context made available by its return to the sources and the re-emergence of a rigorously philosophical pluralism. The work of Karl Rahner from his earliest articulation of a transcendental method through his development of the notion of the 'supernatural existential' and its many applications, to his present theoretical struggle with the historico-political factors exposed by his former student, John Baptist Metz, reveals but one outstanding example of a more widespread European Catholic phenomenon.

In American Catholic thought, with which this article is principally concerned, the situation is far more difficult to understand. In the first place, our own historical sense of our relatively brief American Catholic past has not yet received any definitive treatment—perhaps because many of us vaguely suspect that there is not too much to recover. Yet such vague suspicions cannot veil the need for such recovery—and on a level coincident with the highest demands of contemporary historical scholarship and the most rigorous critique of the cultural and theoretic expressions of the American Catholic religious experience. But instead of such a recovery the present situation seems, to this observer at least, rather disheartening. The liturgical movement, once so promising, seems not to have returned to a more rigorous theoretic critique of its foundations but seems to have retreated into a basic lack of trust of its own foundations combined with somewhat vague and critically innocent calls for joyful 'revolutions.' The American Catholic biblical revival still seems reluctant to enter fully into the theoretic demands of the Bultmannian and post-Bultmannian hermeneutic problem. And, on a more practical level, attempts at structural reforms in the American Catholic Church too often collapse into an impasse in which neither side seems quite able to risk even trusting the other—much less entering into fully critical, i.e., theoretical and factual, discussion of the relevant issues. It is true that the American Catholic philosophical situation seems at present not only promising but possibly salvific for theology; the genuine revival of different traditions of Thomism; the accelerating interest in transcendental method or phenomenological ontologies; the full-fledged entry into the Anglo-American philosophical traditions. But for reasons which only some future historian may properly unravel, the full impact of those revivals have yet to transform American Catholic theology. For example, a philosophically very American—and religiously (perhaps to his surprise) very Catholic thinker like Daniel Callahan seems lately to prefer psychological and sociological critiques of theological phenomena rather than the philosophical critique and constructions which he might well achieve. But we must not paint too bleak a picture. For there still remain many (Burrell, Dunne, Dupré, Lonergan, Dewart, Richardson, Fontinell, et al.) who, in their very different ways, do attempt to recover and reconstruct a philosophical-theological critique of religious experience in a context both contemporary and, in the best sense of the word, Catholic.

In the meantime, however, central attention must probably be accorded to the not anti-theoretical but simply a-theoretical attempts of the at first expanding and now exploding American Catholic Romantic religious phenomenon. And since I doubt that either of the earlier two sections would convince most of the present members of the 'underground' and 'pentecostal' movements on the need for theory, perhaps a consideration of some more pragmatic factors may prove more effective, viz. the inherent religious dangers of a long-range anti-critical stance.

Indeed, in a day when the popular American 'religious' *Weltanschauung* can collapse any genuinely religious basic horizon into the complacency of the 'everyday' speech of fundamentalism (from Heidegger's *Gerede* to Simon and Garfunkel's 'dangling conversations') the pentecostals and spirit-theologians might well reconsider their own mistrust of theory. For unless theological inquiry of religious practice and speech begin once again to take the theoretic enterprise in earnest (not necessarily, of course, with the articulations given above) then the general distrust accorded all 'conversion' experiences and 'religious' speech by that highly elusive and, at his best, highly differentiated consciousness called 'contemporary man' must be judged well-merited. For notice what can all too easily happen to once genuine speech if it becomes content with itself too readily and criticizes itself too lightly. It almost inevitably arrives at the dead-end of 'everyday' (theologically, read fundamentalistic) and eventually corrupt religious speech. Nor is that phenomenon confined to religious conversion. For example, 'intellectual' conversion can become reserved in the popular mind for now mythic figures like Einstein or Teilhard (what splendid poster-materials their extraordinary faces provide!). Or 'moral' conversion can become identified with the 'Up With People' moral rearmament group. 'Religious' conversion can become the reserve of eventually desperate proselytizers for the quickest 'now' trip to the 'Divine' like Tom

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Wolfe's Ken Kesey or Timothy Leary's Timothy Leary. Or 'Christian' conversion can become identified, at one extreme, with mere church attendance or, at the other, with Oral Roberts' faith-healing by placing one's hands on the television set. The problem is not that the originating moment in almost any of the above examples could not really open one's horizon to the transforming possibilities of conversion. But they do not. Why? At least a major part of the reason may well be that (short, of course, of Western *hubris*) it is impossible any longer for a sophisticated contemporary mind to allow such 'conversions' to develop or even endure without engaging in the most rigorous inquiry upon even its richest moments and its possible foundations. We have seen too often how 'religion' can become no more than an intellectual failure of nerve. How 'God' can become an emotional uplift for the 'gaps' in our lives. How 'Spirit' can become an unexamined blanket-word to cover a whole range of rich but too-fleeting experiences which may or may not be real (i.e., true). For the perhaps unpleasant fact remains that no alert contemporary Westerner can really turn his back on science, on criticism, on *theoria* (in a word, on differentiated consciousness) even in his articulation of his 'moral,' 'religious' and 'Christian' life. More accurately, he can do so only at the price (too often and too willingly paid, I fear) of having that life, at first ecstatic, dissolve into the adventitiousness of a 'religious' atmosphere or a 'leisure' moment or harden into the brittleness of an ideology.

In my judgment, then, what the Spirit-theologies fundamentally represent is the cultural emergence in the American Catholic world of a basically healthy and widespread Romantic Revival. But when the revivalists turn to theology they seem either to return to a classical biblicism or to create undifferentiated categories which are left theoretically undefended because usually indefensible. One may even agree that the contemporary under-thirty generation demands a McLuhanite world where they may live 'mythically and in depth.' One may also applaud those theologians who have attempted to capture that world, as William Hamilton does in his brilliant essay 'From Prufrock to Ringo.' One may further wish to encourage without patronizing a theologian like Rosemary Ruether in her plea for religious breathing space *via* some kind of recovery of the originating Christian eschatological spirit. And one may join this writer in refusing to label the present Spirit-movement as simply another kind of *Zeitgeist* theology. But still one's former theoretical reservations hold. And for one who does not claim to be a discerner of spirits but only a philosophical theologian such reservations are critically binding. Indeed, in a day when even the 'establishment' journals like *Time* can list those who 'do' or 'don't' have 'soul' or the *New York Times* can list those who 'are' and 'are not' 'charismatic' (and can even inform its quiet Sunday readers on the availability of 'Rock as Salvation') one need

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not search for what the great American 'Mainstream' likes to call 'fringe' groups in order to document the American Romantic revolt.

It had been said of Giambattista Vico, the great eighteenth century precursor of the later Romantics, that his insistence upon the 'priority of poetry' against *philosophic* rigidity was a doctrine thought out at the end of the seventeenth century, written in the eighteenth, read in the nineteenth, and understood in the twentieth. I trust that our present theological Romantics will not have to wait that long for recognition. But I also hope that they may learn again not to distrust others or themselves when they find that they usually cannot reject the demands of critical investigation upon even their richest and most ineffable experiences—and that such investigation must be done in the light of the authentic traditions of our past and the almost incomprehensible demands of our uneasy present and our uncertain future. In the meanwhile, I hope that they have experienced God's forgiving Spirit deeply enough to pardon one who, at the last, must join Yeats to say: "So get you gone, von Hügel, though with blessings on your head."

The Church, intent on finding God's will and mind, and aware of the insufficiencies of its own criteriologies, has, at times, substituted magic for genuine religious dependence on the Spirit of God.

HOLY SPIRIT AND CHURCH AUTHORITY

DANIEL MAGUIRE

At root, we are all idol-makers who would capture God and truth in static form. We instinctively shy from the Spirit of God who is life and process and surprise. We are strangers to the mobile God of ancient Israel who in "great times" was active and poured out his living spirit on the dead bones of Israel and his people lived. At other times he slept and seemed uninvolved and his people protested this in their liturgies.

Rabbinic teaching was saying at the time of Christ that God's spirit had disappeared with the last of the great prophets. Yet hope perdured in the God who loved "with an everlasting love," who had promised new outpourings of his spirit "on all mankind." The faith of many found this outpouring in Jesus, the man who was "conceived of the Holy Spirit." "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me," he said, and for those who believed him, Yahweh was wide awake again.

Suddenly the Spirit was everywhere, building community, firing believers with love, filling all with understanding. Through the Spirit all know the things of faith; all "are taught by God"; all have gifts of understanding and "need be taught by no one." The Spirit gives each person the capacity to judge, to love, to be free and to be glad. The gift of the Spirit was lavish and without rules. Of unbaptized believers Peter could say: "they have received the Holy Spirit just as much as we have" (Acts 10:47). The earliest New Testament theology of the Spirit was an exuberant and optimistic religious anthropology. It was also a bit naive. Enthusiasm generated absurdities and joyously attributed them to the Spirit of God. (Some early gnostics interpreted Christian freedom as a repeal of the commandments . . . especially those regulating sexual conduct.)

Organization and the development of ministries was

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healthy and inevitable. It did, in fact, obtain, bringing with it, of course, the inherent danger of institutional religion, the danger of "localizing" by arbitrary *fiat* the God whose Spirit it seeks. The religious quest for the Absolute leads to the formation of the *QAHAL* and then, it would seem from history, the *QAHAL* is inclined to evade the quest for the Absolute by absolutizing and sacralizing itself, its history and its instruments. In Exodus they took their golden earrings, melted them into an image and said "Here is your God." The Church, like Israel, is tempted to idolize, to leave its God and to worship its own ornaments. Some historical perspective might help us to assess the extent of our modern idolatries.

The very early Church was not without ministries. It was versatile and liberal in creating, shaping and even discarding them. Aside from the apostles, prime witnesses of the Christ event, we find prophets, evangelists, teachers, pastors, overseers, presbyters, leaders, presidents, stewards or administrators. These ministries were not a primary reality around which the Church was structured, but rather involved functions within the Christian life of service. The lists of ministries (I Cor. 12:28-31; Rom. 12: 6-8; Eph. 4:11) vary without apology. One individual might claim several ministries. There is no indication of a fixed set of "offices" destined for all time.

More is known of the Corinthian Church than any other New Testament Church. Paul was convinced that this Church was enriched in every way and lacking in no spiritual gift (1 Cor. 1:5,7; II Cor. 8:7). In this Church, and apparently in all the Pauline Churches, there was little of the structuring later to be considered essential and divinely designated. There was no monarchical episcopate; there appears to have been no presbyters and no ordination to office by the laying on of hands. In this Church, as Küng writes: "Anyone who is qualified for a particular ministry—as prophet, teacher, helper, superior, bishop or deacon, etc.—and who performs it properly, has received the call of God and the charism of the Spirit." Indeed in the indisputably Pauline letters, the term *episcopos* is found only once, and then in the plural, suggesting a collegial arrangement (Phil. 1:1). (Luke's contention in Acts 14:23 that Paul "appointed elders . . . in every Church" tends to be seen today as influenced by later tradition.)

The early Church did not see Jesus as having brought them the fullness of truth. The Spirit was expected to lead them "to the complete truth" (John 16:13). There was, however, great reliance on the power of the truth that was revealed in Christ. The term "charism of truth" was used by Irenaeus, not to describe the teaching power of Church officers, as it is in Vatican II, but to express the power of the truth itself. The title "vicar of Christ" was first applied to the Spirit. It was not in men of special rank that basic doctrinal security reposed, but in the power of the Spirit of truth. While the apostles lived and could provide living witness of the genetic Christian experience, the Church was adequately served by the rather fluidly and sporadically developed ministries of first applied to the Spirit. It was not in men of spetolic witness, there was room for prophecy and charism. The death of the last apostles and the persistent influx of variant, interpretative theologies changed all this.

In the post-apostolic Church, the systematizing that had already begun became more intense and precise. In a true sense, there could be no "successors of the apostles" since the apostles were first-hand witnesses of the revelation which had been given, in Jude's words, "once and for all." Apostolicity, a property of the whole Church, came to be seen as the essential criterion of being "in the Spirit," of being in contact with the initial formative revelation. The notion of apostolic succession when it first appears in Hegesippus, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen is understood in terms of the maintenance of apostolic doctrine. As Congar says, the "links of this succession are principally those of an authentic teaching."

The line of "succession" went like this: God spoke in Jesus; the apostles experienced the revelation of God in Jesus. After the death of the apostles, those who had heard them had prime credentials. Thus Irenaeus could claim instruction by Polycarp who had listened to John; Mark was thought to have been instructed by Peter and Luke by Paul. (The glut of pseudo-apostolic writings indicate this same system of dependence.) Cities such as Rome, Smyrna, etc., founded by apostles, were considered as specially reliable witnesses to truth. The custom of arguing from "Fathers," unimpeachable authorities from the past, began in the second century and by the time of the Nestorian heresy was an established technique.

The rise of the "bishops" was extraordinary. Though he did not use the later term "hierarchy," Ignatius of Antioch had a markedly hierarchical view of authority and church. He tells the Magnesians and Trallians that in being subject to their bishop they are subject to God. The bishop comes to be seen as a kind of personification of the Church in Cyprian, with his "bishop in the Church and the Church in the bishop." Old Testament notions of king and high priest, as well as the notion of prince, are applied to bishops by Origen and Hippolytus. Texts which originally were applied to all Christians were now limited in application to the bishops: "A spiritual man . . . is able to judge the value of everything and his own value is not to be judged by other men" (1 Cor. 2:14). From the time of the pastoral epistles, there are signs of a developing monarchical episcopate. This development could scarcely have been seen as divinely established since it did not become general practice until the middle of the second century.

Omens and signs were much heeded by the pagans in

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appointing men to high office. Something similar developed in the Church as historical backtracking became difficult and officeholders became the main guarantors of truth. Councils often claimed the support of visions. Visions and supernatural communications are attributed to St. Cyprian. St. Bernard weighs the "signs" in deciding between Innocent II and Anacletus II. Inspiration and revelation are loosely attributed to episcopal and conciliar statements.

The allusions to kings and high priests understandably diminished the stress on service in the development of the episcopal role. Still, Cyprian could say that he had made no decisions "without the approbation of the people."



Bishops were elected by the people and were concerned to give reasons for their decisions. They were to be men excelling in love. To receive someone *episcopaliter* was to receive him with generous hospitality. An effort was made to choose genuinely holy men for the episcopal function. Authority continued to be seen as separable from ecclesiastical appointment. Holy men had an authority directly from God. (Latter, in the monothelite and iconoclast crises, authority passed from hierarchical figures to the monks, whether priests or not, because of their undisputed sanctity.)

The rise of the episcopacy, however, was paralleled by the decline of the charismatic and prophetic in the Church. It is true that as late as the Didache (c. 100) the prophets are in the highest regard in the community. Prophets still celebrate the Eucharist and are permitted to digress from the customary ritual. When there are not enough prophets and teachers, bishops and deacons are to be chosen. The Didache admonishes the people not to belittle bishops and deacons "for they are worthy of honor along with prophets and teachers" (15:2).

Although I Thessalonians urged the faithful not to "suppress the Spirit" or to treat "the gift of prophecy with contempt," prophets who ranked second only to apostles in early lists of ministries, were soon eclipsed by appointed officers. During the second century they are still to be found, but by the third century they disappear.

For the first Christians, Scripture meant what we call the Old Testament. Gradually, however, the Christian Scriptures were formed. Again, apostolicity was the critical factor. By what Cullman calls "the principle of a canon," the Church "drew a line under the apostolic tradition." Without stating the invalidity of subsequent religious experience, the Church "subordinated the subsequent tradition . . . to the superior criterion of the apostolic tradition codified in sacred Scripture." (Oscar Cullman, *The Early Church,* Westminster, 1966, p. 90.) Four gospel accounts were canonized in the Christian scriptures. Celsus wrote that the Christians treated the Gospel "like drunkards" by "recoining it three and four and many times." Many Christians agreed. Strong efforts to reduce the "gospels" to one were made. Interestingly, the most notable efforts were made by men eventually recognized by the Church as heretics—Basilides, Marcion, Tatian, the Valentinians. The prevailing mind of the Church was not scandalized by the multiplicity. It made sense that the divine revelation should be refracted through a plurality of forms. Heresy, as ever, was guilty of reductionism and a narrow selectivity.

The establishment of a Scripture did not mean the adoption of a *sola scriptura* stance by the Church. The Spirit was not to be limited to the pen. Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Basil, Epiphanius and others did not feel that all apostolic richness was contained in the sacred pages.

From the second century on, unanimity of the Churches was an authoritative criterion of truth. According to the classical and sanguine formulation of Vincent of Lerins, that was to be believed which had been believed "everywhere, always, and by all." Unanimity will be seen into modern times as a sure sign of revelation. (It was used by Pius IX and Pius XII to justify the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption.)

The Constantinian event had an influence on the developing Church that was nothing less than colossal. It created changes that linger on in present day Christian consciousness. Clerical separatism and juridicism become conspicuous presences in this epochal time. Bishops had become increasingly strong in the third century. In the Constantinian Church they became *illustri,* equal in prestige to senators. They were vested with honors, subsidies and civic authority. They and their clergy were draped in privileges and immunities. (The Theodosian Code has strong penalties for those who would fraudulently pretend to clerical status to reap its advantages.) Eusebius did not sing alone when he greeted these events in eschatological tones.

The wine of imperial favor was a heady one. Jesus had warned his followers of how the pagan kings ruled. "This must not happen to you." But the new status was beguiling, and heavily juridical notions of authority, society and office seeped into the Christian ecclesial mind. The osmosis of Roman legality was thorough and so the expression: *ecclesia viget lege Romana.* By the time of Gregory I (590-604), it was decreed that Roman law should be used whenever no relevant ecclesiastical law could be found.

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The Constantinian experience also hastened the formation of a separate clerical caste. In the early Church the ministries were seen as functions. Now they constitute the minister a different kind of being. Gradually the notion of *character,* developed by Augustine in another context, was found admirably suited to give ontological basis for the new differentiation of clergy and laity. Pope Celestine I wrote the bishops of Narbonne that they should be distinguished by their knowledge and conversation, not by their dress or "manner of life." His enjoinder was overriden by the processes of clericalization. Special dress, which had not been required even for the liturgy, became common in the fifth century, as did the tonsure. Clerical celibacy made its uneasy but highly significant debut. The stage was set for Gratian's: "There are two kinds of Christians," and for Urban II's "two kinds of life . . . one to help the insufficiency of the weak, another to perfect the goodness of the strong." The creation of specialists is a classical retreat from the rule of the Spirit.

A New Notion of Authority

A revolution in the notion of authority occurred in the middle ages. It is sharply visible in the reforms of Gregory VII. In a desire to free the Church from its identification with political society, Gregory sought to establish the Church as a sovereign society in its own right with power over kings and their kingdoms. He commissioned scholars to comb Roman and ecclesiastical sources for supportive juridical texts. A narrowly juridical conception of Church authority emerged from the burgeoning canonical studies. In earlier thinking, authority was God's and was visibly and sacramentally represented in Church ministers and "vicars." God's authority and power could be vertically, iconologically *presenced* in his ministers. After the Gregorian reform, as Congar writes, "*vicarius* came to indicate, to a steadily increasing degree, a delegated assistant himself possessing an authority handed over by a founder in the past."

The apparently subtle change was massive in its consequences. Church officers, especially the Pope (whose office in this period was much affected by what Weiler calls "totalitarian thinking"), rather than imperfectly reflecting God's authority came to be seen as *possessing* it through delegation. Indeed, authority came to be seen as embodied in the officeholder. A confusion of ecclesiastical with divine authority ensued in succeeding centuries. The change was marked by a switch from a sacramental and mystical to a juridical ecclesiology. Juridical categories converted the Church into what Stickler has called the *Corpus Christi juridicum.*

Though authority at the episcopal level was radically influenced by this thinking, the error was most telling in the subsequent history of the papacy. Papal claims in the ninth century, strategically buoyed by the False Decretals, already had an absolutist tinge. The twelfth century renaissance of Roman law lent itself to a structuring of these claims. In Roman law the subject of law is the individual and in public law the subject is not the people but the state conceived of as a person. The roots of absolutism are contained in this abstractionism since the power of the prince can come to be seen as the personification and embodiment of the people with their rights and powers. Add to this the perennial temptation of any leader to say *"L'état c'est moi,"* and it will explain how some deviant and stubborn forms of papalism rivaled the sovereignty theories of Bodin and Machiavelli in philosophical absolutism.

Aegidius of Rome said that the supreme Pontiff could be "called the Church." Sylvester Prierias believed the universal Church to be "virtually" in the Pontiff. The Church was described as "the body of the Pope." The confusion of divine and human authority can be seen in Tancred's: ". . . . he represents God because he takes the place of Jesus Christ . . . he can grant dispensations beyond the law or against the law." Witness, too, Bernardus Palmensis: "In everything he wants, his own will is the only norm of action." Some went so far as to speak of the presence of Christ under the pontifical species. St. Catherine saw the pope as "gentle Christ on earth." Ockham reports some as saying that if the Pope contradicted the gospel, they would believe him rather than the Gospel. Others opined that by a special revelation the Pope could change the Church's nature and set St. Paul aside in favor of Roman law.

This pontifical fever was running high in some quarters at the time of Vatican I. Aubert records a remark of the bishop of Geneva to the effect that there had been three incarnations of the Son of God: in the womb of the Virgin, in the Eucharist, and in the old man of the Vatican. *La Civiltá Cattolica* explained that "when the pope meditates, it is God who thinks in him." Pius IX was not unaffected by all this. When Cardinal Guidi quoted tradition to ground his modest reservations about the definition of infallibility, Pius replied: "There is only one tradition; that's me." Recently, the American bishops' pastoral on *The Church in Our Day* says that "no one would maintain . . ." that even "all the laity together should be heard by the Christian community in the same way that the Pope in his office of Chief Shepherd" is to be heard.

Fortunately, these currents have not run unopposed. The expression attributed to Jerome had much resonance: *orbis major urbe.* Tradition also enshrined the axiom: What affects all should be treated by all. Gratian took the forgery: "The pope is to be judged by no one" and added "unless he should deviate from the faith." Cardinal Anibaldeschi in the 13th century said that any Church authority could be resisted on grounds of better information, even when there was threatened excommunication. Suarez countenanced disobeying a Pope who

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blocked a necessary council. And Bellarmine, for all his stress on papal authority, conceded that the Church would be in a sorry state if it had to accept a pope who was doing it serious harm. Furthermore, the papal power was never ontologized and given indelible status, as is attested by the multiple depositions of popes in Church history. Important, too, were the moderate conciliar theories that developed widely in the Church of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and which found blessing at the Council of Constance. These theories emphasized the inability of the pope to gainsay the faith of the living Church.

It was not just the papacy that was victimized by being molded into an image of divinity. The Holy Scriptures have been similarly treated. Tertullian felt that "a

doctrine is false by the very fact that Scripture does not speak of it." Irenaeus branded the Scriptures "divine" and "perfect." For the early apologists, the Old Testament was the source of all truth. The Alexandrians emphasized the absolute authority of Scripture. To establish the omniscience of Scripture, the early Fathers took pains to show that the wisdom of the pagans was pilfered from our holy writ. After referring to the sciences of physics, ethics and logic, Jerome said that whatever man's tongue could speak, whatever his mind could encompass is contained in Scripture.

For the men of the middle ages, the book of nature and the book of the soul could only be deciphered by reference to the Bible. Roger Bacon wrote that all the wisdom useful to men can be found in the Bible, although, he conceded, all of it is not therein explained. The Protestant reformers, reacting against the sacralization of tradition and office, cannot be excused of a sacralization of Scripture.

The great councils, a perennially favored technique for probing ecclesial wisdom, fared somewhat better. The manifest humanity of their proceedings generally discouraged their excessive aggrandisement. Indeed, Gregory of Nazianzen was of the opinion that no council had ever turned out well. Augustine's remarks on councils are more helpful and realistic. He says that even in the case of universal councils, "the earlier are often corrected by those which follow them, when, by some actual experiment, things are brought to light which were before concealed, and that is known which previously lay hid." (He used the verb *emendare* to describe the correction of past councils.)

In the period of the counter-reformation (a strange but not entirely undescriptive term), a further consolidation of the authority of officeholders took place. The experience of ebullient diversity banished hope that the power of Christian truth was such as to ensure decisive unanimity. The important magisterial role of the universities in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries waned in the new climate. In subsequent centuries, the boundaries between the juridical and the epistemological blurred as Irenaeus' "charism of truth" no longer referred to the inherent power of revelation but to the power of officeholders to discern orthodoxy. At the hands of theologians "the rule of faith" which used to signify the normative content of the faith came to refer to the official proclamation of the faith by the "divinely assisted" hierarchical magisterium. The juridical metaphor was dominant in the understanding of hierarchical teaching. A doctrinal pronouncement was seen in a manner similar to the enactment of law. An "official" statement is binding if certain conditions are fulfilled and if the officials will to invoke their full authority. The will to bind would, apparently, be a sign of the activated assistance of the Holy Spirit. The modern Rahner-Vorgrimler dictionary puts it baldly when it says that the magisterium is a teaching competence "juridically embodied." The seductive comfort of such an approach is that it views the "official" as divinely blessed. The problems here merit further comment.

The Spirit and the Magisterium

Vatican II confronts the illusion that we live in a post-magical world. It appeals for "a more critical ability to distinguish religion from a magical view of the world and from the superstitions which still circulate." Although magicians inhabit every forum, magic is a natural hazard for religion. The "magico-religious" category of anthropology shows that magic is stimulated when the achievement of results seems beyond our native resources. In the world of science, magic delayed technological growth. In religion it is the bane of creative response. The scantiest look at history shows that the Church, intent on finding God's will and mind, and aware of the insufficiencies of its own criteriologies, has, at times, substituted magic for genuine religious dependence on the Spirit of God.

Sacralization has been our favorite magical indulgence. Sacralization occurs when persons, formulae or things are seen not only as manifesting the sacred or functioning in the realm of the sacred, but as somehow substantively embodying the sacred. Juridical trappings and categories have regularly attended this process, endowing it with respectability and order. It is important to see how the sacralizing process has affected the teaching and ruling function in the Church, the scriptures and dogmatic

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traditions, in order to determine the proper response of the Christian to these realities.

In the view of the magisterium that has prevailed especially since Trent, the magisterium has been thought of as hierarchical. The Pope or the bishops with the Pope can achieve infallibility in their utterances on faith or morals. In point of fact, there is no instance of hierarchical teaching on particular moral questions that is seen as "infallible." In other matters infallibility is rarely claimed, especially of late, as the complexity and history of doctrine and language is appreciated. (Vatican II was avowedly fallible.) More practical in this view of the magisterium is the assertion that the Pope and the bishops are *ex officio* the "authentic" teachers of the faith. Such "authentic" teaching claims the "religious assent" of the faithful. According to Paul VI, the magisterium could "preserve and teach the faith . . . without the help of theology." It would not be easy, the Pontiff concedes, since it would be done without revelation and inspiration and "only with the assistance of the Holy Spirit." Still, it is for the magisterium to "make an authoritative judgment in the light of revelation on new doctrines and on the solutions proposed by theology." Pius IX had put it as clearly saying that it was the duty of the hierarchy to direct theology.

Such a position has difficulties. It treats the magisterium as a preter-theological preserve. As soon as you begin to explain the Christian faith, however, you enter theology and the problems thereof. Scripture itself contains varying theologies. Furthermore, if the magisterium must direct theology and rule on its findings, it has set for itself a supremely theological task. This task, in fact, demands skill not only in historical theology but in exegesis, linguistics, philosophy, etc. The achievement of this theological task without an essential dependence on theological skills sounds dangerously magical. It is also redolent of docetism, which would escape the human condition in the pursuit of the sacred.

If the hierarchical magisterium purports to move amid theological findings and, as though with a divining rod, to discern truth from error, it must and does claim to do so through the assistance of the Holy Spirit. There is another difficulty here. The assistance of the Spirit is not pressed on unwilling subjects. The teaching grace can be blocked by sin. The American bishops' pastoral admitted that "those in apostolic office who violate the limits of their authority . . . diminish their effectiveness in echoing Christ authentically." The promise of Christ's ultimate victory does not allow us to prescind from the darkening influence of sin. If the magisterial reliability of office-holders, singly or corporately, is not dependent on their "disposition and cooperation" (Trent), then we have at once the heresy of forced grace and the "something for nothing" of magic. If it is so dependent, it cannot elude theological evaluation and the possibility of dissent.

Assent to the "authentic" teachers cannot be absolutized. (Thomas More is lauded for opposing his hierarchy in a serious matter.) Rather, if error in hierarchical teaching is recognized in a reliable fashion, it is *dissent* and not *assent* that is religious. The wide dissent of theologians and other Christians to the *Humanae Vitae* of Paul VI is, I believe, a good example of religious dissent. The distressing spectacle of the old teaching on contraception being brought forth again long after its philosophical and theological underpinnings had been cut away, is, among other things, a betrayal of the traditional notion of the oneness of truth. Relying on "the light of the Holy Spirit, which is given in a particular way to the pastors of the Church," the encyclical abstracted from the development of thought that has taken place in the entire human community on this subject. Whatever "light of the Holy Spirit" animated this development of human consciousness is treated as negligible. In the presuppositions of this encyclical, the Spirit, to be heard and to be deemed authentic, must "go through channels." The inevitably limited witness of deceased popes is heard with fixational intensity while the presence of the Spirit in the living Church is bypassed. Dissent to this limiting theology of discerning the Spirit is a religious necessity.

Icebergs in Shipping Lanes

What then of the papal and episcopal roles? First of all, it is inexact to say that there is a revolt against authority today. There is a revolt against authority figures who appear like obstructive icebergs in shipping lanes, frozen fragments from another world. There is also a healthy revolt against sacralized pretenders in Church and state. But human hearts still long for leadership. Edward L. Long has said that the Christian Churches lack a science of leadership and when a great leader happens along we dub it a charismatic event. This lack should be met. Rulers and teachers in new forms are needed for a new age. Ruling leadership should be such as to create growth and peace. Where growth and peace are absent, it is a fair sign of deficient leadership. A breakdown of creative order will be diagnosed by leaders as disobedience or a lost sense of law and order. This is an understandable, defensive simplism. The challenge of leadership, however, is to motivate, not to importune compliance. Jesus, interestingly enough, seemed more interested in the use of authority than in disobedience. The message might be that when authority functions well, the community tends to do likewise.

The rule of the Spirit must be found in human processes and not treated as a *deus ex machina* substitute for the human realities. The authority to rule cannot be conceived as divinely imparted and existing independently of the will of the community. Rather, as Robert Johann writes, the power of authority is based on the "actual intention of unity, institutionally embodied and acknowledged by the plurality of persons as having a claim on

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them." Hence, authority depends essentially on community will and includes in its notion the possibility of deposition or recall. Unimpeachable authority is an idol.

On the other hand, the community which founds authority should not confound it by complying only when it agrees. Authority requires the community-building ability to yield one's preference at regular times. Without this ability to yield and to trust, community ceases and atomistic individualism prevails. This does not mean that there is a given "presumption in favor of authority"—civil or ecclesiastical. Better, it is the task of authority to create a presumption in its own favor. Authority figures must realize that what they command can be commanded because it is good; it is not good because commanded.



Law is a "dictate of reason" by essence. When it is not reasonable, it ceases to be law. The will of the legislator cannot "bind under pain of sin"; sin results from the malicious rejection of a good which the legislator and his law may have exhorted us to embrace.

As to the teaching role of Church officers, it may once have been possible for the bishop to be the principal teacher of doctrine. Because, however, teaching competence must be earned and maintained and is not an *ex officio* endowment, no bishop today could easily achieve it. The "charisma" of the papal and episcopal offices does not impart a special "feel" for the truth that can be divorced from the development of expertise. The Christian duty to teach can best be fulfilled by Church officers if they use their influence to activate the teaching resources of the community, anointed by the Spirit as that community is in Christian faith. When they speak out and teach, they should do so in reliance on the best insights in the community. They should not indulge in a magical view of office that would see their teaching as uniquely authentic regardless of the quality of their learning and faith. They should imitate the Lord who "became as men are" (Phil. 2:7). An acknowledgement of their fallibility will not deprive them of a hearing in an honest world. Since the role of authority is to stimulate, Church leaders should promote a free and vigorous study of theology. A good relationship between authority figures and intellectuals (not that the twain never unite) is the mark of a healthy society.

Finally, in a time of rapidation and "gapping," it would seem that democratically-elected popes and bishops would most effectively serve fixed terms of office. After this time, these men (or women) could return to the Christian community in a priestly or lay role. Such a *kenosis* is not demeaning or dogmatically infeasible.

In asserting the authority of the Church councils, the juridical paradigm has been paramount. All ecumenical councils are thought of as having equal value, and papal approbation has been seen as determinative of ecumenicity. Bellarmine said a council not ratified by the pope is "void." His position seems to be: "Wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, with proper approbation, there am I in the midst of them." A recent study wonders if Martin V might have been too distracted to ratify Constance validly and render it ecumenical. It is as though the pope had a power to will the council into ecumenical being, if he had his wits about him. Likewise, the unanimity of the council fathers is seen as a sign of divine approbation.

More realistically, a council is as valuable as it is representative of the work of the Spirit. Councils attempt, with varying success, to reflect the purest streams of the Church's current doctrinal consciousness. Such serious attempts, as Calvin readily conceded, deserve a most serious hearing. But when a council has done its best, its words do not become the words of God. The American bishops' Pastoral, commenting on the witness of the faithful, says that it is not numbers that count but "who is speaking and what manner of faith is his. Numbers count only if those who comprise the total really know." This incontrovertible insight applies also to the teaching of bishops, whether conciliar or extra-conciliar. The value of their teaching depends on what they know and on the quality of their faith.

The definitions of past councils, then, merit deep reverence. They represent important efforts to give voice to the faith of the Church. If they should be later corrected, as has happened, it is because they are imperfect. Like maps made centuries ago with imperfect tools, they must be open to correction by subsequent discovery. A radical dispensability attaches to any verbalization of religious truth.

Dogmatic Traditions

The authority of dogmatic traditions has been stormily discussed over the years. Some Christians saw only the scriptures as speaking for God and proclaimed revelation closed with the apostolic era. Others merited the rebuke of Jesus: "You put aside the commandment of God to cling to human traditions" (Mark 7-8).

It is close to saying that God is dead if we say he is mute and no longer revealing. Without demeaning the fundamentally "normative" character of the revelation communicated through scripture in the Church, we must say that revelation is not closed. To dogmatize that post-

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biblical words deserve no hearing is dogmagenic deafness. The spirit of all religious experience must be tested to see if it is of God.

The ecumenical age need not shrink from the Marian dogmas or from purgatory, hell or infallibility. The question is not whether these dogmas are found in scripture or defined in council, but whether we can find in them meaningful expressions of Christian experience. The tenure of dogmas does not establish them but it does recommend that they be taken seriously. Healthy traditionalism is concerned for the leakage that besets the collective human consciousness. The dogmas are deeply felt words from man's religious past, words which may represent peak experiences.

In approaching these polemic-scarred words, we must beware a literal fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is easily mistaken for orthodoxy since its rigid reductionism seems safe and preservative. Rather, in the freedom of faith could we not listen anew for accents of the Spirit? Is the Assumption another empty tomb to trouble the apologetes and brace the mariologists? Or, seeing Mary typologically, could the appearance of this dogma have been a strong mythic endorsement of corporality in an atmosphere tainted by Encratite, Manichean and Stoic poisons? The Immaculate Conception, rather than a juridical non-imputation, might express Christian joy and hopefulness at the appearance of life in a world that has heard God's voice. Rather than seeing purgatory in spatio-temporal simplicity as a punitive prelude to bliss, could this myth not be touching the great scriptural truths of God's holiness and man's radical sinfulness, and expressing the need for purification (purgare) before union. The term "infallibility" is clumsy in an age that recognizes the fallibility of language, the partiality of concepts and the processuality of truth. Yet, the dogma of infallibility might well transcend epistemology. It may be an appreciation of the power of God's truth and the already-begun victory of his Spirit. The old theological metaphor, *ex opere operato,* however infelicitous an expression, need not be discarded with the shortcomings of past theologians. This theology was replete with an appreciation of the reality of God's life-giving presence and the meaningfulness of man's approach to God. In whatever bedraggled wrapping traditions may come to us, we should not be too quick to discard them; we should rather be open to the possibility of enriching content.

Desacralization costs us the comfort of false security. Yet, nothing could justify the continued sacralizing of office and book. The urgent task of theology is to develop a criteriology for testing the Spirit. Contact with the ineffable can never be wholly methodized, involved as it is with mystery, with affectivity and intuition. Yet the task remains. Admitting where we have been and what we have done is a necessary first step.

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BOOKS

From Bertrand Russell to Sigmund Freud by way of the New Church

The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944

Little, Brown and Co. $8.95

WARREN COFFEY

One comes away from this second volume of Russell's book liking Russell, on the whole, and wishing him most of what through most of his life he has apparently wished for himself, peace varied, if possible, by an occasional No Popery riot. Russell's first volume went off like an Ivy Compton-Burnett comedy: a country house, crazy Uncle Rollo, daft Aunt Agatha, cold baths, wool, a boy logician being raised by an iron Noncomformist grandmother. The boy logician goes to Cambridge, makes the Apostles, and later writes *Principia Mathematica.* He eventually discovers kissing and in an atmosphere of passionately exchanged bicycle clips, speeches to the working class, wool, and teetotal, marries a Quaker heiress, against the wishes of the iron grandmother. The Furies are there in the wings, also as in the Ivy Compton-Burnett books, but the action is essentially comic.

Then comes World War I, a bad war for logicians as for everybody else, and casts a long tragic shadow in Russell's life and in his book. He prints as epigraph for this record of the next thirty years of his life a Blake poem, "The Defiled Sanctuary," in which a snake vomits poison over the altar of a golden chapel. Russell explains later that he often had occasion in these years to reflect that all the century's bright promise and all human relationships had become defiled. He broke with many of his friends to oppose World War I and eventually went to prison for his pains. He saw his dearest friends die and lived himself through broken-up affairs and marriages and the disappointment of his hopes for happiness from children. He saw at first hand, partly in shock, partly in derision, a new Soviet tyranny take over in Russia just after the Revolution. He saw himself drummed out of Cambridge by his fellow dons for unconventional ideas and, years later, in 1940, was hunted out of the City College of New York by the Roman Catholic interest and denounced by its agent, Judge McGeehan, who clearly knew his way around the thesaurus, as "lecherous, libidinous, lustful, venerous, erotomaniac, aphrodisiac, irreverent, narrow-minded, untruthful, and bereft of moral fiber."

Finally, in 1944, Russell left America to go back to England which this time was fighting a world war which he believed in.

As it is necessary in a minute to go on to Higher Things, let me say here to the Yeah-but-do-I-have-to-read-it? people, yes, you have to read it, but take a transfer and get off at p. 216, where, for reasons probably honorable to the man but certainly fatal to the autobiographer, Russell abandons the candor of the earlier parts and decides not to tell much about his second and third wives or about his children. As a result of the blur this brings into the writing —also what look like the first signs of a mind aging—there is almost nothing in the second half of this volume that could not have been written by a litigious vestryman or by C. P. Snow. This complaint does not arise, I think, from disappointed tabloid-type expectations ("Eccentric Peer Wheels Marriage-Bed Through Streets"), but from an idea that Russell's worst failings as a writer are abstractness (the hankering for Plato's cave) and indignant sprawl (the hankering for Hyde Park) and that much of the best writing in both volumes of the *Autobiography* comes in the shrewd analyses of character and character types, of D. H. Lawrence, for example, also Frieda Lawrence, and Lytton Strachey, Keynes, Shaw, Whitehead, and above all the incisive Russell family portraits and that of Alys Pearsall Smith, the first Mrs. Russell.

Now for Higher Things. The *Autobiography* is very acute on writers and writing, which may provide the shortest way of getting at the essential Bertrand Russell. Tell me what you read, and I'll tell you what you . . . well, anyway Bertrand Russell likes *Ecclesiastes* but doesn't like D. H. Lawrence, whom he writes off as a fashionable madman, adding maliciously but plausibly that Lawrence got all his ideas from Frieda anyway and was much prouder of having married an aristocratic wife than was becoming to him as a writer. Russell was quick, on the other hand, to recognize the promise of T. S. Eliot and to help with counsel, and cash, when Eliot was struggling to support himself and his first wife and get established as a writer. The *Autobiography* prints letters that offer fascinating glimpses of the Eliots in those years, including a letter from Eliot's mother obviously trying to enlist Russell's help in discouraging her son from entering on a poet's chancey life: "I have absolute faith in his Philosophy but not in the vers libres."

But the most remarkable of all of Russell's relationships with literary men was with Joseph Conrad. Though they knew each other over some years, they never spent much time together. Yet they felt an extraordinary closeness and intellectual bond, and Russell apparently named both his sons after Conrad. Among Conrad's books, *The Heart of Darkness* and *Typhoon* became particular favorites with Russell, the one for its knowledge of the passionate madness that lies not far beneath the civilized surface of life and the other because of the plain, unheroic sense of duty it prescribes as the only thing for running in heavy seas.

We are not used to thinking of Bertrand Russell posed in the robes of the tragic muse—antic knickers have seemed sometimes more his line—but Russell

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does have in common with Conrad a brooding sense of the futility of most human endeavor and the way in which men's striving is mocked by a destructive universe. Russell, as his *Autobiography* makes unmistakable, has often lived in spectral loneliness and near-despair and only by iron will has kept sane and working. In books like the *Autobiography* and the earlier *Conquest of Happiness* we see at his most eloquent the brooding private Russell behind the Bertie of the thin and cocksure pronouncements on public questions. This sense of the tragic has kept Russell from ever being a trivial man in the way Keynes and Strachey, for example, in the Bloomsbury generation of Apostles that succeeded Russell's were merely trivial and clever; and the same tragic sense, with its attendant skepticism, has generally kept Russell from being taken in by faction the way another Cambridge generation would be taken in by the Soviet Union in the Thirties.

As he looks back in this volume of his *Autobiography,* Russell sees the philosophical enterprise as not having got much of anywhere in this century. He himself inclines to the idealism of Bishop Berkeley—without, of course, any of the Anglican faith of Berkeley—as the philosophy most consistent with a mathematical-logical view of the universe. But Russell has developed over the years a highly civilized irony about the fate of philosophers and their work, an irony exemplified in this comment on his mail: "I get many letters from Hindus, beseeching me to adopt some form of mysticism, from young Americans, asking me where I think the line should be drawn in petting, and from Poles, urging me to admit that while all other nationalism may be bad that of Poland is wholly noble."

But despite many similarly pleasant and instructive moments the second volume of Russell's *Autobiography* is not up to the first. The demands of paternal and husbandly reticence seem to cause most of the trouble, but there are hints too that age has become a problem. And that is a great pity. This is a brave, testy man.

Exploding Church

FREDERICK FRANCK

Delacorte Press, $6.50

The Catholic Left

JAMES COLAIANNI

Chilton Book Company, $5.95

The Priest in Crisis

DAVID P. O'NEILL

Pflaum Press, $5.95

MARY DALY

One of the most loaded words in the contemporary religious vocabulary is "crisis"—and with good reason. The current crisis in Catholicism is described and analyzed in each of these three books—all of which are insightful without being in the strict sense scientific or scholarly. This kind of writing has evident limitations, but it also has value as stimulus to discussion and further research.

Frederick Franck's book is the work of an artist. It should not be surprising, then, if the product is somewhat impressionistic. The book reflects the personal spiritual quest of the author, who is the product of an agnostic education in the Catholic milieu of the southern provinces of Holland as it existed in his youth. Having lived the past thirty-five years outside of Holland, Franck analyzes the effect of his early environment: "I have absorbed the Catholic pattern of culture thoroughly but ambivalently. This means that I have attached my entire religious, spiritual development to Catholic symbolism without ever having been a victim of the local religio-social compulsions."

While in Rome as an artist, drawing Vatican II, Franck encountered avant-garde Catholics from his native Holland and was astonished to discover that he felt "intuitively identified" with them. The experience helped give birth to the idea of this book, which is essentially a compendium of material gathered during interviews with thirty-seven avant-garde Dutch Catholics (18 priests, 2 Ladies of Bethany, 3 ex-priests, 14 other laymen of various professions). What the author was looking for, in the presentation of his questions, was not labored and technical theological replies, but rather authentic personal responses.

The responses are indeed interesting. All respondents were assured that their anonymity would be respected if they so desired. Their unanimous rejection of anonymity, in the author's opinion, may well be the most significant result of the survey. The answers to the various questions on the Church-dogma-morals are often refreshingly blunt. An example of this quality can be seen in the answer of one participant to the question: "What is your attitude toward papal infallibility?" Answer: "You try and sell that nowadays!"

The respondents to Frederick Franck's questionnaire in general displayed great impatience with ecclesiastical politics, jargon, legalism, hypocrisy. The answers reveal a high degree of tolerance of ambiguity. There is a relativizing, myth-breaking process evidenced, rather than black and white rejection or acceptance. This is revealed in answers concerning the Creed, for example. Most still saw value in it, but there is a clear rejection of verbal fundamentalism. Again, the responses on ecumenism crystallized the prevailing mentality. Franck found a general agreement that ecumenism is only meaningful if it encompasses the whole of humanity. Many found the word obsolete and irritating, suggestive of inter-institutional tea parties.

The later chapters of Franck's book give the results of interviews with liberal Catholics outside Holland. Not surprisingly, the same attitudes are found to exist among Catholics in other countries. The book does not pretend to reveal how widespread the opinions and attitudes expressed actually are, in terms of numbers and percentages. This is not its function. It does describe the shape of an emerging mentality and cannot easily be dismissed.

James Colaianni's book helps to fill out the picture of the Catholic left as it is manifested in the United States. Donald Thorman in his introduction to this book adds historical perspective, pointing out that the Left which Colaianni describes is quite unlike the Left in the

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past, even the recent past, which was characterized by fierce dedication to the institutional Church. The essential difference between the dissenters of the past and the Left of the present is that the latter feel no great loyalty to the institutional Church and are raising questions about the validity of the institution itself.

The Left that interests James Colaianni does not find expression in the "modernizer," who never really gets to the radical questions, contenting himself instead with "up-dating" useless baggage from the past, with putting a new coat of paint over the old. The major concern of this book is more radical: it is with the underlying pathology of institution. For Colaianni, the Church is of course not merely the institution we have too closely identified with it. Rather, it is "a community of persons living in an incarnational world, graced by the presence of God." That is to say, it is the whole human race. This, however, does not exclude an interest in the institution, which still has tremendous influence. Speaking of Groppi, for example, the author points out that he is feared precisely because he is a herald of what could happen if substantial numbers of white Catholic priests ever decided to take the Gospel seriously. Meanwhile, many continue to remain irrelevant, torturing themselves with non-problems. He cites the example of a priest concerned about contraception who asked in anguish: "What is the ordinary magisterium of the Church anyway?" The difficulty is that many still do not see that they are bothering about terms which are in the process of abandonment, that their obsession with verbal constructs is distracting them from reality.

The fact that some people have made a remarkable odyssey is exemplified in one of the most impressive documents cited by Colaianni—a column of Monsignor J. D. Conway, which appeared in 1967, not long before his death. In that column Father Conway ironically referred to a book of apologetics he had written in the past, in which he "deftly refuted a variety of standard accusations and arguments against the

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





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Church." He described the content of the book: "I showed clearly that the Inquisition was advanced juridical procedure in its day, that the condemnation of Galileo was quite plausible, that celibacy was the glory of the priesthood in historical fact as well as in fervent ideal, and even that Spanish bullfighting was an edifying demonstration of courage and art." Conway then added that he was glad the book was out of print.

The fact is, that while some remarkable Catholics of the older generation have been able to grow and adapt in this manner, the transition has not been easy, especially not for those whose sense of personal identity has been linked closely to identification with a moribund ideology. Some have tried to find a way out by employing a weak notion of "balance," of "following the middle road"—which may be an escape for the timid, but hardly profound or satisfying. James Colaianni's book presents an abundance of evidence that the time for such timidity and caution has passed.

At first glance it would appear that the two books we have just discussed are more general in scope, whereas David P. O'Neill's book addresses itself specifically to the identity crisis of priests. In fact, however, the problems raised by Father O'Neill are not limited to priests. What he is writing about is in large measure the Christian identity crisis, even though the application is to one group.

Certainly there are specific problems facing priests, who often find themselves "masters of an eroded competence which seems increasingly irrelevant." This is to some extent true of all professionals facing the contemporary knowledge explosion. There is always the problem of "keeping up" in one's field. In the case of priests the problem is more complex. Even aside from the fact that in most cases theological training is sadly outdated and inadequate, there is also the critical problem of the changing role of the priest, who no longer can be accepted as "expert" in all matters simply by reason of being a priest.

One of the most interesting problems discussed by David O'Neill is that of freedom and initiative. The authoritarian notion of the Church is hardly conducive to creativity. The problem of maintaining that internal freedom which sparks creativity is acute for anyone who takes the institution seriously; it is doubly acute for the priest, who in some manner acts as official representative. If he has some measure of contact with modern reality and at the same time tries to adapt his thinking to the official "line" he falls into a "double-think" situation which hampers free development of personality and thought.

O'Neill introduces some fascinating ideas into the picture when he discusses the Church as a communications system, pointing out that "an interest in modern communication is not a kind of optional extra for the Church, for communication is the mode of its being." Moreover, "the Church, like a telephone system, is a community facility in the area of communication and should have its links with the whole community." O'Neill uses some recent studies in cybernetics to develop the concept of the Church as a communications network. This is especially enlightening in regard to the pathology of the modern Church, which may be compared to a self-steering system that blocks its own internal information. This happens when group intelligence is ignored. The author sees this view of the Church as affecting the concept of the priest, who should serve his people by seeing that channels of communication are open—with the world "outside" and within the Church. It is evident that this vision of the Church is loaded with implications which are still to be worked out, and which are of wider interest and significance than application to the role of priests.

David O'Neill gives expression to many insights, seminal ideas, which could be expanded in volumes. More or less in passing, for example, he mentions the fact that priests, having been educated in a highly dogmatized and essentialist theological system have tended to extend this dogmatism into other areas of specialization. For example, those who have entered the field of psychology often "have tended to make their psychology into a new dogmatism which ends up far away from the fluidity and flexibility of the mature psychologist." Again, this may be applicable not only to priests but also to other Catholics whose education has been under the same influences. It would be interesting to consider the possible effects of a parochial education upon scholarly and professional work outside the field of theology.

None of these books has "answers" but all throw light upon the problems, and O'Neill's work, in particular, pushes beyond description to insight.

Freud: Political and Social Thought

PAUL ROAZEN

Knopf, $6.95

DAN SULLIVAN

A political science don at Harvard, Roazen aims his study at colleagues' persisting indifference to both the vistas and the Gordian knots bequeathed their discipline by Freud. By arguing the fact and broad import for scholars of the Unconscious, Roazen's cross-disciplinary effort merits an attention it may not get from either group. He will probably fail to dissuade the "realist" political theorist from the practical presupposition that he thinks, feels and works in a sovereign here-and-now. The psychoanalyst, in turn, may prejudge R's outsider-critique as another intrusive impertinence, like Norman Brown's or Philip Rieff's. But for some, Roazen will enrich the background of issues now agitating the front-line metapsychologists here and abroad: "am I really doing what I say—and what others collusively agree—I do."; *"where* do I spend my time."; and even more simply, *"how* am I?" If Roazen is not among the avant-garde challengers of our notion of the "real," and, hence, of therapy's very goal, his exposition of the classic contours of resistance, repression and the Unconscious should prepare readers for today's deeper ferment.

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Roazen's study is also welcome for introducing, in brisk but scholarly fashion, several other key tensions and contributions of analytic history. One crucial thread in this history is the painfully slow and uncertain growth of Freud's limited but inspired methodology, whose relative success ought to hearten psychologists hopeful for a deepening rapprochement between specialization and humanistic breadth in their work. The explosive repercussions on our legal, penal and educational systems of Freudian findings on the much talked-about but seldom reflected-on, inverse links between guilt, punishment, and crime are explored with compelling force, but some of Roazen's peers may find even more unsettling the notion that the Freudians have revitalized a cogent framework of the deeply and universally "human" in developing an essentially given, innermost structure of psychic health, freedom and equilibrium. Unequivocal appreciation will be felt by all, though, for Roazen's logical ordering of complex materials, for his compassionate but exacting critical sallies, and for using language cautiously but spiritedly.

Theoretically, Roazen's perspective is more narrow and dated than he can acknowledge. The work's very virtues, such as organizational clarity, can suggest a tranquil digestion of many of the acidic issues raised by today's metapsychologists. No mention is made of the seriously topsy-turvy questions concerning mass-repression and the "real" raised over the past decade, with increasing force, by thinkers like Maslow, Marcuse, Laing, Brown, Winnicott, Perls, etc., all of whom R. may judge as "romantic anarchists." But the new "order" of selfhood and dialogue in depth they have tasted, through "existential analysis," Gestalt group encounter, drugs, and "sensory awakening," may be far less "anarchical" and "romantic" than the ironic detachment and sensory impoverishment we now ingest. At times, even, Roazen's work smacks of being a beefed-up thesis, its amiably rational style reflecting a mind behind which one can sense no pressure, unless it be that for a work on Freud for one's escapist colleagues. Yet, not only by evoking the asynchronism of inner and outer, but by tracing vigorously and logically the course of orthodox analytic development, Roazen has clearly ended by giving us something of notable worth. In this estimate I am doubtlessly prejudiced by his recasting a concept of the "human" which I share, of man as limitless, qualitative and ambiguous, as against the obstinate atomizing behaviorism of academic psychologists and political scientists. "Academic political science . . . has been too concerned with brute data and has been afraid to deal with the more elusive qualities of experience, or at least to acknowledge so doing"; "that psychological understanding is first of all a question of the sensitivity of the fingertips has yet to be conceded."

Unfortunately, Roazen's own "fingertips" are mirrored within the artificially limited research-scope he set himself, chiefly Freudians and neo-Freudians up through the nineteen-fifties. Such boundaries permit gross remarks, about a "unity of mood" among today's analysts, about there having been no great analytic insights since Freud, about interest in the Unconscious having abated. Briefly mentioning Klein, Roazen appears basically unfamiliar with the ongoing revolt triggered by her "British School." Only slight and irrelevant attention is paid Winnicott, and the revolutionary names of Fairbairn and Guntrip appear not at all. Nor is there any attention paid Continental thinkers, like Bion, Binswanger, Lacan, Ricoeur, Boss et al. A fuller acquaintance with even today's American scene would have warned Roazen of the mounting attack on the entire corpus of "ego psychology," as, for example, Freudian theological assumptions about sex as something alien, irrational and anarchical. Fairbairn, especially, has transposed and turned on its head Freud's basically Platonic-Pauline view of Eros as mechanistic and quantitative, replacing it with the integrally personalist and dynamic framework of "object-relations."

In Roazen, though, we find the easy, constant use of terms like "primitive

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drives" and "id mechanisms" to describe sexual desire, along with a claim that Freud finally overcame his rationalist bias. As if it were already settled what "civilized," "sexual" and "schizophrenic" mean, Roazen agrees blandly with the older Freudians that it is impossible to adjust "instinctual claims" to the "demands of civilization," and declares that "instinctual frustration serves as incentive to ego development." From Roazen's viewpoint, his approach to the twin problems of sex-instinct and ego-civilization is "balanced," but the underlying *experiential* presuppositions of this middle-way go unexamined. Rather than turn to the important repercussions of this view of sex on one's understanding of neurosis and one's view of therapy's function, I will point to what seems to me the central key to this view of sex—a key found in Roazen as in Freud and others. It is contained in the repeated insistence that the "sex urge" is innately *futile* and *unsatisfying*, and thus must be sublimated.

The "erotic drives" themselves, Roazen says, drive us toward their own "sublimation." It is doubtful that such an extraordinarily honest and bleak rationalization of one's sexual experience has been made in recent analytic literature. For to say this is not only to set the course of therapy along "enlightened," moderately ascetic-rationalist lines, but it also is to point at the dual negative experience of woman and romantic love, implying with Freud that both are "over-estimated." While Roazen does not share Freud's overt misogyny, he does lean toward a fixed view of the "Feminine" along the classic lines, thus making woman's destiny a frozen function of man's. Where we must begin is with Freud's admission that he could never give himself to politics because of its extreme "uncertainty;" Freud goes on, "a man like me cannot live without . . . a consuming passion. . . . I have found my tyrant, and in its service I know no limits. My tyrant is psychology." As Freud admits again elsewhere, he is essentially "a conquistador, an adventurer." He must have, in brief, endless horizons for knowing and loving. Which is why Freud failed to love woman, as he found her, limited, irrational and enigmatic, and why he attacked sexual love as illusory and futile. Like Freud, Roazen's main description of defense mechanisms and sublimation occurs in those pages where he is talking about love as defenseless against suffering, about normality being the capacity to suffer and endure. Let R. examine the sociological ingredients of woman's dehumanization, and he will come to a different prospect of sexual desire's chance of finding an unlimited and consuming passion in the female beloved. The horizon, in turn, must radically alter one's view of mind-body distance, one's general "realism," and one's sense of what therapists ought to be doing.

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DOWNSIDE
REVIEW
Fall, 1968

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Edgar Hardwick

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Leopards in the Temple
DAVID GALLER
Macmillan, $4.95

Body Rags
GALWAY KINNELL
Houghton Mifflin, $4

Goodbye, but Listen
MARK McCLOSKEY
Vanderbilt University, $4

SAMUEL HAZO

When there are three books of poems waiting to be reviewed, there inevitably arises the temptation to indulge in comparative judgments. Which one will be the "best of the group"; which, the "weakest"? Yet, comparative judgments most often criticize the critic rather than the books being considered, revealing merely his tastes, his predilections, his favorites. In reality, however, there is no competition. No one—not even David Galler—will write another or better *Leopards in the Temple*. No one—not even Mark McCloskey—will write another or better *Goodbye, but Listen*. No one—not even Galway Kinnell—will write another or better *Body Rags*. These books are and will remain what they are, and commenting on what they are is the first business of a critic.

David Galler is an erudite man, and his erudition is both an asset and occasionally an impediment. It is an impediment when allusions in a poem call attention to themselves to such a point that the entire poem hinges on their being instantly understood. This is true of "The Suitor." It is not true of the superb four-part poem "Battle Styles" where a reader's knowledge of the Persians and the Babylonians is incidental

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to his comprehension of the poem. "The Other Chaplin," like "Battle Styles," touches on the same archetypes. You need not have seen Chaplin's "Limelight" to know what Galler means when he says

A retired clown gave a conceited
Picture that seemed quite right (recalling
The brutal shoes and waspish cane)
And bored appropriately, falling
In love with a virgin ballerina.
I was aesthetically satisfied
By his tedious, doomed tries to win her,
As by his arrogance at each
Conspicuous failure.

And yet David Galler as David Galler has an equally clear eye for right now, right here. In "Fog," he writes of that source of displacement that only the fog-ridden know:

Keeping the image live
Of where I started from, I gain some sense
Of where I stand, so long as I move on.

The same presence characterizes "The Passion" and the postwork ennui of "A Compensation"—

And suddenly such peace! Soft to the touch,
These papers; words, mere ink; my knuckles jut
Gently against my lids. And I can't take much
More of I don't know what.

My first reaction to Mark McCloskey's *Goodbye, but Listen* was an infallible example of the fallibility of the reviewer-critic. I was miffed by the book at first sight, perplexed by the idiom and, like all perplexed people, inclined to say that I didn't like what I was having trouble understanding.

Here is a poet who does what all poets should do—he experiments at the frontiers of language, he forges meanings, he dares words into new and beautiful alliances. And it is not just linguistic virtuosity I'm talking about; he has a vision to share. Consider, for example, this final stanza from his elegy to Cecil Hemsley:

The dream is done when dusk invents my eyes
And rain falls to sharpened air.
The houses seem as through a telescope
Reversed; minute and sinister,
Someone floats away across the street.
Puddles shine like broken glass.
I remember now that he is dead,
And know that I was bound to him.

Anyone who takes risks with words has to be careful of merely being idiosyncratic. Hopkins and Hart Crane, despite all their excellences, were not above lapsing into mere idiosyncrasy at times, indulging in what Donne referred to as a "concupiscence of wit." I say without qualification that McCloskey's bouts with meanings are singularly free of such indulgences. By their subtlety and their abandon they insinuate themselves into consciousness so that the meanings are felt or sensed without having to be accounted for discursively.

Galway Kinnell has already demonstrated that he is a significant contemporary poet in *What a Kingdom It Was* and *Flower Herding on Mount Monadnock*. The talent in those books is still evident in his new testament *Body Rags,* particularly when he reveals his phoenix self in "Another Night in the Ruins" or toys with memories of former loves while tanning his "deathward flesh in the sun."

But this book raises both questions and doubts for me—not about Kinnell as a poet since he has already proved that—but about particular lines in particular poems. Why, for example, should anyone think these passages poetic?

Clouds
rise by twos out of the jungle, cross
under the moon, and sink
into
the peak called Font-des-Serpents

Where is "The Apocalypse of Lamech"?
Where is the "Iliupersis"?
Where is the "Khavadhaynamagh"?
Where is the "Rommant du Pet au Deable"?
Where is "The Book of the Lion"?

In the first excerpt I'm left on the level of pure description (as I'm similarly left by such whole poems as "La Bagarede," "Night in the Forest," "In the Farmhouse"). In the second excerpt, I wonder if Kinnell's preference for the exotic in the citation of titles or place names (or rarely encountered adjectives and nouns) is merely a device to excite "poetry" out of mere strangeness? If not, why the inclination toward "dophophyllidiums," "ornithosuchus," "stellie," "fer-de-lances," "khoskura," and so forth. Admitting my ignorance at first reading, I ask if poetry



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is enhanced even when this ignorance is compensated for. I doubt it. Of course, these are reservations that can be ignored with impunity since more people will and should read Mr. Kinnell's book than will read this review, but I say them anyway. Yet, I would be remiss if I did not add that the Dantesque and and labyrinthine mood of "The Last River" is hard not to keep remembering, and "The Correspondence School Instructor Says Goodbye to his Poetry Students" is for me on a par with Kinnell's "To a Child in Calcutta," "For Robert Frost," "On Frozen Fields," "Easter" and "The Avenue Bearing the Initial of Christ into the New World."

The Secular Congregation

ROBERT RAINES

Harper & Row, $3.95

DAVID KIRK

We live in a world of rapid change in the forms, methods and values of life. There is in us a great ambivalence toward this change. We may be fascinated

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participants in the contemporary movements and centers that are producing it, and yet we also may draw back, fearful of leaving the old ways and values, fearing the new, which only gradually reveals its characteristics. This ambivalence is especially true of church life and is naturally reflected in the attitudes of both clergy and laymen.

The Secular Congregation strikes a blow at this ambivalence and demonstrates how the balance of church life was tipped on the side of creative experimentation, involving both clergy and laymen, in particular local situations. Here is a book attempting to show how churches can explore the expanding frontiers of ministries. There are interesting descriptions of how the parish of the First Methodist Church in Germantown, Penn., was forced by circumstances to open up to the world and to their neighbors. The crisis was not unusual: finances, race, politics, sex. Somewhere along the way, some members of the parish decided that Jesus Christ had a lot to do with race, politics (especially during the Johnson-Goldwater election) art and the *Zoo Story*, which they wanted to use in their liturgy.

The struggle then was between the pietist and the secular Christian. The *pietist* was church-centered and looked primarily for God in the Church, the sacraments and communal life. The *secular* Christian was world-centered, looking for God primarily in the world, its words, events and communal life. In the end, First Methodist's pietists and secularists decided to make a journey into the unknown together, working through and living through the pietist-secularist tension, sharing the same struggle for truth.

It is the conviction of Robert Raines that only as congregations are faithfully secularized can they be effective instruments of God's mission in the modern world. He believes that it is possible for "The secular congregation" to embrace all that is good in the new movement while holding to all that is good in the tradition of the Church.

There are at least two ways to work toward the future of the Church. There are the *reformers* who try to re-shape present forms of Church life. And there are the *revolutionaries* who seek to develop new forms in the light of the present and future of the Church in the world. They believe that freedom for new forms of life may require the death of the old forms.

The Germantown project seems to have elements of both; perhaps such a congregation demands a variety of shapes and forms.

It is interesting to note that the parish itself seems to take a reformer stance, while an associated project, Covenant House, seems to take a more revolutionary attitude. Although Covenant House is not institutionally or organizationally related to the First Methodist congregation, it grew out of the work of a few people of that parish. Covenant House began as an open-ended place of *being*; new structures of service were developed around actual local human needs and Covenant soon became a place of *doing*.

Is renewal subverted when new impulses are absorbed into present forms? I am not sure. Certainly, as described, the First Methodist congregation, which works within present structures, would seem more churchy, more clerical than Covenant House. Raines still speaks of clergymen in a "leadership" capacity in churches. I would think rather that leadership is the last word to be associated with ministry. The ministry, the charism of guidance, St. Paul calls it, means being second to none in *service*. "Leadership" is a special charisma, not an office, given to men like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Pope John. The declericalization of ministry is perhaps impossible within the context of the old institution.

I am not sure that the First Methodist Church of Germantown is a *secular* congregation yet. There is a lot of "de-churching" (I do not mean de-christianization) which must take place before one is secular. I am not sure a secular congregation exists at this moment within the confines of ecclesiastical domination.

But the point is that we are "between the times"; we are on the road. We have

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not found for the future a final definition or style which the past furnishes us with. *The Secular Congregation* describes the present level of Christian experiment: we have opened up and taken pivots, but we have not yet made a breakthrough to the new land.

The book will interest any Christian seeking a meaningful form of life. The lively descriptions of various projects—First Methodist, Covenant House, Wellsprings Ecumenical Center, The Glass Door, the Mental Health Mission Group—encourage us on our way, to seek to serve and live creatively, experimentally, even daringly in the particular and peculiar situation in which we are located. It is not a "how-to-do it" book. *Secular Congregation* may yield some guidelines and some pointers for comparable situations, but we should beware of making generalizations and ideology of their specific observations and results.

History of Ethics

VERNON J. BOURKE

Doubleday, $6.95

EDWARD LeROY LONG, JR.

This is an important, perhaps even a definitive, book. It is surely destined to be used as a panoramic guide to the development of Western moral philosophy, from approximately 500 B.C. to the present.

Bourke has set out to give a comprehensive account of the history of ethical theories in which "each type of ethics speaks for itself without conscious criticism from the writer . ." (p. 307). He has divided his treatise into five sections, four dealing with the past and one dealing with the present. The first part, sub-divided into three chapters, deals with Graeco-Roman theories and covers the period from the pre-Socratics to the neo-Platonists. The second part, entitled Patristic and Medieval Theories, also contains three chapters. One chapter deals with almost a thousand years of Christian thought; the second, with Jewish and Moslem ethics during the same period; and the third, with "Right Reason Theories" which came to dominate thinking during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. A third part of the book, entitled Early Modern Ethics, covers the period from 1450-1750. Here, likewise, three chapters are used to cover the material. One, entitled Humanist Ethics in the Renaissance deals with Platonic ethics in Italy and Britain, Aristotelian ethics, and (to the probable surprise of many readers) the ethics of the Protestant Reformers. The other chapters deal with the British scene (egoistic, Platonistic, and deistic ethics) and the highly rationalistic period on the continent (from Descartes to Kant). Section four, entitled Modern Theories, deals with eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It devotes one chapter to Britain (portrayed as the seat of utilitarian and subjectivist ethics); one to Germany (that is, to idealistic ethics); one to the Spiristic ethics of the Franco-Latin countries, and one to a quite different ethics, which Bourke terms "societal" and under which he deals with theorists like Comte, Marx, Berdyaev, Durkheim, *et al.*).

Each of these first four parts treats each geographical area chronologically. Individuals are discussed sequentially and the thought of each is compassed into a brief and succinct description of both his writings and the central ideas of his ethic. Sometimes this material comes pretty fast. In the chapter of Humanist Ethics in the Renaissance, for example, some fifty men are mentioned in nineteen pages. Quotations, usually limited to one or two from each of the more significant figures, are included. These seem wisely chosen to illustrate the central idea attributed to their respective authors.

With the beginning of the fifth section the chronological/sequential pattern is changed to a typological one. Contemporary ethical thinking is treated under five rubrics. Axiological ethics, basing decisions upon a consideration of values, includes thinkers like Franz C. Bretano, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann. Self-realization and utilitarian ethics are discussed in terms of men like T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, A.E. Taylor, Josiah Royce, and William James. Naturalistic ethics, which Bourke considers very much alive despite G.E. Moore's condemnation of the "naturalistic fal-



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lacy," include the work of Herbert Spencer, Sigmund Freud, and John Dewey. A fourth chapter discusses the development of the analytical tradition and its division between those favoring special symbolic language and the ordinary language group. Existential and phenomenological ethics are treated together in a chapter that concludes both the section and the book as-a-whole.

The change from chronological (with geographical subdivisions) to typological chaptering does not result in a basically different mode for presenting the material. Each chapter is still a compendium of short, succinct portrayals of individual thinkers and their views. This means that trends, movements, influences of one school upon another, and cultural factors that affect a particular ethic, while not ignored, are clearly not given much attention. Bourke seems a bit more aware that typological categories have limits (witness his uncertainty as to where to treat William James) than he is about the possible arbitrariness of geographical/chronological divisions.

Over a hundred pages of finely printed notes, bibliography, and index follow the three hundred pages of exposition. In the three dozen lines Bourke permits to carry his own perspective, coming at the conclusion of the fifth chapter of the fifth part of the book, he suggests that "what is needed now [in ethical reflection] is some spark of genius to provide a revised method of making judgments . . ." These will be based upon the experienced facts of human life and ". . . will keep us open to empirical data and the dimensions of human personality, without shutting us off from the exercise of reason and the light of intuitive understanding." (p. 308)

The book might have been improved or clarified in the following ways:

(1) It should have been entitled the History of Moral Philosophy, or the History of Philosophical Ethics. The material covered is almost exclusively concerned with the work of philosophers (or theological ethics when functioning philosophically). It clearly prefers rationalistic approaches (on page 295 existentialistic ethics are all but read out of true philosophy) and says very little about political and cultural atmospheres in which speculative thinking occurs.

(2) Perhaps it could have avoided the shift from chronological to typological exposition had more reflection been given to the perennial patterns that appear throughout all ethical reflection. As it stands the book might give the impression that there is a greater discontinuity between the past and the contemporary in ethical reflection than may be the case.

(3) The author's disinclination to intrude his own views into the exposition would not necessarily have precluded the more consistent use of summary and guideline paragraphs throughout the treatment. Some of the individual chapters end very abruptly (e.g. p. 189); others, with helpful and instructive summaries (e.g. p. 86). The very choice of categories and rubrics for the exposition itself—a sure necessity and justified intrusion of the author's own perspective—belies any inert objectivity to the treatment. A bit more specific and articulate analysis could improve the narrative.

(4) The publisher ought to have been persuaded to put the footnotes at the bottom of the page on which each reference occurs. But, barring that (which is difficult for financial reasons), to at least facilitate the "hunt and find" process. The present format has the book's title on the top of each left page, the sectional heading on the right. It would have been better to put the sectional heading on the left, the chapter title on the right. Then, notes could have been put under chapter title in the rear. As presently printed, one must first locate the chapter number before he can even begin to search for a reference. Books intended for scholarly purposes should be differently designed than those printed for casual reading.

Despite these limitations this is a clear and comprehensive treatment. Not many such secondary discussions of the history of particular aspects of human speculation are being produced today despite the growing knowledge which is constantly making it possible to improve upon older efforts. Used as a guide to further exploration of the individuals it mentions the book will surely be of value, both in the classroom and beyond.

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The Religious Community and the Secular State

KENNETH WESTHUES

Lippincott, $3.95

PAUL HANLY FURFEY

Westhues bases his discussion on the very reasonable theory that a religious community, to attain its purpose, must be a rather small, affectionally motivated, face-to-face group. That is to say, it must be a "primary group" in the language of the sociologists. In Apostolic times, the Christians living in a particular city formed a group of this sort. Thus, "the company of the believers" living in Jerusalem "were of one heart and one soul." However, as Christianity spread—and particularly after the Edict of Milan in 313—the primitive spirit became diluted. Christians became satisfied with a token commitment. They were indeed serious about saving their

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souls; but they were also concerned about "a thousand other things, from raising a family to getting rich."

The earliest religious communities represented a revolt against this growing spirit of this-worldliness within the Church. In their structure they were primary groups. In their loving daily contacts their members mutually encouraged one another to be unworldly.

As the years passed, the religious communities developed problems of their own. One was the problem of sheer size. When a monastery grows in numbers it reaches a point where each monk cannot know every other monk with real intimacy. The community becomes a "secondary group," that is, a group whose members are governed by explicit rules and a formal chain of command as they pursue some common purpose. They lose the advantages inherent in being a primary group. There was also the problem of adjustment between the religious community and the ecclesiastical bureaucracy, between the monastery and the diocese. What happened most frequently according to Westhues was the integration of monasteries into the Church structure "as performers of special tasks." The religious were persuaded "to accept such tasks as preaching against heresy or teaching Christian doctrine to children or making converts in distant lands."

Through the Middle Ages and into modern times the importance of religious orders "as performers of special tasks" continued to increase. An extraordinary example is furnished by the military religious orders such as the Templars or the Knights of Malta; even warfare became a specialized function of religious communities. The Society of Jesus perhaps represents the culmination of these tendencies. Here everything is subordinated to the loyal and efficient service of the Church. Quite consciously and frankly the primary group has been abandoned for the secondary group.

The mid-twentieth century is obviously a time of rapid change within the Church. Of particular importance in the present connection is "the shift from an otherworldly theology to a this-worldly theology, from the idea that God is good and the world is bad to the idea that God created the world and His will is that it be drawn to himself." Westhues believes that "nearly every reform in every community" reflects this new realization.

The adaption of communities to the new spirit seems rather uniformly to involve a return to the idea of the primary group. This is well illustrated by the Brothers of St. Joseph in Oklahoma City, a group which Westhues describes at some length. Canonically the Brothers are not a religious communiy at all, but a pious union. They are a genuine primary group of working men who live together, pool their resources, and seek Christian perfection in this way of life.

It seems to me that Westhues fails to realize how widespread the idea has become that holiness may well be sought through community life in a small primary group which serves as a base for service to one's fellows. There is a good deal of discussion along this line in established religious communities. For instance, I know one community of brothers which plans to experiment with the idea. Six or eight brothers will live together in a rented house. During the day they will work at various places in various jobs appropriate to the spirit of their community. As members of their total religious community they will be members of a secondary group; but their daily life will be the life of primary-group members. Nor is this experiment unique. A number of religious communities, both of men and of women, are testing out similar plans.

The ideal of sanctification through primary-group living has been extremely important among advanced social actionists here in the United States in recent decades. Here the Catholic Worker movement pioneered. Catholic Worker groups in various cities were intimate, face-to-face groups; out of their mutual love they drew the courage for social action, often heroic action. Many have followed this example: the Friendship House groups in New York, Chicago, and elsewhere, Fides House in Washington, Emmaus House in Spanish Harlem, and a recently founded Emmaus House in Washington.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 172)

commentators had the youthful audacity to mention Scripture, or allude to the writings of any of the apostles or saints. (The numerous quarrels between the Papacy and holy men and women in the past might seem to be relevant here, but only of course if one is willing to learn from the lessons of the past. . . .) The symposium of "leading Catholics" failed also to make any reference to prayer, the sacraments, sin, grace, or redemption; Christ was mentioned once, in order to recall *The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor*. . . .

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

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